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BY 
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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN 
HISTORY 
UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 
-ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the military and political implications of 
the United States' foreign policy towards Guatemala in the years 1961 to 1969. 
Guatemala was a key battleground of the Cold War in Latin America in the crucial 
decade of the 1960s. While greater scholarly attention has focused on the 1954 U.S. 
backed CIA planned cou~ in Guatemala, the events of the 1960s proved an equally 
significant watershed in U.S.-Latin American relations. 
Tue outbreak of a nationalist insurgency in Guatemala early in the decade 
provided the Kennedy Administration with a vital testing ground for its new 
counter-insurgency and civic action politico-military doctrine. Tue fear of another 
Cuba, combined with the growing political and social instability within Guatemala, 
increasingly drove U.S. policy makers first in the Kennedy and later in the Johnson 
Administration to adopt a largely military solution in Guatemala just as in South 
Vietnam with similar tragic results. 
Relying primarily on Presidential archival materials, government documents, and 
Spanish publications as the basis ofits analysis, this study demonstrates how 1) the U.S. 
transmutation of military doctrine and cultures warped civil-military relations within 
Guatemala, 2) assured the emergence of the Guatemalan military as the dominant force 
within society, and 3) inadvertently increased the very instability and conflict the U.S. 
hoped to stem within the region. 
This project demonstrates that by the late 1960s, due in significant part to U.S. 
11 
political and military inteivention, the manageable crisis of a small nascent guerrilla 
movement erupted into an all-out Guatemalan civil war whose tragic consequences 
reverberate to the present. 
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION 
On the night of November 12, 1960, two Guatemalan army officers -- Captain 
Chur del Cid and Colonel Rafael Sessan Pereira -- imprisoned in the Matamoros 
barracks for acts of rebellion against their government, escaped from their basement 
cells through the collusion of dissident officers within the Guatemalan Army. While 
attempting to make their way to a side gate of the barracks, they were spotted by an 
army colonel and captain' who rushed to sound the alarm. Captain Chur del Cid and 
Colonel Pereira immediately shot both brother officers down at point blank range. With 
the aid of nearly a hundred fellow conspirators, they quickly seized automatic weapons 
from the barracks armory, commandeered several jeeps and an armored car, and 
crashed through the Fort Matamoros' main gate headed for the Atlantic Coast.1 
This entire incident may have gone down as just another example of what the 
United States Department of State once referred to as "overheated Central American 
bravado"2 except that the daring Colonel Pereira was a part of a much larger scheme 
involving over a third of the officers in the Guatemalan Army. The colonel and his 
co-conspirators were bent on rebellion and not just flight. Arriving in darkness at the 
important Zacapa military base in northeastern Guatemala, Pereira and his compatriots 
pretended to be reinforcements and captured the garrison without firing a shot. Most of 
the soldiers at the base joined the revolt, others fled. Among the escapees was Colonel 
Ramon Gonzales, the commander of the Zacapa base. Racing along the dirt roads in his 
favorite English sports car, he reached the sleepy capital, Guatemala City, around dawn 
and gave the alarm. Military and government officials were stunned and incredulous. 
1 
No one had suspected either a coup or revolt from among the military . The tiny 
Communist Party and Fidel Castro were the current bogeymen of Guatemalan politics . 3 
While shock and confusion reigned in the capital, Pereira's rebel convoy which 
had swelled to near battalion size drove on toward the coast , increasing in numbers and 
enthusiasm at each village along the way. Several of the rebels camped outside the 
Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios, dressed in campesino garb, posing as rice dealers. The 
next morning they captured both the base and the port . They executed the colonel in 
command and began to distribute mimeographed tracts to nearby peasants and 
fishermen. Some of the pamphlets called for an overthrow of President Y digoras 
Fuentes because of his corruption and slavish devotion to the United States ; others 
espoused Marxist and Castroite revolution. Hundreds of peasants presented themselves 
to the rebels and asked for arms. The Guatemalan navy, consisting of only three vessels 
-- two of them actually personal yachts of the president -- escaped the capture of its 
main base and got away from shore in time to notify the capital through radio 
transmission , confirming the se1iousness of the revolt. 4 
A telegram arrived at the State Department from the U.S. embassy in Guatemala 
City a little after noon on November 13th, 1960. "Some kind of uprising Guatemala 
City aborted early this morning" , began U.S . Ambassador to Guatemala , John J. 
Muccio. 5 He then relayed considerably inaccurate and sketchy details of what had 
occurred so far. His report proved overoptimistic. 
By the afternoon of the next day Secretary of State , Christian Herter, apprised 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower who was vacationing in Augusta , Georgia , of the 
situation . It was becoming clear to numerous U.S. State Department and diplomatic 
2 
officials that events in Guatemala were splillllllg "out of control" and required 
immediate U.S. action. Guatemalan President Miguel Y digoras Fuentes had been 
engaged in a drinking bout at his country estate with a number of his colonel mends on 
the day of the revolt. In his autobiography My War with Communism, he claimed it 
was "a banquet." He kept calling Ambassador Muccio with alarming reports that 
Castro was involved in this rebellion, which had meanwhile spread to over a third of the 
Guatemalan military. Reports of skirmishes between Nicaraguan troops and Cuban 
"invaders" along the Costa Rican border further flamed U.S. fears.6 Complicating 
matters was the presence of some two thousand Cuban exiles being trained by the CIA 
for an invasion of Cuba at the La Helvetia plantation of conservative businessman 
Roberto Alejos in the province of Retalhulen in the remote northwestern region of 
Guatemala. 
By the evelllllg of November 14th, before President Eisenhower even gave 
orders for U.S. military intervention, the Guatemalan Air Force, as well as Cuban exiles 
and American CIA pilots flying from secret air bases near the capital, began bombing 
and strafing the rebels in Puerto Barrios and Zacapa, as a sort of trial run for their later 
operations in the Bay of Pigs. U.S. transport planes, on Eisenhower's orders, airlifted 
both Cuban mercenaries and loyal Guatemalan troops to siege lines outside the rebel 
strongholds. U.S. bombers flying from air bases in the Panama Canal Zone joined the 
attack. By November 16th, five United States naval vessels, including an aircraft canier 
with eighty-five jet fighter-bombers and a 2,000 man strong Marine amphibious group, 
arrived off Puerto Barrios, supposedly to "interdict a planned Cuban invasion of 
Guatemala in support of Castroite rebels. "7 The next day the revolt was finally crushed 
3 
without direct U.S. Marine inteivention. Most rebel officers surrendered. Dozens 
escaped, however , into the countryside where they soon formed the embryo of a 
guerrilla movement which fights in the Guatemalan jungles to this day. 8 
Although nowhere near as famous as the 1954 U.S. backed CIA planned coup 
in Guatemala, the revolt of November 13, 1960, and its immediate aftermath proved a 
watershed event for both U.S.-Guatemalan relations and the entire history of Central 
America. The revolt sparked the first serious insurgency in the Western Hemisphere 
since Augusto Sandino's war with the United States Marines in Nicaragua in the 1930s. 
It also elicited a determined reaction from three successive administrations in 
Washington. Beginning in the 1960s the United States, primarily in response to the 
perceived political and economic threat of the Cuban Revolution and this nascent 
guerrilla movement in Guatemala, began to exert increasing political influence on 
Guatemalan society, particularly in the areas of military aid, internal security, civic 
action and counterinsurgency training. Guatemala became a laboratory for the Kennedy 
Doctrine of nation building and defeating wars of national liberation in Latin America 
just as Vietnam became the model in Asia. Combined with other internal factors in 
Guatemalan society, United States military aid and doctrine increasingly polarized 
politics, warped economic development, repressed democratization and despite the 
lofty, even sincere, ideals of the Alliance for Progress, helped elevate the Guatemalan 
military from its traditional role of arbiter among numerous political factions to sole 
ruler of Guatemalan society. Before the decade ended some 10,000 Guatemalan 
civilians would lose their lives as a result of these developments. 
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This study will examine how political and social crisis first arose in Guatemala in 
the late 1950s as a consequence of the 1954 U.S. sponsored coup and the Eisenhower 
Administration's insistence in maintaining a strong anti-communist bastion in 
Guatemala. Washington's support for political repression and the crushing of internal 
dissent provided a key impetus for the later largely nationalist insurgency movement. 
The 1959 Cuban Revolution heightened the Eisenhower Administration's concerns for 
further revolutions in Latin America and the Caribbean. Eisenhower's response 
emphasized internal security and increased military and economic aid to keep 
Guatemala and other supposedly threatened nations firmly within the capitalist Western 
fold. 
This paper will demonstrate how the Kennedy Administration devised a much 
more sweeping two pronged strategy for opposing any communist intrusion into its 
vital Latin American sphere of influence. The Kennedy approach encompassed both 
Alliance for Progress economic aid and a new counter-insurgency and civic action 
security program. Guatemala became a prime testing ground for this comprehensive 
military, ideological, and geopolitical struggle against communism in the Western 
Hemisphere. The United States brought enormous influence to bear particularly in its 
championing of the Guatemalan military as the chief agent of stability and change. 
Washington frequently intervened in the volatile internal politics and social upheaval of 
Guatemala with often unintended yet almost always tragic results. 
When hopes for socio-political reforms and liberal economic development 
faltered by the mid-1960s, the Johnson Administration with its Mann Doct1ine 
increasingly turned to a strictly military solution in Guatemala strikingly similar to its 
5 
policy in both Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. The short term success of 
defeating most of the Guatemalan insurgents exacerbated the political climate of terror 
and fear, and crushed the last hopes for ameliorating the horrendous living conditions, 
racism and social injustice of Guatemalan society. In attempting to prevent a serious 
insurgency and social crisis in Guatemala , the United States helped set into place many 
of the key elements which led directly to both. 
6 
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CHAPTER II 
IMPACT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION ON THE UNITED STATES MILITARY 
AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO GUATEMALA 
On the morning of January 1, 1959, Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras 
Fuentes was enjoying the traditional New Year's breakfast of rum, orange juice and 
tamales when his Foreign Minister Unda Murillo whispered in his ear: "Batista has 
resigned. He has fled with all his ranking military and political supporters. It appears 
., 
Castro will run the new government ." 1 
Although neither Y digoras or his foreign minister seemed particularly alarmed at 
that moment (nor were most officials in the U.S. embassy in Guatemala City), Castro's 
revolution would have a profound effect on the politics and internal security of 
Guatemala for the next two decades. As Castro moved towards socialism and agrarian 
reform during his first year in power, he increasingly aroused the ire of the Eisenhower 
Administration, Guatemala's principal benefactor in both economic and military aid. 
The conflict between Castro and the Kennedy Administration almost led to nuclear 
war. 
The revolution in Cuba represented a serious blow to U.S. economic and 
strategic interests in Latin America. It also threatened to upset the favorable balance of 
power the United States had hitherto enjoyed in the Cold War. The containment 
policies of Truman, Kennan, Acheson and Dulles had been designed primarily for 
Europe , then expanded to Asia and the Middle East. Communism would be deterred at 
a safe distance in fairly exotic locales. Yet with a socialist revolt in the Caribbean, the 
Cold War, for the first time, seriously intruded upon the Western Hemisphere, 
8 
-Washington's own backyard and previous "safe zone." Castro's revolution violated two 
cardinal rules of Washington's Latin American policy. First, by expropriating U.S. 
property which Castro began in the summer of 1959, it challenged the doctrine of no 
expropriation without full and immediate compensation that had been the cardinal rule 
since the start of U.S. economic expansion in Latin America in the 1890s.2 Second, in 
the spring of 1960 Castro crossed the line of acceptable behavior by embracing 
communism and aligning ,Cuba with the Soviet Union in direct defiance of the U.S. 
position , ratified by the OAS, that communism was "incompatible with the institutions 
and way of life of the Western Hemisphere. 113 As humiliating and shocking as the 
Cuban Revolution was to the United States, a far greater threat emerged in the potential 
spread of Cuban style revolution throughout Latin America. While the United States 
could countenance the economic and strategic loss of a single island, it understandably 
feared the exportation of the Cuban model to other countries. Locked in a global 
struggle with the Soviet Union, successive administrations in Washington viewed the 
"loss" of any additional Latin American territory as a victory for their mortal enemy. 
The rise of fidelismo throughout Latin America made it clear that the United States 
faced an urgent challenge in developing new strategies for dealing with a completely 
unprecedented situation·-- a hemisphere that appeared to be on the verge of revolution.4 
One of the first places that revolution would break out was Guatemala. 
But before the Kennedy Administration developed a larger grand strategy 
against Castro style Communism in Latin America, the Eisenhower Administration 
reverted to a more characteristic response to destabilize and overthrow Castro's regime 
through covert action. This decision would eventually lead to an insurgency in 
9 
Guatemala. As early as November 1959, Eisenhower approved sabotage operations 
against Cuban sugar refineries, port facilities, and electrical power stations. On March 
16, 1960, CIA chief Allen Dulles went a step further in submitting a memorandum to 
the President entitled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime." Its 
stated objective was "to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one 
more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the 
U.S., in such a manner as ,to avoid any appearance of U.S . intervention."5 Allen Dulles 
and Eisenhower were both old hands at this type of clandestine operation, having 
carried off similar ones in 1953 in Iran against Premier Mossedegh and in 1954 in 
Guatemala against President Jacobo Arbenz. Revisionist Richard H. Immerman's 1982 
The CIA in Guatemala : The Foreign Policy of Intervention is probably the most 
thorough investigation of theUnited States' role in the 1954 coup to date. Immerman 
traces a direct link between the 1954 coup and the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, 
conducted in totally different circumstances, yet with the same easy assumption that the 
CIA could rig a counter-revolution in its favor without directly revealing U.S. 
involvement. Immerman made extensive use of newly declassified government 
materials under the Freedom of Information Act, oral histories, National Security 
Council and State Department memoranda from the Eisenhower Library as well as 
personal interviews. The one criticism of his work is that it deals almost exclusively 
with the U.S . side of the coup and its aftermath, and ignored the impact of Guatemalan 
domestic politics on the coup. 
Ironically, the CIA chose Guatemala as the training site for its secret invasion of 
Cuba, code named Operation Zapata , named oddly for the anti-American, pro-land 
10 
-reform hero of the Mexican revolution. Guatemala was in fact the obvious choice as 
the United States' most pliable ally in the region. In the years 1954-1959 in what 
amounted to a government salvage job after the economic and social dislocation of the 
1954 coup, Washington disbursed some $110 million in economic aid to tiny 
Guatemala. lbis figure comprised about a third of all U.S . economic aid to Latin 
America in the period . Having conspired, along with Guatemalan rightists, to 
overthrow the democratically elected reformist government of President Jacobo 
> 
Arbenz , the Eisenhower Administration felt duty bound to create a prosperous capitalist 
showcase state in Guatemala . It encouraged a tripling of U.S . investment in the 
country , vastly expanded Guatemala's military and totally reorganized the state's internal 
security apparatus. 6 Eisenhower's hard line stance in Guatemala reflected a ratcheting 
up of Cold War tensions around the globe in places as diverse as Iran, Formosa, and 
South Vietnam by his aggressive Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles felt that 
Marxist take-overs could be reversed and cited Guatemala as the first successful 
example. 
In the wake of the 1954 coup, the FBI , CIA and U.S. diplomatic personnel 
descended on Guatemala to begin instituting a drastic overhaul of the police and 
security network. In conjunction with Castillo Armas' Liberacion government , they 
helped establish the Guatemalan National Security Council (modeled after the United 
States') , the new Department of Security (modeled after the FBI) and the Defense 
Against Communism Department (modeled after the CIA). CIA personnel and 
Guatemalan security police drew up a "blacklist" of 70,000 "subversive suspects" from 
the Arbenz period which would become a primary reference book for government 
11 
associated right wing paramilitary groups throughout the 1960s.7 CIA officer David 
Philips in The Nightwatch revealed how he and other counter-intelligence officers 
sorted through Guatemalan records in the mid-1950s: 
I returned to Guatemala for a one month temporary duty 
assignment...as part of a team to assist the new government 
in sifting and evaluating the documents left behind when 
Arbenz and his friends abruptly went into the foreign 
embassies. The papers we found were an intelligence gold 
mine, filled with nuggets of information ... The 
CI-nicks-counter-intelligence officers -- who worked with 
me were ecstatic. These were pearls which could be fondled 
for years.8 
In 1956, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) - AID's 
predecessor instituted the first Office of Public Safety police training program in the 
Western Hemisphere in Guatemala. FBI and U.S. military advisers strengthened and 
reorganized the 3,000 man National Police, the secret Judicial Police and the Treasury 
Guard, Guatemala's Secret Service.9 A 1957 Office of Public Safety Memorandum 
clearly laid out the priorities of this reorganization: 
It may be assumed ... that the primary police function of 
protecting life and liberty and preserving the peace is in 
reality a secondary function of the police administration and 
executive management. Operations top level planning, 
intelligence gathering activities are singularly directed 
towards alertness and preparedness against 'the threat of 
the communists' instead of being directed against the army 
of criminals. 10 
Ronald M. Schneider's 1958 orthodox work, Communism in Guatemala, 
provides a good representation of U.S. fears of communist subversion in the region 
during the 1950s. But like its 1955 predecessor, Daniel James' Red Design for the 
Americas: Guatemala Prelude, its scholarship has been called into question for its 
exaggerated appraisal of the communist threat and its almost exclusive reliance on 
12 
extreme right wing sources and interviews with Castillo Annas' Liberacionista Army 
veterans. Post-revisionist historian Stephen G. Rabe has even suggested that the CIA 
helped finance Schneider's study. 11 
Even in this relatively early period, Washington began to view Guatemala as an 
ideal training ground for the U.S.'s larger security goals in the hemisphere. A 1958 
Public Safety memorandum spoke of the director's "pleasure regarding the project for 
· ' ) 
third-country training in Guatemala for Ecuadorians in border control methods and 
scientific surveillance techniques." The same document went on to cite "joint 
Guatemalan, Salvadoran and Honduran police training exercises near Guatemala 
City .... "12 
Still the government of President Castillo Armas, the U.S. designated leader of 
the 1954 coup (who had been a furniture salesman in Honduras when the CIA picked 
him) proved so inept, corrupt and repressive that no amount of American largesse 
succeeded in halting Guatemala's economic and political slide. When a deranged 
rightist officer assassinated C;istillo Annas in July 19 5 7, several officials in the United 
States and Guatemalan governments including U.S. ambassador David Sparks, 
expressed relief 13 In the election which quickly followed, massive voter fraud by the 
ruling party, the National Democratic Movement (MDN) cast doubt on its candidate 
Miguel Ortiz Pasarelli's victory. When the apparent true winner, Miguel Y digoras 
Fuentes, retired general and former Public Works Minister under the ruthless dictator 
Ubico, protested , Washington supported his call for new elections. An ailing Secretary 
13 
of State John Foster Dulles sought an end to political anarchy in Guatemala, which had 
increasingly become an embarrassment to United States' prestige. 14 
Y digoras won a plurality of 42% in the 1958 elections , running on a platform of 
nationalism and political reconciliation . His victory was ultimately decided in the 
National Assembly with considerable arm twisting by the new U.S. ambassador John J. 
Muccio , who conveyed the Eisenhower Administration's "strong desire for a stable and 
unified government. 1115 
Y digoras was therefore somewhat beholden to the United States despite the fact 
that four years previously th~ CIA had rejected him as a potential leader of the coup on 
the grounds that he was "too headstrong and unpredictable. "16 Guatemala owed the 
United States $18.2 million in development loans borrowed between 1955 and 1959 
and counted on a similar amount in direct U.S . economic grants for survival each year. 
In April 1960 when the CIA requested the creation of a secret training base m 
Guatemala for Cuban exiles bent on invading Cuba, Y digoras willingly complied . A 
$50,000 personal bribe , combined with $500 ,000 increase in military aid no doubt 
sweetened the deal. 17 Y digoras may have even genuinely relished his involvement in this 
clandestine attack against Castro . In his autobiography Y digoras pictured himself as a 
cold warrior in the most colorful terms : 
I fought Castro-Communism from the outset and from the first 
days of 1959. I was a victim of Fidel Castro's aggression . I 
frustrated his invasion of Panama in March of 1959; I broke off 
relations with his government in April of 1960; I withstood two 
military uprisings inspired by his money and his agents ; I 
cooperated with anti-Castro groups to train 2,000 Cubans and 
launched them against the Soviet bastion in the Caribbean; I put 
down an incipient civil war in March , April and May of 1962 ; I 
swung a submachine gun around my shoulder in November of 
1962 and put down a rebellion of the Guatemalan Air Force .18 
14 
Even members of Y digoras' own government later admitted much of this was 
bombast. The plantation La Helvetia owned by the brother of the Guatemalan 
ambassador to Washington, Carlos Alejos, provided an ideal training site for the Cuban 
exiles. It was remote yet within B-26 bombing range of Cuba. For insurance, the CIA 
constructed two new airstrips to support the Cuban invasion on the outskirts of 
Guatemala City and set up a frogmen training center in Barcenda. Secrets as large as 
armies and airforces are notoriously difficult to keep -- and word of the operation 
quickly leaked throughout Guatemala, prompting student protests. On October 30, 
1960, the centrist Guatemala City daily La Hora published an article revealing the 
existence of the camp and the Cuban exiles training there. 19 
Guatemalan officers, especially the younger reformist ones, expressed outrage. 
According to Turios Lima, a young participant in the revolt and later guerrilla 
commander, the presence of Cuban exiles training in Guatemala: "was a shameful 
violation of our national sovereignty. And why was it permitted? Because our 
government is a puppet. 1120 But he emphasized that his reasons for joining the revolt 
were essentially "the traditional ones of younger officers fed up with corruption, 
desiring structural changes in the army, nothing really different. 1121 
Disgust throughout Guatemala with Y digoras' corruption was universal. In 
1958 as his first official act in office Ydigoras increased his own salary to $150,000 a 
year -- the highest for a head of state in the Western Hemisphere. He also granted 
himself a generous million dollar pension fund. He appointed his daughter ambassador 
to France and his cousin education minister. 22 Auctioning off the national fincas 
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(government owned plantations) to whomever offered him the largest bribes. the new 
president sold offices, as one opponent put it "like a street vendor selling tortillas. "23 
Y digoras particularly enraged younger officers by promoting older cronies while 
obstructing the promotions of lieutenants and captains. He went "colonel crazy" in the 
late 1950s, jumping favorites several grades, bestowing the rank on civilian bureaucrats 
and drinking buddies until the Guatemalan Army attained the ludicrous distinction of 
having 35% of its officers hold the rank of colonel (4.7% of U.S. army officers in the 
same time period were colonels). 
TABLE 124 
COMPARATIVE OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE 1960 
(in percentages) 
Rank United States Brazil Guatemala Panama 
General .4 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Colonel 4.7 3.7 35.1 
Lt. Colonel 11.3 10.0 6 .0 2.0 
Major 17.4 14.8 6 .0 4.0 
Captain 32.9 33 .0 14.0 7.0 
1st Lt. 18.4 26.8 15.0 32 .0 
2nd Lt. 14.9 10.3 23.0 54.0 
In 1960 El Imparcial, Guatemala's most influential newspaper, decried the "lack 
of discipline [which] increased from top to bottom, consuming social energy and 
discouraging everyone. "25 Not all officers, however, were angry at Y digoras for his 
graft and demoralization of the military. Several senior colonels expressed resentment 
that they had not been cut in for their fair share of the $50,000 bribe or the $500,000 in 
additional military aid. 26 
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The Eisenhower Administration's reaction to the rebellion of November 13, 
1960, proved swift and decisive. Informed by Secretary of State Christian Herter that 
the situation was "not good", President Eisenhower decided that "if we received a 
request from Guatemala for assistance, we would move in without delay. "27 Stymied 
by the breakdown of the Geneva talks with the Soviets over the U-2 Incident and stung 
by domestic political criticism, blaming his administration for the "loss" of Cuba, 
Eisenhower was in no mood to equivocate. As in the 1954 coup, American pilots flew 
combat missions against the rebel bases in American donated planes with Guatemalan 
airforce markings. In this and other phases of U.S. involvement, Guatemala emerged as 
a training ground for perfecting CIA covert techniques later used in Laos and Vietnam 
Lacking an airforce, pummeled by U.S. B-26 bombers from both Retalhulen and 
Panama, the rebels' resistance quickly faded. The U.S . naval presence off Puerto 
Barrios overawed many of the insurgents and clearly dispirited rebel morale. Still the 
revolt had been a close run thing. Disputed reports from among the participants 
claimed that Cuban exile troops and not loyal Guatemalan soldiers carried out most of 
the ground fighting against the insurgents . Y digoras apparently mistrusted his own 
troops .28 Some 120 Guatemalan army officers and an estimated 3,000 soldiers, over a 
third of the overall force, participated in the uprising which lasted four days, took over 
three major military bases and gained control of the country's largest port city. While 
the revolt started as a nationalist protest against institutional decay and the presence of 
the Cubans, its bloody outcome further radicalized the survivors. They would return to 
the country fifteen months later as determined communist guerrillas. Thus in one fell 
swoop, the United States and Y digoras eliminated nearly all the young reformist 
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idealism within the Guatemalan military. This would be sorely missed when the 
Kennedy Administration attempted to implement social reforms within Guatemala a 
year later. 29 
Despite Washington's energetic support on behalf of his regime during the crisis, 
the United States increasingly pulled away from Y digoras after the coup. The slow 
unraveling of Ydigoras' presidency began in November 1960. A 1959 collapse in the 
price of coffee, Guatemala's number one export, accelerated domestic disillusionment 
with Y digoras' economic program He would flounder desperately in his remaining two 
and a half years in office, trying to divert attention from his personal malfeasance, 
political unpopularity and economic failure by alternatively calling for invasions of 
British Honduras (Belize) and Castro's Cuba as well as overdramatizing his extremely 
modest land reform program 30 
After the Cuban Revolution, the Eisenhower Administration began to shift its 
Guatemalan security policy away from deterring a Moscow-inspired political takeover 
by a leftist-communist popular front to the suppression of a possible Castro style 
guerrilla insurgency. Hemispheric defense doctrine, with its emphasis on anti-Soviet 
submarine surveillance and air patrols , gave way to internal security. 31 While the 
Kennedy Administration claimed credit for developing this new strategy in a truly 
comprehensive fashion, much of its roots really lay in Eisenhower's re-energized Latin 
American policies in the late 1950s. The 1958 near murder of Vice President Richard 
Nixon by angry mobs in Caracas, followed by the Cuban Revolution, aroused the 
administration from its general torpor regarding Latin America with its emphasis on 
large capital investments, limited military grants, and "trade not aid." The Suez and 
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Hungarian crises, the launching of Sputnik, and the 1958 U.S. invasion of Lebanon had 
tended to keep Washington's attention riveted on the Soviets and the Middle East, not 
Latin America . By the late fifties, however, the rise of anti-Americanism in the 
Hemisphere, spurred by U.S. support for dictators, and the fear of "other Cubas" 
forced Eisenhower to re-evaluate his Latin American policy. 
This shift on the security side occurred much earlier in Guatemala when the 
instability of Castillo Ann,as' post 1954 coup government required a heavy emphasis on 
internal surveillance and police repression of "all hostile political elements." It 
remained doubtful just how powerful these "elements" that included a handful of 
communists, peasant labor leaders, university professors and students, actually were. 
Certainly, the temptation of Guatemalan political leaders to use this largely American 
fashioned security apparatus for their own dictatorial purposes proved overwhelming. 
The security build-up in Guatemala served as a model for similar expansions in other 
Latin American nations implemented at the end of the decade. A foreign service 
dispatch of September 1959, from the American Embassy in Guatemala to the State 
Department traced the history of U.S. military involvement throughout the decade and 
highlighted the fluctuations of disbursements: 
Guatemala has been the recipient of exclusive aid under the 
Mutual Security Program. In addition to moderate military 
assistance and the existence of an Army Mission and an Air 
Mission, some $58,000,000 has been made available during the 
past five years as technical and Special Assistance. This was a 
consequence of the need to bolster the economy and strengthen 
the democratic regime which followed the overthrow in 1954 of 
the Communist-dominated Arbenz Government. 
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1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
The allocation of funds have been as follows: 
Army Mission Including 
Milita(Y Assistance 
' 
$ 67 
68 
TABLE Il32 
APPROXIMATE COSTS 
(In Thousands) 
Air ICA 
Mission TC 
$ 60 
64 
(Construction of Inter-
American Highway) 
SA BPR 
68 58 $1,814 $ 8,039 $ 70 
688 71 1,833 12,681 2,902 
237 77 2, 189 15,423 8,845 
170 78 2,226 10,250 9,440 
239 93 2,708 423 2,375 
313 135 2,400 70 3,500 
Military assistance to the Army Mission ( column #I) , which included training 
and equipment, was minimal during the years of the Arbenz presidency , 1953 and 1954. 
In fiscal year 1956, aid increased by about 1,000%. This occurred in conjunction with 
the massive overhaul of Guatemalan military and security forces (police , secret police , 
and the new security departments) , by U.S . Army, CIA and FBI advisors. A gradual 
fall-off of investment then occurred which began to rise noticeably again during the 
Castro years 1959 and 1960. During the years of this admittedly uneven build-up , the 
Guatemalan Army increased in size by 60%, from 5,000 to 8,000 men. The 
Guatemalan National Police increased by 50% from 2,000 to 3,000 men. The Public 
Safety Program records show similar patterns of U.S . investment. 
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FIRST YEAR 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Table ill 33 
ANNUAL BUDGETS OF TIIE PUBLIC 
SAFE1Y PROGRAM, GUATEMALA 1957-1961 
(US thousands) 
TOTAL TECH PART COMMOD 
280 38 0 242 
158 58 37 58 
72 53 13 0 
267 37 1 219 
271 ' 35 11 213 
OTHER 
0 
5 
6 
10 
12 
The United States made a large initial investment to set up the program and 
reinvigorate Guatemalan police and internal security. A drop-off followed, but again 
the advent of Castro brought about a nearly 400% increase in funding between FY1959 
and FY1960 which continued into FY1961. It is important to note that no tables of 
CIA or FBI spending in Guatemala have been declassified to date, though one can 
assume their spending patterns approximated those of Military Assistance and the 
Office of Public Safety. It is known that the CIA under both Eisenhower and Kennedy 
spent $11 million setting up various Cuban exile bases and training programs in 
Guatemala between April 1960 and April 1961.34 Political scientists and human rights 
activists, Susanne Jonas and Michael McClintock, in their works The Battle for 
Guatemala (1991) and The American Connection (1985) make a strong argument that 
the roots of all political repression in Guatemala lay in these crucial Eisenhower years of 
the mid to late 1950s, but this study will show that the Kennedy influence in the early 
1960s was even more pronounced and predominant. 
21 
One of the ironic outcomes of the Eisenhower Administration's increased 
military assistance, intelligence and internal security spending in Guatemala was that the 
network it helped install seemed to know everything that was going on inside of the 
country except the fact that one-third of the military was about to rise up and 
overthrow the government . Much of this was due to both Washington and the 
Guatemalan government's obsession with the small Guatemalan Communist party as the 
only credible threat to the government. 
In hindsight the appraisal made in this internal Office of Public Safety memo, 
dated June 20, 1960, speaks volumes of the U.S. misappraisal: 
Tue extent to which military assistance can, by strengthening Guatemala, 
aid U.S. national security and our foreign policy interests is perceptible 
but of a rather diverse nature. As of now it is doubtful if Guatemala 
could be of much help outside the confines of its own frontiers. There is 
however gradually being engendered a better understanding of free world 
ideology, a better esprit de corps, and hopefully, we think, slightly less 
political ambition on the part of those trained in the military. It is true 
there remains a large group of older senior officers who would like to be 
President, but junior officers are now learning something about simple 
military devotion to duty. Training in U.S. service schools has positive 
benefits not only in the military sense but also has observably had very 
considerable desirable moral influence on those who have passed through 
them 35 
Four months later the Guatemalan military erupted in revolt led almost 
exclusively by junior officers, most trained in U.S. service schools, all under the age of 
thirty. Tue memorandum was correct in stating that a majority of these officers had a 
strong moral devotion to duty, yet that devotion led them to oppose, not endorse, the 
security policies of the United States. 
"Castro changed everything," asserted Captain Thomas "Rip" Robertson , former 
rodeo rider and CIA pilot who took part in both the 1954 Guatemalan coup and the 
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1960 crushing of the rebels. "We were in a whole new ballgame and our pitching was 
pretty wild the first couple of years." 36 
It would fall to the Kennedy Administration to try and pick up the pieces of a 
fairly botched U.S. economic and security policy in Guatemala. The new administration 
would crystallize the doctrine which dominated U.S. policy in Guatemala for the 
remainder of the decade. 
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-CHAPTER ill 
THE KENNEDY DOCTRINE IN GUATEMALA 
1961-1963 
"For the first time in our history an enemy stands poised at the throat of the 
United States," candidate John F. Kennedy told a veterans', convention at Miami Beach 
on August 26, 1960. "Castro's ambitions extend far beyond his own shores. He has 
transformed the island of Cuba into a hostile and militant Communist satellite -- a base 
from which to carry Communist infiltration and subversion throughout the Americas ... "1 
In January, 1961, the same month the new president took the oath of office, Premier 
Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech to the meeting of International Communist 
Parties in Moscow , in which he pledged the Soviet Union's support for "wars of 
national liberation" around the globe. A representative of the Guatemalan Communist 
Party (the PGT) attended this meeting. But the Kennedy Administration had no 
intention of countenancing Guatemala's "liberation." 
The Kennedy Administration arrived in Washington in January 1961, with a 
throng of what were later referred to as "action intellectuals" ready to propose and 
implement a host of new foreign policy initiatives designed to roll back and defeat 
Communist revolution throughout the Third World. Early hagiographic accounts, such 
as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s 1965 A Thousand Days, pictured Kennedy and his advisors 
as sober, reflective, dedicated knights-errants. But as revisionist historians, such as 
Thomas G. Paterson , in his 1989 Kennedy's Quest for Victory point out, the new 
president and his close inner circle placed a premium on toughness, energy, drive and 
vigor, on an aggressive "hands-on can do" approach to foreign policy. They regarded 
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Eisenhower's recent Cold War diplomacy, particularly in Latin America, as soft, 
uninspired and lethargic. "We have allowed a soft sentimentation to form the 
atmosphere we breathe," Kennedy claimed "toughminded plans have to be designed. "2 
Kennedy regarded Latin America as an area of supreme geo-political importance 
only superseded by the direct conflict with the Soviets in Europe. With much fanfare, 
he proposed an "Alliance For Progress" in March of 1961, an ambitious $20 billion aid 
program for Latin America over ten years. While the Eisenhower Administration had 
already put forward a somewhat similar increase in Latin American aid at the Bogota 
Convention in 1960, the Alliance for Progress promised to do far more. It 
encompassed "a vast cooperative effort unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of 
purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American peoples for homes, work and land, 
health and schools ... "3 
This new partnership of North and South would embrace both econormc 
development and social restructuring. It included national planning and technical aid, 
agrarian and tax reform, public housing, education, health care -- a veritable cornucopia 
of social reforms and improvements. All this would supposedly operate within the 
framework of democratic institutions, proving "the compatibility of representative 
government with material progress." Harking back to Jefferson and Bolivar, Kennedy 
cloaked these ideas with the mantle of revolution: "Let us once again transform the 
American continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts ... "4 
Central to the Alliance for Progress, though never mentioned by name, was a 
more recent revolution -- the Cuban one of Fidel Castro. "It was," Ronald Steel 
observed in Pax Americana "neither charity nor a guilty conscience but Fidel Castro 
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who provided the inspiration for the Alliance for Progress ... [it] might never have seen 
the light of day, let alone grow into a childhood, had Fidel not injected the fear of 
Communism into official Washing-
ton." 5 
Less than a month after the announcement of this grand new initiative, the 
ghastly failure of the U.S. backed Bay of Pigs Invasion doused cold water on Kennedy's 
initial enthusiasm for redrawing the political and social parameters of Latin America. 
Yet the seriousness of its Cuban failure only emphasized the administration's desire to 
achieve some kind of success south of the border. It proved telling that the man who 
had come up with the phrase "Alliance for Progress" and would help put the program 
together , Kennedy aide and Harvard graduate Richard Goodwin, (twenty-nine years old 
at the time) had never been to South America. 6 Kennedy's ideology and energy almost 
immediately ran up against the harsh political and social reality of Latin America. 
Guatemala, one of the highest per capita recipients of Alliance for Progress aid 
in the 1960s illustrated just how stark Latin American reality could be. In 1961 
Guatemala had a basically two crop export economy consisting of coffee and bananas, 
90% of which were sold to the United States for very low, largely U.S. determined, 
prices . On the other hand, Guatemala purchased 80% of its imports -- staple grains, 
manufactured goods , machinery and equipment -- from the United States at relatively 
high U.S. prices. The result was an unfavorable balance of payments and an almost 
classic neo-colonial dependency on the United States . 7 
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Guatemalan society, like most of Latin Americas, was sharply stratified along 
rigid, almost feudal, class lines. The criollos, affluent land owners of Spanish and other 
European ancestry, comprising about 2% of the population, owned 70% of the land. 
Most of the senior, high-ranking military officers either came from or identified with 
this class. Together with wealthy businessmen and foreign investors the criollos 
dominated Guatemala's economy and politics. Politically they aligned themselves with 
the right-wing National Liberation Movemeut (MLN), Castillo Armas' reactionary, 
fiercely anti-Communist political party. 8 
A larger middle class group of mixed Spanish and Indian ancestry, the ladinos 
made up around 40% of the population and owned about 20% of Guatemala's land. 
Largely urban, shopkeepers, craftsmen, managers, low level government functionaries, 
as well as some small farmers, the ladinos were an important force in the more modem 
sectors of the Guatemalan economy and supplied the Guatemalan military with most of 
its junior officer corps. The majority, but not all, allied themselves with the liberal 
centrist Revolutionary Party (PR). The Kennedy Administration counted on these 
ladinos to lead the way towards the modernization and democratization of Guatemala. 9 
The largest population group in Guatemala in 1961, making up about 55% of 
the roughly four million population, were impoverished Maya Indians. They owned less 
than 10% of the land and were virtual serfs forced by law to work 150 days a year for 
starvation wages on the vast coffee, banana and cotton plantations of the criollos. 
Largely disenfranchised, 80% illiterate, with a life expectancy of forty-two, an infant 
mortality rate of 40% and an average per capita income of $63 a year ( compared to 
$181 for the average Guatemalan), the Indians of Guatemala remained completely 
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isolated from the political life of the country. Worse, they were subject to a centuries 
old form of racism and discrimination. With their very different Amerindian looks, 
clothing, language, customs and religion, the Maya represented the ever present 
"demonic other" of Guatemalan society. Through over four hundred years of Spanish 
domination, they endured expulsion, massacres and economic dehumanization. 10 As 
one Spanish plantation owner said in a telling comment on both racism and upper-class 
opposition to modernity: ,'Why spend ten thousand dollars for a tractor when you can 
get Indians to work for seventy-five cents a day?"11 
This almost incredibly inequitable political-economic structure of Guatemala 
posed a huge obstacle to the Alliance for Progress , which the Kennedy Administration 
never really overcame. Yet while the Eisenhower White House never even attempted 
to change and, in fact, reinforced this status quo, the crusaders of the New Frontier, 
actually made a stab at it. The already relatively high economic aid to Guatemala 
increased by over 40% in the early 1960s to about $25 million per year. This expansion 
of aid was based in part on the Alliance for Progress' favoritism towards "constitutional 
governments" in Latin America. The Kennedy Administration cut aid to numerous 
notorious dictators in the region such as the Dominican Republic's Trujillo and Haiti's 
Duvalier. Kennedy hoped to encourage democratization by rewarding more moderate 
and democratic regimes like Betancourt's in Venezuela and Frondizi's in Argentina. In 
January 1961 the Kennedy Administration refused to recognize a military junta which 
had recently seized power in El Salvador. Such lofty principles, like much of the 
rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress, did not last long. Still, in early 1961 hopes for the 
Alliance ran high. 
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In a wave of initial optimism and idealism scores of Peace Corp Volunteers and 
Maryknoll missionaries arrived in Guatemala, setting up peasant cooperatives and local 
improvement projects. United States Agency for International Development (AID) 
loans, both large and small, multiplied as well as credits from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), the Inter-American Bank of Rural Development (IBRD) and 
the Export-Import Bank. , Guatemala received staple grains and dairy products from 
Food for Peace and private contributions from CARE and Project Hope .12 
The bulk of the larger economic loans and grants to Guatemala, however, like 
practically all Alliance for Progress aid, were "tied loans." This meant that the dollar 
loans or grants had to be spent on purchasing American goods and services. In effect 
the Export-Import Bank and AID used taxpayers' money to subsidize the growth of 
large American companies that did business with Guatemala. Guatemala's U.S. 
purchases were often made at prices 30%-50% above world market prices so that, in 
real terms, the value of the aid was little more than half the nominal amount. Moreover , 
goods which Guatemala bought within the framework of this "not-quite-aid" were 
typically second rate. American freighters transported goods to Guatemala which 
could no longer be sold on the U.S. market -- obsolete machinery, antiquated vehicles 
and machine tools . (The same procedure existed with U.S . military sales to Guatemala. 
The U.S. military unloaded much of its obsolescent equipment on Guatemala at high 
U.S. prices.) Worse still, the Hickenlooper Amendment to the 1962 Foreign 
Assistance Act, drawn up in reaction to Castro's seizure of U.S. property in Cuba, 
called for the automatic suspension of U.S. aid to any country "which expropriated or 
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nationalized the property of U.S. citizens. "13 Foreign and international loans to 
Guatemala held the same stipulation. Thus, Alliance for Progress aid, meant 
supposedly to develop and reform Guatemalan society, by its very nature forbade the 
equitable reform and redistribution of Guatemala's land and resources. In 1960, U.S. 
and foreign companies owned nearly 40% of Guatemala's arable land They also held 
claim to the vast majority of its natural resources -- oil, nickel, tungsten, iron, timber 
and natural gas. In the, early 1960s, $92 million of the $117 million of foreign 
investment in Guatemala came from the United States. By 1964, Guatemala imported 
$38 million more than it exported and $36 million of this unfavorable balance of 
payments was with the United States. 14 
The majority of large Alliance for Progress development projects helped neither 
Indians nor middling Guatemalan businessmen and farmers. The huge $12 million Rio 
Hondo Road Project, begun with much publicity by the Kennedy Administration in 
1961, provided a prime example of Alliance for Progress aid in Guatemala. Tue project 
connected the main Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios with Honduras. The Guatemalan 
government had to pay the $12 million in principal plus roughly $5 million in interest 
back to the United States in dollars, which placed a heavy burden on Guatemala's 
balance of payments. The Guatemalan government purchased all the machinery for 
construction from the United States under the terms of the loan. The engineer, 
contractors, supervisors and smveyors were all from United States companies. Three 
U.S. firms -- Nebloteer, Poteshnick and Harrison, paved and constructed the road. Toe 
highway itself largely facilitated the shipment of export crops -- coffee, bananas and 
cotton, not from individual farmers but from large plantations. 15 U.S. AID loans built 
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similar roads north to the mineral and oil extraction enterprises of American and foreign 
investors . The Rio Hondo project drove numerous Indian families, that had the bad 
fortune to be located in its path, off their land with little compensation. All these newly 
constructed roads provided access for the Guatemala military in their new U.S. built 
trucks , jeeps and armored cars to reach remote hinterlands where guerrillas operated. 
Most of the road projects of the Kennedy era in Guatemala traveled through guerrilla 
country. Little wonder many embittered Guatemalan Indians referred to the Alliance 
·, 
for Progress as Alianza para el Progresso - The Alliance Stops Progress. 16 Much of 
the historiography of the Alliance captures the disillusionment with the program in its 
very titles : Victor Alba's 1965 Alliance Without Allies, Jerome Levinson and Juan de 
Onis' 1970 The Alliance That Lost Its Way, Robert Smetherman's 1972 The Alliance 
for Progress: Promises Unfulfilled. 
The Kennedy Administration's economic program in Guatemala operated on the 
assumption that there was a connection between poverty and political instability which 
would inevitably lead to Communism. But as political scientist Lucien Pye and others 
pointed out, this was not necessarily the case. 17 Economic development was probably a 
greater cause of social instability than simple economic deprivation in Guatemala. The 
Alliance for Progress unleashed a torrent of investments, loans, grants, rural projects, 
industrial enterprises, peasant cooperatives, road building, local improvement 
campaigns, free clinics, bribery, extortion, land grabbing, price fixing, forced expulsions 
and general socio-economic chaos. As the Yankee dollars poured in, the 
de-stabilization of society and the exploitation of the poor increased. Peasant 
cooperatives and credit unions, set up by Peace Corps volunteers, enraged local 
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plantation owners because they made the campesinos less dependent on the criollos. 
When American AFL-CIO volunteers handed out Spanish translations of the 
Declaration of Independence to labor umons, Guatemala businessmen protested 
vociferously against the distribution of Communist propaganda. Food for Peace milk 
and cheese undercut Guatemalan dairy farmers. When the Peace Corps built schools in 
the countryside, less Indian children reported for work on cotton plantations. 18 The 
Guatemalan oligarchy an,d the Kennedy Administration were clearly speaking two 
different languages in early 1961. Jean-Francois Revel captured something of this 
quandry when he stated: "The idea that an authoritarian political system must collapse 
because it cannot provide a decent life for its citizenry can only occur to a 
democrat ... The notion that whoever holds power must clear out because his subjects 
are discontented or dying of hunger or distress is a bit of whimsy that history has 
tolerated few times in real life." 19 
The Alliance for Progress brought about a huge rise in expectations to the poor 
of Guatemala which upset the traditional social fabric much more than Castro's largely 
annoying radio broadcasts. Wealthy Guatemalans certainly regarded Kennedy, with his 
wild ideas of land reform and progressive tax codes, as a much greater threat to then: 
position than Castro. As one landowner put it, "When the Cubans come I can shoot 
them but I can't shoot these damned Americans. 1120 One of the great unintended results 
of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala was that it helped fuel the very insurgency it 
was designed to defeat. Capitalist democracy in a society as feudal as Guatemala 
represented , a truly revolutionary idea. Yet having raised expectations of individual 
prosperity, the program failed miserably to deliver on them. The great majority of 
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funding still went to the larger development projects which inevitably benefited U.S. 
investors and Guatemalan elites. Peasant social reforms and local improvement 
projects, on the other hand, barely scratched the surface of deep, systemic, century old 
inequities. 21 
Was another alternative available to the Kennedy Administration to truly 
modernize and democratize Guatemala? Numerous tracts of land could have been 
redistributed among the Indians. A larger amount of government loans and private 
,, 
investment could have been targeted to small businesses and domestic manufacturing. 
But such a course of real reform would have infuriated the Guatemalan oligarchy and 
substantial elements of the military, the United States' only real allies in Guatemala. It 
also would have hurt U.S. corporations' and investors' profits. Such a scheme would 
also weaken the political dependence of Guatemala on the United States at a time when 
the Kennedy Administration attempted to forge strong U.S. dominated military and 
economic alliances throughout Central American as a wedge against Castro. The 
Kennedy Administration faced a fundamental dilemma early on in Guatemala. It could 
either have chronic instability, wedded to political and economic dependence or an 
independent, semi-socialist state in Guatemala. As much as the Kennedy 
Administration claimed to dislike the former, it clearly preferred it to the latter. 
The Kennedy Administration's reform program in Guatemala can best be 
evaluated in its approach to the vital land issue. Just as 19th century black 
sharecroppers in the United States could never hope to gain any real political power 
until they first owned their own land, so two-thirds of the Guatemala population 
remained forever isolated, embittered and marginalized, simply because they did not 
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own enough land to feed themselves. Large scale coffee, banana and cotton production 
for export soared during the Alliance for Progress years, almost in direct proportion to 
malnutrition, unemployment, infant mortality, disease and demoralization among the 
Indian and poor ladino population. 22 Mayas would literally die of starvation while 
hauling hundred and fifty pound banana stems on their backs fourteen hours a day. In 
1961, one YMCA volunteer walked away in shock when he discovered 5,000 Indians 
living in rat infested tin and stucco housing on a coffee plantation with a total of six 
' 
open water faucets and no medical facilities. 23 From 1961 to 1964 the Gross National 
Product of Guatemala rose an average of 5.5% a year -- a higher growth rate than the 
United States in the same period, yet income among the lower 60% of the Guatemalan 
population actually dropped 14%.24 "Guatemala," as Marxist journalist Eduardo 
Galeano remarked, "was developing itself into its grave. "25 Or as Riguberta Menchu, a 
peasant Maya woman put it, "These people don't care. For these people an Indian is 
less than a dog. "26 
In 1961 under pressure from the Kennedy Administration Guatemala's president 
Miguel Y digoras Fuentes finally initiated his long awaited land redistribution program 
He decided his government should dispose of some 132 national fincas (government 
owned plantations) expropriated from Germans during World War II and from fo1mer 
Ubico and Arbenz supporters. Y digoras held several elaborate, ribbon cutting 
ceremonies, attended by U.S . embassy officials, in which he distributed 12 of the 132 
fincas to landless Indians to be divided into numerous family plots. He sold the 
remaining 120 fincas to wealthy landowners and a number of his own relatives, 
pocketing much of the profits. 27 Ambassador John 0. Bell called the effort "a good first 
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step. 1128 For his agricultural minister during the Kennedy years, Y digoras appointed 
Pedro Mombiela, one of Guatemala's richest cattle barons. Like most Guatemalan 
cattle ranchers, Minister Mombiela had created his vast grazing empire by expelling 
Indians at gun point from their traditional holdings. Guatemalan U.S . AID director, 
Herbert Hardin, said that Mombiela has "a number of interesting ideas in the areas of 
land reform. "29 One of his brainstorms was colonization . Mombiela distributed tracts 
of impassable, mountainous jungle lands in the northernmost province of Peten on 
,  
which, as one peasant remembered, "God couldn't grow a carrot ," to incredulous 
Indians chosen by lottery. Some of these areas were so remote "a jaguar couldn't reach 
them "30 Government helicopters dropped off the lucky owners along with some lumber 
and a few hand tools. The hardy individuals among them managed to hack their way 
back to civilization with machetes. Those less resourceful were left to the vultures. 31 
The Inter-American Bank of Rural Development director in Guatemala wrote: "There 
have been some problems with the government's new overambitious resettlement 
schemes. "32 
In his five years in office Y digoras redistributed land to 2,451 Indian families. 
In 1953-4 President Arbenz, who was overthrown by the CIA, redistributed land to 
some 100,000 Indians. One idealistic U.S . businessman, Patrick A Mulvey, became so 
frustrated with the Kennedy Administration's failure to push land reform in Guatemala , 
that he hatched the idea of the U.S. government, through third parties , simply buying up 
$40 million dollars worth of land and then redistributing it to peasants on its own. As 
he wrote , the mere mention of land reform in Guatemala "sets off the red flag of 
Communism among wealthy businessmen. "33 The White House shelved Mulvey's idea 
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as "an interference in the internal affairs of Guatemala. "34 Thomas and Marjorie 
Melville's 1971 Guatemala: The Politics of Land Reform is one of the earliest revisionist 
works on economic and social inequality in Guatemala. Written during the height of 
the Vietnam War by two former Maryknoll missionaries, who shocked the State 
Department by joining the guerrillas, their study comprehensively examines the failure 
of agrarian reform with particular emphasis on Guatemalan sources. The Melvilles 
correctly appraise land reform as the acid test of democratization in Guatemala, which 
both the U.S. and all Guatemalan governments since Arbenz failed. They also 
convincingly demonstrate that the 70 year alliance between the Guatemalan oligarchy, 
U.S. investors,and the U. S military effectively quashed all reform efforts whether they 
emanated from Guatemala or Washington. 
With the road to social progress increasingly blocked by local elites and the 
United States' own reluctance to force through meaningful change, the main emphasis 
of the Kennedy Doctrine in Guatemala shifted quite early from reform to repression. 
Almost from day one, the Kennedy Administration established the primacy of internal 
security, of holding the line against Communist and leftist agitation while or until 
supposedly enlightened elements with Guatemalan society would implement social 
reforms. National Security Action Memorandum 34, dated February 20, 1961, laid out 
the four point security program which would dominate Kennedy policy in Guatemala. 
It sharply reflected a military emphasis. 
1. The Defense Department has taken steps to unify the various Service 
Missions in each Latin American country into a single MAAG 
(military Assistance Advisory Group) under the command of Commander 
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in Chief Caribbean Command (CINCARIB). 
2. AID is engaged in reviewing the Public Safety Program for Latin America to 
insure that it is highly responsive to the critical needs of each Latin American 
country for police assistance and surveillance of hostile elements. 
3. Pursuant to NSAM 19, AID and the Defense Department are acting jointly 
in the development of civic action projects, additional to those now 
underway, that might usefully be undertaken in Latin America. 
4. Pursuant to NSAM 18, an expanded program of close collaboration 
between the U.S. and Latin American military in areas of training, 
equipment and tactical indoctrination is currently underway. 35 
These became the pillars of U.S. policy in Latin America as a whole. In the 
early 1960s the Kennedy White House moved away from President Eisenhower's 
program of unconventional covert war against undesirable governments (Mossadegh's 
Iran, Arbenz's Guatemala) towards a policy of both overt_and covert war against the 
internal enemies of friendly governments such as South Vietnam and Guatemala . U.S. 
trained anti-guerrilla fighters would defeat local insurgents that plagued U.S. allies. 
Kennedy's new counter-insurgency program initially turned the foreign policy 
establishment on its ear with a flurry of seminars, counter-insurgency courses, 
bureaucratic upheavals "and an almost frantic formulation of unfamiliar policy"36 Some 
of this actually had a comic aspect as plump, middle aged foreign service veterans 
donned jungle gear while observing Green Beret exercises. The traditional American 
military service chiefs resisted what they regarded as the "crackpot aspects" of this new 
"we have to be guerrillas to defeat the guerrillas" doctrine, but gradually, albeit 
reluctantly, they got on board especially after each service was guaranteed its own sexy, 
new COIN outfit. 37 
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History provides numerous examples of nove~ ground breaking milita1y 
doctrines, which events prove to be dead wrong: Douhet's theory of strategic bombing, 
the British early twentieth century battleship mania, and French Defense Minister Andre 
Maginot's state of the art, high-tech defensive line, to name a few. While the jury may 
still be out on the Kennedy Doctrine of Counter-insurgency, it seems destined to join 
this list of strategic "white elephants . 11 Michael McClintock's 1992 Instruments of 
Statecraft provides one of the latest and most sweeping studies of U.S. 
' 
counter-insurgency warfare in the post World War Two era. McClintock reveals that, 
while the Kennedys were aware of the broader socio-political parameters of Third 
World guerrilla warfare, they still judged the threat to be amenable to a technical fix. 
McClintock gives rather short shrift of the Kennedys' understanding of the political 
nature of insurgency, that it was a response to colonialism and socio-economic injustice, 
but his work is indispensable in chronicling the military development of this doctrine, 
dating back as far as the Filipino Revolt of 1899-1902. Like his earlier 1985 American 
Connection, McClintock's Instruments of Statecraft draws heavily upon declassified and 
leaked Department of Defense , FBI , and CIA sources . Both books are sharply critical 
of U.S . policy and full of valuable data and insights on how ideology can shape military 
doctrine and vice-versa . 
As far back as the early 1950s, John F. Kennedy expressed the belief that Soviet 
sponsored brushfire warfare represented the gravest threat to the world balance of 
power. He felt the United States had to counteract it with a new kind of anti-guerrilla 
warfare, especially in Latin America, where the threat of social revolution loomed 
large. Drawing on the lessons of the few successful counter-insurgency campaigns, 
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those of Sir Robert Thompson in Malaya and Edward Lansdale against the Huks in the 
Philippines, Kennedy began formulating his new "Special Warfare" strategy. Ironically, 
former French paratroop generals like Francois Massu, supplied much of the 
counter-insurgency inspiration to the Kennedy Administration from articles in the 
Revue Militaire D'Information. 38 What most observers failed to note was that these 
same French officers had lost their own counter-insurgency campaigns first in 
Indo-China and later in Algeria, using these exact, highly acclaimed yet wrong headed 
theories. 
The first principle of the Kennedy Administration's counter-insurgency strategy 
in Guatemala was to avoid the use of large conventional American ground forces. 
Except for Green Beret advisers, Army technicians and trainers, Guatemalans were to 
fight Guatemalans. Thus Vietnamization came to Guatemala eight years before 
President Nixon implemented it in Vietnam As a March 20, 1961 Department of 
Defense Memorandum stated: "A well trained indigenous force can better counter the 
Communist threat and propaganda than the larger powers. At least our hand will not be 
apparent. Our biggest assistance can come through the Military Assistance Advisory 
Groups (MAAG) if they are provided with the doctrine for anti-guerrilla 
counter-subversion and are given clear political goals. "39 
On May 25, 1961 Kennedy addressed the entire nation before a Joint Session of 
Congress, devoting considerable time to the Communist insurgency crisis. In words 
riven with irony, he expressed as much the U.S. program in Vietnam and Guatemala as 
the supposed Soviet threat it was designed to defeat: 
... their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no 
missiles, and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, 
42 
::. 
technicians, and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is 
required, it is usually done by others, by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins 
striking alone ... by subversives, saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some 
cases control whole areas inside of independent nations. 40 
With few credible insurgencies in the hemisphere in early 1961 Kennedy initially 
took a keen interest in Latin American police training. In National Security Action 
Memorandum No. 88, dated September 5, 1961, he called for additional "steps ... to train 
the Armed Forces and Police Forces of Latin America in controlling mobs, and 
rioters ... Also what other steps are we taking to increase the intimacy between our 
Armed forces and the military of Latin America? It has been suggested that we set up a 
camp in the United States similar to the FBI Academy which brings in police from all 
over the Americas. "41 
The United States had been training Latin American police officers in a 
haphazard, country by country fashion since the 1940s. In 1962 at Kennedy's 
insistence, the United States created the Inter- American Police Academy in the Panama 
Canal Zone.42 In late 1963 the school changed its name to the International Police 
Academy (IPA) and moved to Washington, D.C. Spanish speaking, retired American 
police and FBI officers taught the standard eight week general course which covered 
finger printing techniques, surveillance, riot control, interrogation, incarceration and 
criminal record keeping methods. During the 1960s, 452 Guatemalan police officers 
graduated from the academy. The Guatemalan police acquired an unsavory reputation 
for corruption dating back to the 1950s. Office of Public Safety memos reported rapes, 
opium smuggling and the frequent torture of suspects. One report stated that suspects 
were often held between "ninety days and four years before being charged with 
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crimes. ''43 U.S. sponsored police training emphasized both professionalization and 
moderation to solve these problems. In 1962 Assistant Secretary of State, Edwin 
Martin, noted that : 
In assessing the internal security situation in Latin America we found 
that civil police forces in many countries needed assistance in police 
administration, training and operational techniques and particularly 
required greater mobility and more adequate systems of communication 
largely related to riot control and other threats to public order. 
Consequently the public safety program, which is an integral part of the 
AID program, is designed to meet these requests.44 
Through the Office of Public Safety Program, the Kennedy Administration 
supplied the Guatemalan police with helicopters, computers , radios, armored cars and 
machine guns. It furnished the police with millions of rounds of small arms ammunition, 
thousands of revolvers, shotguns, tear gas grenades, riot batons, shields and helmets, 
hundreds of walkie-talkies, police cars and wagons, gas masks and bullet proofvests. 45 
Students from San Carlos University, as well as labor unions and leftist political parties, 
frequently demonstrated against the government during the Kennedy years and the 
Administration wanted always to be fully prepared . As former AID Administrator 
David Bell testified before Congress in 1963: 
The police are the most sensitive point of contact between the 
government and the people, close to the focal points of unrest and better 
trained and equipped than even military in 
most cases to deal with both major and minor forms of violence, 
conspiracy, and subversion.46 
In the opening paragraph of the International Police Academy's catalogue, the 
Office of Public Safety stated that of all its programs "training has the most enduring 
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effect. 1147 While Academy spokesmen characterized the school's course material as 
dealing exclusively with "those modern techniques of law enforcement necessary to 
maintain an effective, responsive and humane police force, 1148 counter-insurgency and 
political warfare constituted a considerable part of all instruction, according to the 
academy's own published curriculum. Lectures , such as "The Threat to Latin America," 
"Communism in the Caribbean" and "The Enemy Within," indicated the ideological 
flavor of this supposedly 1,lllbiased, strictly professional, training. 49 
Public Safety Advisers in Guatemala furnished in-country police training as well. 
Each adviser put together a team of top IPA graduates , high ranking senior Guatemalan 
police, as well as U.S. military police personnel from the American Embassy's MAAG 
Army mission to conduct police training seminars throughout Guatemala. The Office of 
Public Safety's in-country advisory staff: like all American security programs in 
Guatemala, was relatively large. From two political advisers in 1961, the OPS mission 
grew to four by 1965 and seven by 1969, making it the largest contingent in Latin 
America. (See table below.) 
TABLE IV50 
US ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICAN POLICE FORCES UNDER THE 
PUBLIC SAFETY 
PROGRAM - FISCAL YEARS 1961- 1969 
(Current U.S . dollars , in thousands) 
Total Expenditures Students Trained in the US US Public Safety Advisors 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Columbia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
120 78 2 
2,325 
8,612 
2,386 
6,944 
1,921 
4,193 
3,915 
45 
64 
570 
163 
448 
160 
204 
160 
2 
1 
5 
4 
3 
3 
(TABLE IV continued) 
Total Expenditures Students Trained in the US US Public Safety Advisors 
El Salvador 2,092 168 1 
Guatemala 4,855 462 7. 
Honduras 1,741 105 3 
Jamaica 780 92 1 
Mexico 745 34 
Nicaragua 315 81 2 
Panama 2,148 202 3 
Paraguay 23 
Peru 4,142 llO 
Uruguay 2,209 173 4 
Venezuela 3,625 541 4 
Other/Regions 2,239 36 
TOTAL 55,307 3,874 45 
While the OPS mission was still relatively small compared to the U.S. military 
mission, it remained vital due to its strategic placement at the heart of the Guatemalan 
police apparatus . OPS advisors and their associate personnel trained, directed and 
indoctrinated thousands of Guatemalan rank and file police officers. According to AID 
figures the in-country training program involved some 30,000 Guatemalan police during 
the decade of the 1960s, making it the largest in Latin America. 51 In-country training 
covered urban and rural patrolling operations, vehicle and equipment maintenance , the 
tracking of suspected subversives, communication , intelligence, and the 
"implementation of modem scientific aids," (torture). 52 
The Guatemalan National Police Force expanded dramatically during this period 
of intensive U.S. training and modernization . From 3,000 men in 1961 it grew to 4,500 
in 1965 and to 6,500 by 1968. Due to their sensitive nature, many of these figures may 
only be fragmentary . The Guatemala government employed numerous "reservists" and 
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"assistants" during periods of terrorist crises in the 1960s. Part of the OPS training 
and indoctrination of the Guatemalan National Police included the Kennedy 
counter-insurgency doctrine of employing "associated friendly paramilitary forces to 
help support embattled free world governments. "53 Both the Guatemala military and 
police maintained close links to rural and urban paramilitary squads throughout the 
1960s. These right wing groups frequently consisted of retired or reserve police and 
Army officers joined typic~lly by plantation overseers and factory foremen employed by 
the Guatemala oligarchy. Because of the sensitive nature of these groups and the 
danger of their activities smearing the reputation of the U.S. Office of Public Safety, the 
program itself rarely provided them with arms. Instead, the Guatemala police 
purchased weaponry for them through private arms sales with U.S. manufacturing 
firms. (See table below.) 
TABLE V54 
US ARMS SALES TO GUATEMALAN POLICE FORCES 1961-1969 
Quantity Products lmQQrter License Date ReciQient 
75,000 rds FC .45 cal ammo Jones Aircraft & Arms 6/61 Police Use 
-New York, NY 
100,000 rds FC amrno(Army 3800 45cal.) " 9/61 Police Use 
120 SW .38 cal. revolvers Smith & Wesson 12/61 Judicial Police 
-Springfield, MA 
120 SW .22 cal. revolvers " 6/62 Judicial Police 
75 CI .38 cal. revolvers Colt Industries 6/93 National Police 
-New York, NY 
640 CI .38 cal. revolvers 12/63 National Police 
25,000 rds FC .38 cal. ammo Jones Aircraft & Arms 6/64 National Police 
-New York, NY 
167,000 rds WI ammo (.388,.222,.270 Winchester Industries 9/64 Treasury Police 
.32,.22 ,.25,.38 cal.) -Hartford, CT 
3/65 National Police 
65 WI rifles 6/65 Judicial Police 
100 SW .38 cal. revolvers Smith & Wesson 9/65 Treasury Police 
-Springfield, MA 
650,000 rds WI ammo (.22,.25,.32, " 12/65 National Police 
.78,.380 cal.) 
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(TABLE V continued) 
Quantity Products Importer License Date Recipient 
2,500 AA MPG-100 CNgas AAI Corp-Baltimore , MD 2/66 National Police 
grenades 
2,500 AA MPG-100 C gas grenades II 2/66 National Police 
200 SW .38 cal. revolvers Smith & Wesson 10/67 Judicial Police 
- Springfield , MA 
150 CI .38 cal . revolvers Colt Industries 12/67 National Police 
-New York, NY 
150 CI .22 cal . pistols/revolvers 3/68 Treasury Police 
345,400 rds WI ammo (.22,.243,.250. Winchester Industries 3/68 National Police 
· .270,38, cal .) -Hartford , CT 
120 SW .38 cal . revolvers Smith & Wesson 12/68 Treasury Police 
-Springfield, MA 
300 CI .38 revolvers Colt Industries 3/69 National Police 
-New York, NY 
250 CI .22 pistols/revolvers II 4/69 Judicial Police 
During crisis periods in the early 1960s, the United States frequently rushed 
additional special purpose police equipment on U.S. Army transport planes directly to 
Guatemala City. Some of this equipment was similar to that of the Soviet Bloc. A 
March 15, 1962, memorandum to the President stated: 
Contrary to the impression in a cable from Guatemala City this morning, 
most of the internal security equipment which has been approved has 
been delivered. Two items, sickening gas and two water tank trucks 
were not initially approved because it was not thought desirable to 
associate the United States with these patently repressive instruments. 
As a substitute new tank trucks , which incidentally must be procured in 
Germany and are of the type used by the Soviets and East Germans 
along the Berlin Wall (author's italics) have been sent and are now in 
Guatemala City ... 55 
It is ironic that John F. Kennedy, famous for his 1963 speech at the Berlin Wall 
condemning Communist tyranny against the people of Eastern Europe , used the exact 
same instruments of repression against college students and labor unions in Guatemala. 
This classified document is also indicative of Kennedy's keen interest in the internal 
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security of Latin American nations. One would not ordinarily suppose that a U.S. 
president would be concerned with such detailed minutia as the type of crowd control 
equipment employed against rioters in Guatemala City. 
Civic action provided another keystone to the Kennedy Doctrine in Guatemala 
and particularly emphasized the notion of "winning the hearts and minds" of the 
Guatemalan people as we)l as vigorously promoting the concept of "nation building." 
The Pentagon defined civic action as: 
the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the 
local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, 
agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation and others 
contributing to economic and social development which would also serve to 
improve the standing of the military forces with the population . 56 
Several questions arise from the definition itself By its very nature civic action 
contained an imperialist connotation. It consisted largely of bringing civilization to the 
natives. The whole concept was externally imposed like most Alliance for Progress 
programs. It also embodied a militarist solution. Under civic action the military 
became the chief agent of economic development in the countryside, not civilian 
government agencies or the peasants themselves. The third question to ask is why does 
the indigenous military's standing with the population need to be improved? The 
answer was that in most of the Third Word countries where the United States 
employed civic action, the military had a terrible reputation as the violent gendarme of 
the unjust status quo. Tiris was certainly the case in Guatemala where the appearance 
of soldiers in Indian villages touched off panic -- and for good reason. Civic action 
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therefore involved the concept of having soldiers with few economic skills attempt to 
bring material prosperity to people who hated them 
Since civic action neatly tied together both the military and economic 
components of the Alliance for Progress, the Kennedy Administration enthusiastically 
pushed it as a kind of panacea for the socio-political problems of Latin America. In his 
March 13, 1961, Alliance for Progress speech President Kennedy stated: "And the new 
generation of military leaders has shown an increasing awareness that armies can not 
' 
only defend their countries -- they can as we have learned through our own Corps of 
Engineers, help to build them "57 Unlike counter-insurgency, civic action had the 
advantage of being far more palatable to elements of the Congress that remained 
skeptical of Kennedy's militaristic approach to Latin America. Senator George Aiken of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed these sentiments when he spoke to 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. 
I have been concerned as I know you have over the past years , Mr . Secretary, 
lest we provide the means for arming one Latin American country against 
another -- or against their own people. I know we have both expressed a hope 
that there will be more conversion to engineering battalions and other phases of 
the military besides that of being strictly policemen. And I am glad to hear you 
report what progress is being made. 58 
Normally the Civil Action portion of a Military Assistance Program (MAP) 
grant was in the area of 10-15%. (In Guatemala in the early 1960s it averaged 12%.) 59 
But this 10-15% greatly eased the Congressional passage of MAP grants to dictatorial 
regimes. Administration officials "talked up" the benefits of the Civic Action portion of 
military assistance while they publicly down played the more unsavory aspect of 
counter-insurgency and Office of Public Safety funding which really made up the lion's 
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share of grants. The opposite was true in classified documents where State Department 
and CIA personnel rarely emphasized Civic Action as a workable solution to the crisis 
in Guatemala. 
The United States sent its very first Civic Action Mobile Training Team 
(CAMTT) to Guatemala in November 1960. Guatemala served as a sort of guinea pig 
for virtually all of Washington's Latin American security initiatives in this period. At 
first the program was designed to have a very "low cost", almost "no cost" budgetary 
profile. The U.S. would simply provide training and the Guatemalan military would 
pick up the tab for improving its nation's infrastructure. In 1961 the Kennedy 
Administration expanded funding dramatically from the $75,000 the Eisenhower 
Administration provided to $310,000.60 President Ydigoras expressed immense 
enthusiasm for this new version of military assistance. Unpopular at the time, he saw 
civic action as a vehicle to improve his image. The Guatemalan civic action program 
was unique from all others in Latin America in that the United States Civic Action 
coordinator acted solely as an advisor. As part of the deal to allow it to be tested in 
their country, the Guatemalan military controlled and conducted the entire program 
Both U.S. Army Mission and AID officials complained of this, fearing the notoriously 
corrupt Y digoras might siphon off funding. Indeed for the amount of money and 
equipment disbursed, the Guatemalan Army did not complete that many projects. 
Civic action in Guatemala focused on a limited number of irrigation projects, 
dispensary services, road building, school construction, water purification and sanitation 
and communication improvements. As with several large AID projects many of these 
had a dual civilian-military purpose. In accordance with U.S. military doctrine, the 
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Guatemalan military carried out the majority of its civic action programs in the most 
disaffected regions of the countryside, Zacapa and Izabal where the rebel movement 
flourished. 61 
The problems that resulted from the Guatemalan civic action program illustrated 
some of the basic weaknesses and contradictions of the Alliance for Progress and the 
Kennedy Doctrine in general. Supposed altruism engendered resentment from all sides. 
Peasants and Indians expr~essed suspicion over these projects, particularly road building 
and the laying of telephone lines in guerrilla areas. In the past, government school and 
road construction always employed local Indian labor, providing desperately needed 
income to the rural poor . Now the Guatemalan Army carried out the majority of these 
construction projects , eliminating civilian jobs. This also angered local ladino 
construction firm owners. Large landowners complained that irrigation projects made 
the Indian more self-reliant and less apt to report to work on their plantations. 
Landowners regarded civic action built school houses with particular anathema. "Once 
an Indian can read you can never get him to work. .. he becomes lazy ... no good," one 
stated in Barizan after the military erected a new school house. 62 
Indian and peasant workers felt they could build schools and clinics more 
cheaply and efficiently than the Army. They pointed to shoddy construction, inflated 
costs, and graft at virtually every civic action site. Soldiers invariably sold left-over 
construction materials to local businessmen. Many officers in the Guatemalan Army 
infused with machismo and a centuries old warrior code deeply resented having to play 
the part of "glorified construction workers." They felt it denigrated their stature as 
soldiers to swing picks and shovels. With guerrillas operating openly in the 
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countryside, civic action programs seemed superfluous to them, their job was to kill the 
enemies of the state. Talented ambitious officers avoided civic action duty. 
Incompetent, corrupt ones generally ran the program 63 
Because of its relatively low budget, $300,000 - $500,000 per year in the 1960s 
(though some of this was supplemented with Guatemalan funds), the U.S.-Guatemalan 
Civic Action Program had a showcase atmosphere to it. Isolated projects furnished 
excellent ribbon cutting photo opportunities for U.S. and Guatemalan political and 
military leaders. "A lot of it was a publicity gimmick," Peace Corp worker Gerald 
McGetrick noted. 64 Indeed in 1963 some 20% of the U.S. Civic Action budget in 
Guatemala went to such ceremonies, receptions and brochure publications, detailing the 
accomplishments of Civic Action in Guatemala. 65 The project never really made much 
of a dent in the horrendous poverty of the countryside which by 1964 was the second 
worst in the Hemisphere after Haiti. Bringing more soldiers into contact with peasants 
and Indians did not have the beneficial effect Kennedy Administration officials hoped 
for either. Guatemala officers could barely conceal their contempt for Indians even 
while they worked among them Stuck in isolated villages for weeks at a time, they 
often raped Indian women and confiscated food and drink. Questionable polls 
( conducted in virtually occupied villages) showed only a slight increase in respect for 
the military among the populace during the projects which rapidly eroded once the 
soldiers left. Peasants became cynical. "You have to have a guerrilla unit nearby to get 
drinking water ," one said. 66 President Y digoras liked to throw handfuls of candy at 
Indian children while visiting civic action sites in perhaps a fitting metaphor for the 
whole program 67 Guerrilla fighter Hernandez Mayen, a witness to U.S.-Guatemalan 
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civic action as a child, said: "I was glad that the Army built the school, but I would have 
liked it better if they had killed all the landlords . 1168 
If the Kennedy Administration could not wm the "hearts and minds" of 
Guatemalan peasants , it was determined to win over those of the Guatemalan military. 
By early 1962, the White House translated the intellectual theory of counter-insurgency 
into a comprehensive bureaucratic program In January, 1962, National Security 
.. 
Memorandum 124 established the Special Group (Counter-insurgency) as a permanent 
part of the administration's national security apparatus (See table below) 
Table Vl 69 
President 
---------
-Special Group 
(Counterinsurgency) 
I Executive Departments 
and Agencies 
-----------------Members 
State Department, Chairman 
Attorney General 
Department of Defense 
Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Agency for International Development 
United States Information Agency 
Special Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs 
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National lecurity Council 
Members 
President 
Vice-President 
Secretary of State 
Secretary of Defense 
Director , Office of 
Emergency Planning 
OFFICIALS : 
Special Assistant to the 
President for National 
Security Affairs 
Executive Secretary 
The Special Group, which met every Thursday afternoon in the Executive Office 
Building, centered on formulating security policy for several designated target 
countries. Though numerous other countries were later added in 1962 only four here 
mentioned by name in National Security Memorandum 124 -- Laos, Thailand, South 
Vietnam and Guatemala . ., When asked how trouble spots were singled out, Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric replied: 
Well, usually either State of CIA or once in a while AID or Defense 
would come up with a program which some desk officer had honed in 
on. It wasn't a very scientific process ... It really reflected what was 
happening in the world at a particular time and what particular area 
offices were interested in ... 70 
This Special Group (Counter-insurgency) structure proved important because it 
was duplicated at the U,S. Embassy in Guatemala City (and many others) with Special 
Group (Counter-insurgency) Country Teams. These comprised the chief 
representatives of the embassy, the military attaches, the USIA, the AID, the CIA, 
military missions (or MAAGs) and other agencies represented in Guatemala. The 
Guatemalan Special Group Country Team met frequently under the close supervision 
and leadership of the Ambassador, John 0. Bell. 71 This whole process further 
militarized U.S. embassies. Instead of being diplomats, ambassadors like Bell became 
quasi-military leaders. The whole concept of counter- insurgency contained a 
conspirational, cloak and dagger flavor which appealed to the Kennedy sense of style. 
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The very concept helped lead ambassadors like Bell into clandestine midnight meetings 
with the Guatemalan military and opposition political leaders, ever deeper into the 
internal affairs and political morass of Guatemala. The cult of counter-insurgency 
encouraged an underhanded, manipulative approach to foreign relations. "Every 
member of the embassy b~came an operative. We really started to think that we could 
control events in what was really an uncontrollable society, "72 one official in the 
Guatemalan embassy later admitted. The Kennedy Administration's entire view of the 
world was that of a giant conspiracy which could only be mastered from great centers 
of power. 
Before an actual guerrilla movement erupted in February 1962, the Guatemalan 
counter-insurgency program focused mainly on training the Guatemalan army in 
preparation for this new style warfare. The Department of Defense erected a complex 
new counter-insurgency bureaucracy to match the White House's which reached down 
from the Pentagon to the lowest individual Guatemalan conscript. ( See table on next 
page.) 
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TABLE VII 73 
COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND CMC ACTION 
ORGANIZATION MODEL FOR TRAINING 
Secretary of Defense Assistant for Special Operat ions 
Secretary of Army Counter-insurgency Assistant 
' 
' Chiefs of Staff Special Assistant for 
Counter-insurgencv 
Army General Staff 
Deputy Chief of Staff Continental Army Command 
(CONARC) 
Assistant Deputy 
Chief of Staff for 
Special Opera tions 
School of the Special Warfare Director for Special Director for Civil Civil Affairs 
Americas School Warfare Affairs School 
(Canal Zone) (Fort Bragg) (Counter- insurgency) (CivicAction ) (Fort Gordon) 
Tue majority of out-of-country counter-insurgency training for Guatemalan 
officers and enlisted men took place at the U.S. Army Caribbean School in Panama , 
renamed the United States School of the Americas on July 1, 1963. President Kennedy 
placed particular emphasis on this school, vastly increasing its faculty, training facilities, 
curriculum, and enrollment. 74 The school's normal student load at one time consisted of 
about 500 Latin American students (as opposed to 90 during the Eisenhower years). 
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and specialists from the United States military though Latin American officers also took 
part . The school had two instructional departments -- the internal security department 
and the technical department. The former's course work was taught almost exclusively 
in Spanish and included counter-insurgency operations, military intelligence, military 
police, command and staff: infantry operations, jungle warfare, and airborne assault. 
The department , according to its own handbook, provided "instruction in every aspect 
of counter-insurgency :, military, paramilitary, political, sociological, and 
psychological. "75 The school provided additional jungle training for Guatemalan cadets 
at the United States Air Force Tropical Survival School located a the nearby Albrook 
Airbase in the Canal Zone. The U.S. Army's Eighth Special Forces Group which 
Kennedy permanently deployed to Panama in 1962 supplied instructors.76 The table 
below shows the number of Guatemalan graduates from the School of the Americas 
1961-1964, approximating the Kennedy years. 
TABLE VIII77 
Central American Graduates 
United States School of the Americas 1961-1964 
Country 
Costa Rica 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
TOTAL FOR CENTRAL AMERICA 
TOTAL FOR LATIN AMERICA 
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Number 
1,639 
358 
958 
810 
2,969 
1,420 
8, 154 
16,343 
Guatemala did not represent the highest number of graduates, largely because 
alone of all the Central American countries, it maintained a U.S. Green Beret operated 
counter-insurgency training base on its own territory, secretly established in Maricos in 
May, 1962. By then Guatemala, unlike her sister republics, did not need to ship so 
many officers and enlisted men to Panama for the latest, up-to-date instruction. Also of 
note in the chart is the fact that nearly half of all Western Hemisphere School of the 
Americas graduates came, from Central America even though their nations represented 
only a tiny percentage of the total Latin American population. The proximity of the 
region to both Cuba and the United States, plus the budding insurgency in Guatemala, 
heightened the Kennedy White House's security concerns for the region. Walter 
LaFeber, one of the leading revisionist historians on U.S.-Central American relations, 
refers to the U.S. School of the Americas as the School of Golpes (coups) in his 1984 
work Inevitable Revolutions. A Mexican official remarked: "Give me the names of the 
first 60 students and I'll pick your presidents in Latin America for the next 10 years. "78 
Indeed, numerous officers trained there led revolts against democratically elected 
governments in their home countries. While the Kennedy Administration initially hoped 
to graduate professional, democratic minded young officers from these huge academies, 
the emphasis on anti-communist ideology and counter-insurgency turned out a throng 
of authoritarian rightists. Worse, their activities increased anti-Americanism throughout 
the Hemisphere. These new Kennedy trained Latin American soldiers wore United 
States-style uniforms, insignia, and helmets, carried United States weapons, and in the 
case of Guatemala, were led by United States advisors. Who they represented was all 
too apparent to embittered, impoverished campesinos. 
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The cream of the Guatemalan young officer corps received further 
out-of-country U.S . counter-insurgenc y instruction at the U.S . Army Special Warfare 
Center and School at Fort Bragg , North Carolina . Unlike the School of the Americas , 
the Fort Bragg facility furnished training for primarily American troops and officers . 
The United States bestowed a particular badge of honor on the select Latin American 
officers (usually the brightest of their own service academies) that it invited to this 
school. 79 (See table below.) 
TABLE IX 80 
LATIN AMERICAN GRADUATES 
UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER 
AND SCHOOL (FORT BRAGG) 1961-1963 
Country Number 
Argentina 19 
Bolivia 23 
Brazil 2 
Chile 6 
Colombia 5 
Costa Rica 1 
Ecuador 14 
El Salvador 1 
Guatemala 13 
Haiti 1 
Honduras 1 
Mexico 3 
Nicaragua 8 
Peru 4 
Venezuela 11 
TOTAL 112 
Again for a country of only four million, Guatemala's 13 graduates indicate a 
disproportionate representation . Graduates from this elite center invariably rose high in 
the ranks of the Guatem alan military to command positions and political office (Lucas 
Garcia and Rios Montt , presidents of Guatemala from 1978-1982 and 1982- 1983 
respecti vely, both attended this school in the early 1960s ). 81 
60 
JI 
The United States also trained selected Guatemalan officers in civic action at the 
Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia; in close support and napalm 
bombing at the United States Air Force School at Albrook Air Base in the Canal Zone, 
in Air Force Special Operations at the Air Commando School at Howard Air Force 
Base in the Canal Zone and at the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) at Elgin Air 
Force Base, Florida. 82 
In 1962 on Presid1;nt Kennedy's expressed recommendation, an Inter-American 
Defense College was established at Fort Lesley McNair in Washington, DC from which 
16 Guatemalan cadets graduated by 1964.83 The proximity with the capital gave a 
number of these young Guatemalan officers the chance to forge close links with 
government officials, Congressmen and U.S. military officers at a number of 
professional and social functions. 84 
Another important component m U.S . sponsored Guatemalan 
counter-insurgency training was the U.S. Army Special Forces Mobile Training Teams 
(MTTs) . These consisted typically of twelve to thirty-six men squads of Green Beret 
specialists who were flown in from the United States Eighth Special Forces Group at 
Fort Clayton in the Canal Zone to train Guatemalan non-commissioned officers in 
weapon use, equipment maintenance, paramilitary techniques , and anti-guerrilla 
operations . 85 A great advantage of the MTT concept was that it allowed the Executive 
Branch in emergencies or otherwise to donate potentially vast amounts of specialized 
training, equipment, even manpower, to Guatemala off budget. MTT costs were 
outside the Military Assistance Program (MAP) funding for a pa1ticular country such as 
Guatemala . They were billed instead to the Eighth Special Forces and Southern 
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Command's budget in Panama. Equipment could be "lent" from the Eighth Special 
Forces, training provided, even direct combat troops supplied without it ever showing 
up as an overrun on Guatemala's MAP budget. The MTT program allowed both the 
Kennedy and later Johnson Administration to circumvent Congressional oversight in 
their counter-insurgency war in Guatemala. 
Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning's 1966 Internal Security and Military 
Power in Latin America provides an excellent analysis of the Kennedy militarization of 
Latin America in the early 1960s. An orthodox or neo-conservative work and nowhere 
near as critical as later studies by Immerman, LaFeber, Stephen Schlesinger, or Rabe, 
Internal Security and Military Power was, nonetheless, ahead of its time in calling into 
question many assumptions of the Kennedy Doctrine. The authors proved prescient in 
their delineations of said doctrine's contradictions. Another excellent work in this vein 
is Cesar D. Sereseres' 1971 doctoral dissertation "Military Development and the U.S. 
Military Assistance Program for Latin America." Sereseres argues that Kennedy's 
program did succeed, but only in transmitting military expertise, not democratic values, 
to Guatemala. 
All this vast panoply of inter-country training brought increased contact between 
United States and Guatemalan military personnel. Part of the whole assumption behind 
this effort (for Congressional sensibilities anyway) was that such contact had a 
beneficial effect on the social and political views of Guatemalan officers. Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara assured a Senate subcommittee that "the experience we 
have had indicates that exposure of military officers to our schools acquaints them with 
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democratic philosophies and democratic ways of thinking which they in tum take back 
to their countries. 1186 How instructions on the proper method for slitting a guerrilla 
suspect's throat with a K-bar knife fit into this scenario, the Secretary never elaborated . 
Even within the Kennedy Administration, considerable skepticism existed on this point. 
In 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin stated: 
Theoretically we can put vast amounts of arms and riot equipment into 
Latin American hands today to stamp out rebellion and shoot down the 
Communist leaders and their followers. But in whose hands would we 
put these arms? How can we be sure that the riot quellers of today will 
not be the rioters of tomorrow? What good are arms and security 
controls in a permanently unstable society?87 
These words could serve as the epitaph for the Kennedy Doctrine in Guatemala. 
Senator Edward Gruening, a sharp critic of Kennedy's Latin American policy, 
stated early in 1962: 
Latin American military leaders contrary to the Administration's 
misplaced faith in them, will continue to react to power struggles in their 
own countries in accordance with their own estimates of the situation, 
their own ambitions, their vested privileges, and their own heritage . 
Democracy does not rub off by commingling of individuals or by grants 
of military assistance. 1188 
Since it would neither fundamentally change its investment and trade policy with 
Guatemala, nor use its political and economic leverage to force through real agrarian 
reform, the Kennedy Administration chose the military option together with some 
largely cosmetic local improvement projects (this is not to say that the people involved 
in these projects were insincere). It decided ultimately to bet on the Army and the 
internal security system of Guatemala in order to achieve its over-arching strategic 
goals . This militarization of policy was by no means unique to Guatemala. It took 
place within a continental, indeed global, context. When Premier Khrushchev said in 
1961, "We will bury you," he fed into the fears of the Kennedy Administration that 
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Third World nationalism, both in Latin America and among the newly emergent African 
and Asian nations, would naturally embrace World Communism and not the United 
States . While in retrospect much ofKhrushev's rhetoric can be seen as bb.1£:: at the time 
to many highly respected observers the communist movement seemed in ascendancy. 
As William 0. Walker ill has pointed out in his excellent 1994 article, "Mixing the 
Sweet with the Sour: Kennedy, Johnson, and Latin America," the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis combined with the ,frustration and failure of implementing reforms, pushed the 
Kennedy Administration irrevocably in its last year or so towards a less idealistic, more 
hard line stance in Latin America. The White House accepted military coups in 
Argentina, Peru and Bolivia without cut-offs of economic or military assistance, which 
it had formerly employed in such instances. 89 As one diplomat brazenly put it, Latin 
American governments needed "less development and democracy, and more machine 
guns. 1190 The table below showed how massive and unprecedented a buildup the 
Kennedy program embodied in the Western Hemisphere. 
TABLEX 91 
UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA 1952-1963 
Fiscal Year 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
64 
Amount (in dollars) 
200,000 
11,200,000 
34,500,000 
31,800,000 
30,400 ,000 
43,900,000 
47,900 ,000 
54 ,600,000 
53,700,000 
91,600,000 
123,200,000 
149,700,000 
While a gradual buildup already commenced under the Eisenhower 
Administration (the huge leap from 1953 to 1954 was at least partially attributed to the 
anxieties surrounding the 1954 Guatemalan coup), the virtually 300% increase from 
1960 to 1963 remained striking. With the advent of the Kennedy Doctrine, the Cold 
War had truly come home to Guatemala and substantial other parts of Latin America. 
The Kennedy Administration's creation of an almost parallel secret 
Counter-insurgency State stretched out both vertically and horizontally from the lofty 
heights of the White House to the Department of Defense, the Agency for International 
Development, the FBI, CIA, to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, the National 
Palace, seat of the Guatemalan Government and Military, to Training Centers and 
Academies all over the world, and finally to individual nineteen year old Guatemalan 
officers and conscripts and Mayan couples and their impoverished children drinking 
dirty water from empty U.S. ration cans. The immense scope, bureaucracy and import 
of this effort testified to the enormous influence the United States imposed on 
Guatemalan society at every level in the early 1960s. The contrast was even more 
striking compared to the 1940s and 1950s when, as one State Department official put 
it: "Except for an occasional flare-up, the Latin American Desk was always a good 
place to take a nap. "92 By the early 1960s, the Kennedy White House saw to it that no 
one was sleeping. The vast expanded machinery of statecraft kept grinding 
remorselessly well into the night with all its attendant consequences. The Cuban Missile 
C1i.sis had shown that the war for the soul of Latin America could indeed be a war to 
the death, involving vast global stakes. The outbreak of leftist insurgencies throughout 
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the region, combined with the immense increase in U.S. military assistance , set the stage 
for over three decades of "dirty war" in the Western Hemisphere. That war would first 
commence in Guatemala. 
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CHAPTER IV 
U.S. RESPONSE TO INSURGENCY AND POLITICAL CRISIS 
IN GUATEMALA 1962-1965 
On the morning of February 6, 1962, a force of about fifty Guatemalan 
guerrillas attacked and captured two army outposts, one in the town of Morales, the 
other in Bananera, the headquarters of the United Fruit Company's Atlantic Division. 
The guerrillas seized weapons and money from the military posts and robbed the United 
Fruit office of $18,000. The leader of both groups was the former Lieutenant Marco 
Antonio Yon Sosa, one of the key participants in the November 13 1960 military revolt 
against Y digoras. Along with his compatriot Luis Augusto Turcios Lima, Yon Sosa 
launched a guerrilla insurgency which unnerved the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations, turned both rebels into popular heroes and touched off what amounted 
to a thirty-year civil war Guatemala. As a sign of the desperate, devil-may-care 
recklessness of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement, Yon Sosa commandeered a transit 
bus that same day making all the passengers (many of whom cheered him) get off along 
a dirt road. He then crashed through a military roadblock with the bus, shooting out all 
the windows in a wild fire fight from which he narrowly escaped with his life. It would 
prove the first in a series of hairsbreadth escapes which only further enhanced his legend 
and frustrated the Guatemalan military's attempt to capture him 1 
Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima were only twenty-two and nineteen respectively 
when they joined the November 1960 revolt. Graduates of the Polytechnic School, 
Guatemala's military academy, they had both received training in guerrilla warfare at 
United States Army facilities as did most young Guatemalan officers; Turcios Lima at 
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the Ranger school at Fort Benning, Georgia and Yon Sosa at Fort Gulick in the Canal 
Zone. Turcios Lima in particular enjoyed his sojourn in the United States. "Sure I liked 
it. We had the officers' club, 15 ounce Texas steaks, good clothes, the best equipment. 
Plenty of money, too; every month I sent $150 to my mother. What worries did I 
have?"2 
Neither Yon Sosa nor Turcios Lima embraced a coherent political philosophy at 
the time of the revolt, aside from the hyper-nationalism prevalent among young 
Guatemalan officers. Neither communis~ socialism nor any long term societal reforms 
interested most of the rebels. Their three principal demands included the resignation of 
Y digoras, the cashiering of politically appointed senior officers and the transformation 
of numerous military bases into educational centers. Indeed, on the morning of 
November 14th, when some eight hundred peasants presented themselves to the rebels 
at the Zacapa base and asked for arms, the officers refused to issue them 3 A 
correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor wrote from Guatemala City that 
December: 
It was the very limited scope of the movement's political orientation that 
caused its military downfall; having a huge arsenal and a military zone 
under its command signified nothing, so long as the military leaders did 
not understand clearly why they were fighting and towards what goal 
they were moving. 4 
Faced with the prospect of execution or lengthy imprisonment if captured, the 
more daring rebel officers escaped into the countryside. Yon Sosa fled to Honduras, 
while Turcios Lima managed to cross the border into El Savador. Along the way they 
frequently sought refuge among peasants and it was through this experience that 
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Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa began their political conversion to Communism Cesar 
Montes , a later guerrilla leader, explained:: 
In Guatemala, as in Honduras and El Salvador all the peasants helped and 
protected the rebels, tried to influence them and win them over to their side. 
The peasants' motive was not only to offer them solidarity and sympathy but 
also to win allies and leaders in their struggle for land. The peasants had done 
this with many rebel leaders over and over again; they had been doing it for 
years, for centuries. Many of the rebels did not respond but the effort was not 
in vain; the influence was felt by some, although not immediately. Yon Sosa and 
Alejandro de Leon's companeros did not jump to conclusions but little by little 
the peasants won them over. 5 
In the spring of 1961 Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima slipped back into Guatemala 
and made several secretive forays to the capital. There they held talks with leaders of 
Guatemalan political organizations. Of the "mainstream" political parties in Guatemala, 
the Revolutionary Party (PR) was the most leftist oriented and one would assume 
sympathetic to the rebels' cause. The PR had been the party of the progressive liberal 
presidents Juan Jose Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz, that had dominated Guatemalan 
politics during the revolutionary period, the so-called "ten years of spring" between the 
1944 revolution and the 1954 U.S. backed coup.6 
At this stage of its development, however, the Revolutionary Party frowned 
upon direct involvement with the violence prone rebels. Repression under both Castillo 
Annas and Y digoras had decimated its ranks, imprisoning, executing and forcing into 
exile its most militant members. While the party detested Y digoras, it hoped to replace 
him constitutionally in the 1963 elections. Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa could not wait 
that long. 
In April 1961 Fidel Castro defeated the American sponsored Bay of Pigs 
invasion. This David over Goliath victory against the great imperialist enemy enthralled 
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communists, socialists, revolutionaries, and common people throughout Latin America. 
Yon Sosa and Turcios Lima were no exception. Tue victory also moved Cuba into a 
tighter alliance with the Soviet Union. In July 1961, the two young Guatemalan rebels 
began talks with the Partido Guatamelteco del Trabajo (PGT), Tue Guatemalan 
Communist Party. "They were different from the others," Turcios Lima later told an 
interviewer: "They really cared about the people. "7 From the very first meeting 
according to Turcios LiJv.a "a close collaboration began between the PGT and the 
military rebels. "8 But still in these first few years the Communists did not dominate the 
rebels' fairly broad based supporters. Guerrilla leader Camilo Sanchez recalled that 
when he joined the rebels he discovered "not only Communists but also sincere 
revolutionaries, Catholics, socialists, anarchists and people whose only aspiration was 
to overthrow the regime in order to replace it with something more equitable. "9 
In the same month of July 1961, Y digoras' government executed one of Turcios 
Lima's and Yon Sosa's closest military comrades -- Alejandro de Leon who had been 
captured by the chief of the Secret Police. This act precipitated a marked hardening in 
the resolve of the rebels to embark on a program of violent revolution rather than seek 
the political solution advocated by the Revolutionary Party. Tue rebel group called 
itself the Guerrilla Movement Alejandro de Leon - November Thirteen (MR-13) - a 
name that commemorated both their fallen comrade and the abortive revolt of 1960. In 
their February 1962 opening statement, broadcast over a secret radio transmitter and 
printed on thousands of leaflets distributed throughout Guatemala City, the guerrillas 
declared: 
Democracy vanished from our country long ago. No people can live in a 
country where there is no democracy. That is why the demand for 
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change is mounting in our country. We can no longer carry on in this 
way. We must overthrow the Y digoras government and set up a 
government which respects human rights, seeks ways and means to save 
our country from its hardships, and pursues a serious self-respecting 
foreign policy. 10 
This statement contained little in the way of Marxist ideology yet the Y digoras 
government immediately branded MR-13 a Castro-Communist movement hiding behind 
a progressive mask "to better dupe naive supporters and lull the United States into 
complacency .1111 Richard ,,Gott's 1970 Guerrilla Movements in Latin America is one of 
the first revisionist studies of the guerrillas in Guatemala. It paints a complex portrait of 
the various guerrillas' motivations and ideologies. Though clearly leftist, even Marxist 
in orientation , the Guatemalan insurgency, according to Gott , was never Moscow or 
even Havana controlled. Still it would later derive considerable moral and ideological 
support form the world wide communist movement . Unlike Marxist writers , Eduardo 
Galeano and Adolfo Gilly, Gott correctly perceived no inevitability to the guerrillas' 
success and is frank about their relative weakness in the 1960s. 
Though their initial attacks were militarily insignificant, the guerrillas succeeded 
in electrifying the anti-Y digoras forces within Guatemala and precipitated the first of 
numerous political crises. A further collapse in coffee prices and government losses in 
the December 1961 National Assembly Elections contributed to the social and political 
tensions . After leftist gunmen assassinated his universally despised Secret Police chief: 
Colonel Renulto Gonzalez , on January 24, 1962, Ydigoras declared a state of siege, 
shut down the University of San Carlos and flooded the capital with troops. 12 When the 
guerrillas began their attacks a few days later, students , labor unions and rebel 
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sympathizers organized large demonstrations and strikes throughout Guatemala. In the 
capital the demonstrations turned to riots. On February 16th student militants captured 
two radio stations in the capital and began broadcasting various Castroite and 
anti-Y digoras tracts. 13 In early March another guerrilla front, this one led by rebel 
Colonel Paz Tejada, called the "October 20th Front" in honor of Juan Jose Arevalo's 
1944 revolution, began attacks on the government from Honduras. Sympathizers 
detonated bombs throughout the capital.14 Ydigoras called up 20,000 reservists and 
stationed scores of soldiers in U.S. provided armored vehicles on every street comer of 
Guatemala City. U.S. Ambassador John 0. Bell feared the President was losing his 
gnp. He wired the military authorities in Panama "to prepare for emergency 
measures. '15 On the recommendation of the Commander in Chief Caribbean, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff dispatched a carrier group to Guatemala and ordered six additional 
C-130 transport planes to reinforce already alerted paratroopers and Special Forces in 
the Canal Zone. 16 Outraged Guatemalan political demonstrators continued to call for 
the President's resignation. These included not just the centrist Revolutionary Party 
(PR) and the Christian Democrats (CID) but even the right-wing National Liberation 
Movement (MLN) which held Y digoras responsible for the revolutionary chaos and 
resented his recent extremely modest land reform and tax proposals. 17 
With both the right and left against him, all Y digoras really had to turn to was 
the Guatemalan military and the United States. Fear of a second Cuba gripped both the 
State Department and the National Security Council which met on March 1st to discuss 
the crisis in Guatemala. The prospect of the Guatemalan government falling in a coup 
to leftist, possible Communist guerrillas and their political supporters, constituted the 
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ultimate nightmare of the Kennedy Administration. Its entire doctrine had been 
designed to prevent this. Y digoras played "the American card" masterfully. He wrote 
President Kennedy on February 28, 1962, advising him that "the Cubans will be here in 
a matter of days." 18 
In April 1962, the Kennedy Administration took its first serious political step in 
Guatemala when it encouraged U.S. ambassador John 0 . Bell to broker a political 
agreement whereby the ,Guatemalan military assumed virtual control of Y digoras' 
government. Increasing U.S. support for praetorianism or de facto military rule within 
the Guatemalan government can be traced from this date. The Guatemalan military was 
so concerned over the unrest it probably would have taken this step in any case. But 
U.S. support steeled their determination. "I conveyed to the military chiefs the United 
States understanding of the need for drastic measures in such a crisis," John Bell wrote 
to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. 19 
Y digoras replaced under pressure ten of his eleven civilian cabinet ministers with 
military officers, an unprecedented step in Guatemalan history. Only his civilian foreign 
minister, Unda Murillo, remained.20 The most powerful of these appointees was the 
Minister of Defense Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia, the Guatemalan officer with the 
strongest ties to the United States, who had most vigorously advocated the U.S. 
military doctrines of civic action, counter-insurgency, and out-of-country U.S. training 
for Guatemalan officers. Peralta had served as Chief of Delegation on the 
Inter-American Defense Board at Fort McNair, Washington, DC. He had also been 
chief military attache to the Guatemalan Embassy in Washington, 1957-1959.2 1 In a 
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comparison with a similar scenario unfolding in South Vietnam at almost the same time, 
ifY digoras represented the Diem of Guatemala, Peralta Azurdia was the Ky. 
The bulk of the Guatemalan military remained estranged from Y digoras despite 
his belated efforts since the November 1960 revolt to regain their favor. Y digoras 
especially indulged his Air Force. Well aware that most Latin American coups began 
with the bombing of the Presidential Palace, he doubled Air Force salaries, issued 
smart, distinctive blue uniforms and allowed pilots to supplement their incomes by up to 
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$20,000 a year through crop dusting. His pampering of the Air Force widened the rift 
between the two services which had intensified due to the alacrity with which the 
Guatemalan Air Force bombed rebel Army officers during the November 1960 uprising. 
The Guatemalan Army long regarded the Air Force established during World War II by 
American advisers as a largely U.S. creation. 22 Nicknamed the "old Fox", Ydigoras 
used these tactics of "divide and conquer" not only against his political rivals but against 
his own military, as did Diem, Ky, and Thieu in Vietnam U.S . indoctrination and 
training of the Guatemalan military, combined with the general ideological 
demonization of Castro presented in all U.S. service schools, contributed to the 
combined messianic and siege mentality of the Army's leadership in the crucial 
February-April 1962 crisis. Leading officers felt they had to take command "to save 
their country from the clutches of diabolical Castro-Communism "23 Aside from radio 
broadcasts of moral support, however, few credible links existed between Castro and 
the demonstrators. 
The increased flow of U.S. milita1y equipment, training and technology greatly 
enhanced the prestige of the Guatemalan military, boosting its power and influence at a 
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time when other segments of Guatemalan society appeared weak and fragmented . With 
most of its reform elements either dead or radicalized, the military's nationalism became 
wedded with a sharp distrust of all left leaning social reform. In a similar situation in 
October 1944, the military responded to the popular will and overthrew the tyrannical 
regime of Jorge Ubico, ushering in ten years of democracy . In April 1962, the officers 
closed ranks around the unpopular Y digoras and crushed the general strike. 
Their appetite fo~ political power whetted, indeed sanctioned, by the United 
States, segments of the Guatemalan military next plotted the overthrow of Y digoras 
himself to be replaced by a military junta. An interesting aspect of this process was the 
United States' constant denial of the effects of its own collaboration with the military at 
virtually every step of the way. In a telegram to the State Department dated August 14, 
1962, Ambassador John 0. Bell stated: 
I believe close U.S.-Latin military association does contribute something to the 
development of Latin American military respect for democratic and progressive 
policies and a great deal to their understanding of the dangers of communism I 
do not suppose this or any other association likely to persuade the military of 
the desirability of adhering to "Constitutional principles" if such adherence 
appears to them the equivalent of delivering themselves and their country into 
hands of radical regimes apt to produce Castro-type government...While there 
may be some truth to the notion that U.S . equipment used increase military 
prestige and increases the capability to suppress the citizenry whether such 
increased capability will or will not be used to suppress democracy or 
democratic elements is determined by attitudes and not the possession of 
non-possession of U.S . equipment.Recent MAP policies accentuating internal 
security mission and encouraging civic action seem right to me ... 24 
After his second close call in February-April 1962, Ydigoras still displayed 
amazing political survival skills. Realizing that once he crushed the small rural 
insurgency in Guatemala, his usefulness to the United States might end, he cleverly 
dithered on the anti-guerrilla front to the disgust of both the Guatemalan military and 
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the U.S. embassy's Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)25 In late October 
1962, once again playing the reformer, he even enacted the country's first income tax.26 
This proved too much even for his favorites in the Air Force. On November 25, 1962, 
encouraged by members of the oligarchy and upset over the possible return of the 
liberal former president Arevalo, a number of pilots bombed the National Palace. 
Y digoras emerged, covered with plaster and according to his own questionable account 
(he was sixty-six at the tii:µe ), began firing at the jets with a machine gun from the roof 
of his palace.27 Again Y digoras' byzantine intra-service tactics paid dividends. The 
Army, long jealous and resentful of its sister service's numerous perks, enthusiastically 
put down the revolt. Several senior Army officers, Colonel Peralta among them, feared 
a leftist takeover if the President was suddenly and violently overthrown. They planned 
on getting rid of him much more gradually themselves. 28 James Dunkerly's 1988 
post-revisionist work, Power in the Isthmus, supplies a detailed view of Guatemala's 
internal politics throughout this period . Unlike earlier revisionists, such as LaFeber, 
Immerman, Stephen Kinzer and Stephen Schlesinger, who tend to attribute almost all of 
Guatemala's problems to outside manipulation, Dunkerly explores the inner workings of 
Guatemalan domestic politics, the influences of both Spanish and Indian culture, and the 
complexities of class, race and ideology as they relate to Guatemalan society. While he 
views U.S. influence as a predominant constant , Dunkerly convincingly demonstrates 
that Guatemalan politics provide the crucial catalyst for virtually all U.S. interventions . 
The proposed return of former liberal progressive president Juan Jose Arevalo 
from exile in Mexico to run in the 1963 presidential election, lent additional urgency to 
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the military's plans to oust Ydigoras. Ydigoras seemingly went along with Arevalo's 
political comeback, announced by the exiled president on Mexican radio. The "Old 
Fox" apparently wished to play the various political parties in Guatemala off against one 
another by maintaining the "Arevalo option." Speaking to rightist, Y digoras 
condemned Arevalo; when addressing leftists he praised his reforms. Yet he took no 
definitive stand one way or the another to either ban the ex-president or let him run. 
The Guatemalan military took an extremely dim view of Arevalo. In the highly charged 
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reactionary atmosphere of the Cuban Missile Crisis and an ongoing insurgency, it 
regarded even a largely centrist figure like the ex-president as a "dangerous 
crypto-Communist . "29 Arevalo made his own contribution to the historiography of 
U.S.-Guatemalan relations with his early 1963 "dependency school" work, The Shark 
and the Sardines. Along with its title, Arevalo's overall viewpoint can best be 
encapsulated in a rough translation of one of his book's chapters: "The Pentagon, Wall 
Street, and the State Department -- Three Words for the Same Thing." His 
understandably bitter anti-American analysis equated U.S. policy with outright 
imperialism. He would soon face one wing of his designated unholy trinity. 
The U.S. Embassy in a secret memorandum to the State Department, dated 
November 12, 1962, ominously entitled "The Possibility of a Preventative Coup," noted 
that the Military are determined to prevent the ascension of Arevalo to the 
presidency ... No one should predict Ydigoras' early downfall ... [but] the introduction of 
the fear of Arevalo adds an additional element of danger to the equation. Recent steps 
on Y digoras' part to demonstrate that despite his many contacts with Arevalo, he is 
really anti-Arevalo, probably were calculated to ease military minds. "30 
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Student and labor groups stepped up their demonstrations throughout the winter 
of 1962-1963 as the Guatemalan left anticipated the return of their hero, Arevalo, the 
father of the 1944 revolution . Yon Sosa, Turcios Lima and Colonel Paz Tejada 
increased their hit and run guerrilla attacks in the Sierra de las Minas mountains, 
frequently cutting commercial traffic along the main Atlantic Highway. All the guerrilla 
opposition movements in Guatemala united in December 1962 into the Fuerzes 
Armedes Rebeldes (FARh Rebel Armed Forces. 31 Ydigoras further piqued the U.S . 
military mission at this juncture by forbidding the creation of a heavy armored battalion 
for continental defense. 32 He feared it would be used against him and his instincts 
proved prescient. The United States acquiesced and perhaps even conspired with 
Y digoras' defense minister Colonel Peralta Azurdia in the March 1963 plot to 
overthrow the president . 
Ambassador John 0. Bell met with Y digoras for the last time on March 25, 
1963. In a telegram summarizing their meeting, Bell stated: 
I told him in my view neither Guatemala nor the United States could accept the 
control of the government of Guatemala getting into hands which would be 
likely to deliver the country to communism again ... Certainly if it were possible 
to defeat Arevalo in a honest and clean election that would be a ideal. However 
there was a great danger that Arevalo might win the election either because the 
issues weren't clear, the opposition was too divided or the people might be 
deceived as to his character. 33 
Bell went on to say that Y digoras' position on "alternatives to the elections were 
guarded and unclear." Worse, Bell mentioned Y digoras' saying that "Arevalo according 
to the Constitution had a legal right to enter the election." A follow-up CIA report 
accused Y digoras of "collusion with the Marxist orientated Arevalo. "34 
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Five days previously Y digoras had met with President Kennedy at the Central 
American Presidents Meeting in San Jose , Costa Rica. Kennedy, according to 
Y digoras, was noticeably "chilly" towards him CIA reports of the period persistently 
questioned Y digoras' "reliability" -- notoriously dangerous words in the intelligence 
community. 35 On March 27, Arevalo arrived secretly in Guatemala City, setting off 
huge political rallies and numerous , according to the Office of Public Safety accounts --
"anti-American disturbances. "36 This new crisis took place at a time when the United 
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States was obsessed with the deterioration of another of its authoritarian allies -- the 
Diem regime in South Vietnam 
A constant shuttle of Guatemalan high ranking military officers to and from the 
U.S . Embassy followed until on the morning of March 31st, Y digoras awoke to a 
Sherman tank crashing through his residence's front gate . Defense Minister Peralta 
Azurdia announced a suspension of the 1956 Constitution , declared a state of siege and 
then almost as an afterthought proclaimed himself "Chief of State. "37 
An absolute "smoking gun" of U.S . complicity in the coup has yet to be 
declassified. "Citing top sources within the Kennedy Administration" journalist Georgia 
Anne Geyer in a December 24, 1966, article in the Miami Herald disclosed that 
President Kennedy chaired a secret meeting in early January, 1963, which "gave the 
green light" for a coup against Y digoras . 38 Two of the five alleged participants denied 
the meeting took place. One, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin 
Martin , insisted the United States never approved an overthrow . "No initiative was 
required for the military to oust Y digoras ," he told interviewers . He later admitted: 
"We decided not to try to stop the military if they moved to overthrow Y digoras, a 
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quite different thing from initiating a coup. 1139 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer 
in their 1983 Bitter Fruit provide one of the better accounts of U.S. machinations in the 
1963 coup though they slight Guatemalan participation. The whole 1963 episode 
remained strikingly similar to the November 1963 Diem coup in South Vietnam In 
both cases evidence from the conspirators supports the notion that at the very least the 
United States could have stopped either coup if it so desired. The military plotters in 
both cases would not ha':;e dared to act without the expressed sanction of the United 
States. Y digoras fared better than the assassinated Diem The military exiled him to 
Nicaragua, where he sulked and wrote his memoirs. 
In an April 3, 1963, news conference, a reporter asked President Kennedy in 
direct reference to the coup: "Are we going to have any consistent or uniform policy on 
whether or not to recognize governments that take power by force?" Kennedy replied: 
"No, we haven't got a consistent policy because circumstances are sometimes 
inconsistent ... This government that has taken over in Guatemala has indicated that it 
will eventually provide a return to civilian rule ... "40 In reality "civilian rule" would not 
return for three more years. On April 17, 1963 the United States recognized the new 
"government" a mere 18 days after the coup. In fact, by this time the Kennedy 
Administration did have a consistent policy on military coups in Latin America: if the 
officers involved expressed a strict anti-communist line, their government would be 
recognized; if the officers endorsed a leftist program, as in the 1963 military revolt in 
Bolivia, the United States withheld recognition and cut all aid. By 1963 the White 
House regarded the promotion of democracy in Latin America, so prevalent in its 1961 
86 
[! 
rhetoric, as impracticable given the exigencies of the Cold War. The Johnson 
Administration's Mann Doctrine of 1964 would crystallize this transformation. 
Ironically Colonel Peralta Azurdias' military government which the Kennedy 
Administration hoped would immediately attack the guerrillas hesitated to unleash an all 
out counter-insurgency war. The reasons proved complex. First, Peralta may have 
genuinely desired a rapprochement with the guerrillas. Though he had not taken part in 
the 1960 revolt, Peralta had a reputation as a mentor and confidant of many of the 
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younger rebel officers. He regarded a number of them as misguided youths who might 
yet be brought back into the fold now that their arch-nemesis, Y digoras, had been 
usurped. Military solidarity and fraternity were intense throughout the Guatemalan 
Armed Forces and in the early phases of the insurgency, many officers hesitated to fire 
upon brother officers, a phenomena which also occurred in the early months of the 
American Civil War. Second, Peralta, by all accounts a consummate professional, didn't 
feel his military was ready yet to take on a large-scale counter-insurgency campaign 
whose failure might cast a negative reflection on him. Third, like Y digoras, Peralta 
recognized the advantages to having a troublesome if not especially virulent guerrilla 
movement in Guatemala. It guaranteed continuous large scale U.S. economic and 
military aid and tended to portray him as a heroic, embattled free world leader. Peralta 
was also something of a nationalist who didn't like being ordered about constantly by 
the United States Military Mission.41 The notion that all Latin American military leaders 
were hopeless dupes of the United States is far too simplistic a characterization. Despite 
its strong alliance with Washington, the Guatemalan military possessed a fierce 
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nationalist tradition which often complicated its relationship with the United States . 
The U.S . in tum grew increasingly frustrated with the new junta. 
Peralta in any event proved a much more serious commander-in -chief than 
Y digoras. He cracked down on corruption and brought in a new breed of efficient, 
largely military administrators, engineers and specialists establishing a sort of "military 
technocracy." In May, 1962, in his capacity as Defense Minister , Peralta had already 
authorized the construction of a secret counter-insurgency base in Maricos, Izabal, in 
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the heart of guerrilla country. Members of a U.S. Special Forces Mobile Training Team 
(MTT) , consisting of three officers and three enlisted men, supervised anti-guerrilla 
training at the base. All were Vietnam veterans and of Puerto Rican or Mexican 
descent, chosen for their language skills and presumably to keep the operation less 
conspicuous. Fifteen hand-picked Guatemalan officers, trained in counter-insurgency at 
the U.S. Army School of the Americas, augmented the American staff. This base 
constituted the first counter-insurgency training facility outside United States territory 
in the Western Hemisphere .42 It became a model for dozens of others, installed in Peru , 
Colombia, Bolivia, Honduras , Chile, Ecuador and Argentina in the 1960s and 1970s 
during the Johnson and Nixon Administrations. The base provided the embryonic seed 
for the larger Guatemalan Army's counter-insurgency battalions which would wreck 
such havoc in the countryside in the mid-1960s . 
In the fall of 1962, Peralta tested some of the smaller units trained at this 
specialized facility. Transported by helicopter, led by Green Berets and reinforced with 
U.S . paratroopers, they effectively wiped out Colonel Paz Tejada's "October 20th 
Front". Pleased with these results, Peralta agreed to an expansion of the program In 
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the years of the military government, 1963-1966, Peralta with the principal aid of the 
United States instituted a large specialized military build-up and modernization program 
for all of Guatemala's armed forces.43 
In January 1963, the U.S. Congress approved the FY 1963 U.S. Military 
Assistance Program (MAP) for Guatemala budgeted at $1,667,000. This was revised 
upwards after the March 31, 1963 coup to a total of $2,524,000. (The 1960 allocation, 
Eisenhower's last, was $313,000.) The U.S. further boosted assistance by "windfall 
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funds", monies provided under an AID "Civic Action" budget, raising the total dollar 
value of the package $325,000 to $2,849,000.44 The Department of Defense disbursed 
additional grants to this amount in the fall. Overall this constituted a roughly 900% 
increase over the FY 1960 allocation. AID's Office of Public Safety's Guatemalan 
budget for 1963 was $382,000, a 550% increase over the $71,000 spent in 1962. 
(There had been a considerable drop in :funding from $271,000 in FY 1961 to $71,000 
in FY 1962, attributed both to overgenerous investments the previous two years and 
U.S. disenchantment with Y digoras after the February-April 1962 uprising which the 
Guatemalan military, not the OPS funded police, put down.) The United States made 
another huge totally unrecorded contribution to the Guatemalan military in this period . 
The CIA donated some $5 million in military hardware (planes, landing craft, mortars , 
bombs, ammunitions, and small arms) left over in Guatemala from its failed 1961 Bay of 
Pigs Invasion. Rather than crate and cart the equipment back to the United States, the 
CIA simply gave it to its faithful collaborator, Y digoras. The crafty president 
apparently warehoused much of it, fearful of his own military and planning to dole it out 
judiciously to individual officers for political favors. After the March 1963 coup, 
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Peralta distributed all of this considerable cache to his Army, Navy and Air Force, 
further engorging them with weaponry.45 
Total funding for the United States' military assistance to Guatemala dropped 
briefly in the years 1964 to 1966 before rising again in 1967 at the height of the 
counter-insurgency war. But 1963 was a peak year of heavy U.S. investment. (See 
table below.) 
TABLE Xl46 
MILITARY AID TO GUATEMALA: 1962 - 1969 
(Millions of dollars) 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
TOTAL MAP 2.072 2.35 2.063 1.339 1.489 2.247 1.225 1.993 
Material 1.402 1.675 1.414 .667 1.044 1.710 .779 1.649 
Training .49 .475 .520 .528 .305 .436 .336 .244 
Supply .180 .205 .129 .800 .100 .400 .260 .050 
(US logistical aid) 
Excess Grants .600 1.100 .200 .800 .100 .400 .200 .050 
Military Sales .106 .027 .276 .448 .600 .334 .210 .590 
TOTAL 
MILITARY AID 2.666 3.482 2.539 2.587 2.189 2.981 1.635 2.583 
Army and Air Force equipment and ammunition levels attained new heights as 
well. The Air Force acquired 4 T-33 jet trainers and 4 C-47 aircraft, both particularly 
suited for counter-insurgency operations. The Army received its first 4 U H-2 
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helicopter gunships, as well as trucks, radios, walkie-talkies and small arms. By the end 
of 1965, five elite Guatemalan infantry battalions designated interestingly enough "MAP 
units" reached full strength under the Peralta Administration. They were equipped with 
the latest U.S . weaponry including .45 caliber pistols, .30 and .50 caliber machine guns, 
60 and 81 mm mortars, M-16s, recoilless rifles, infrared night vision scopes , smoke and 
explosive grenades, even guerrilla sniffing German shepherds. 47 
Critics of the theory that U.S. military aid has a strong influence on the doctrine , 
capabilities and political predilections of Latin American militaries, such as Cesar D. 
Sereseres, point out that U.S. military aid is usually a relatively small percentage of the 
overall Latin American defense budget. And this is certainly true in the case of 
Guatemala. As the chart on the next page shows in the year in question , 1963, when 
the United States funded the Guatemalan military with approximately $3. 5 million in 
military aid, the government of Guatemala itself spent $9. 9 million on its own defense 
budget. 
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TABLE XII4 8 
GUATEMALAN DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 
(in millions of dollars) 
Presidential Office 1961 1962 1963 1964 
General Staff of the President .842 .798 .674 .608 
Presidential Guard .247 .282 .259 .279 
Ministry of Foreign Relations 
Central American Defense Affairs 
(CONDECA) 
Ministry of National Defense 8.804 9.124 8.988 10.994 
Personnel Services "' 5.170 5.167 5.285 6.026 
Salaries for Officers 1.965 1.965 
Salaries for Specialists 1.800 1.740 4.504 5.196 
Salaries for Enlisted .840 .863 
Commissions and Pensions .565 .641 .781 .830 
Regular Operations 3.504 3.778 3.653 4.968 
General Services-Food, 3.285 3.560 3.434 4.750 
Medicine, FueL etc. 
Maintaining Students and .168 .168 .168 .150 
Attaches Abroad 
Military Life Insurance .050 .050 .050 .050 
Center for Development of Public 
Administration .001 .001 .001 .001 
Maintaining • Students at Escuela de 
Applicacion 
Investment and Construction .130 .178 .050 
Construction/Navy Headquarters .130 .130 
Construction/National Monument -- .010 
Acquisition of Vehicles .038 
TOTAL FUNDS APPROPRIATED 
FOR ARMED FORCES 9.893 10.204 9.921 11.881 
But as the above Guatemalan Defense Appropriations chart demonstrates , the 
vast majority of the nation's own defense funding went to salaries, maintenance of 
facilities and equipment, food, fueL pensions, health care, insurance, and the like. 
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Thus, while the U.S. proportion of the $13.4 million spent on defense in 
Guatemala in 1963 (Guatemala's $9.9 million plus the U.S .'s $3.5 million) was only 
26%, it provided the crucial 26% comprising all the new equipment and specialized 
training for elite counter-insurgency units, the so-called "tip of the spear" of the 
Guatemalan Army. This $3.5 million imposed United States military doctrine on the 
Guatemalan Armed Forces with its emphasis on counter-insurgency and civic action. 
The bulk of Gua~emala's roughly 10,000 man Army were largely defensive, 
maintenance, and administrative troops. The "MAP units", on the other hand, made up 
an elite anti-guerrilla strike force . They consisted of five battalions . The Army based 
three of them in Guatemala City: the two principal infantry battalions, Brigada Mariscal 
Zavala and Brigada Guardia de Honor, as well as an elite military police battalion . 
These were crucial because U.S. military advisors hammered home the importance of 
maintaining absolute control in the capital city. Similar to Saigon in South Vietnam, 
Guatemala City was the nerve center of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG), the U.S . Embassy, the seat of the Guatemalan government and military 
command, the vital political, economic and communication center of the nation . As in 
Vietnam, U.S. and allied forces could afford to give up considerable portions of the 
countryside , but always had to be able to hold the capital and put down any popular 
insurrection or internal coup there "with first rate politically reliable troops ."49 
In the key rural guerrilla areas, the Guatemalan military stationed their 
remammg two elite battalions, the Brigada General Manuel Lisandro Barrillos in 
Quetzatenengo and the Brigada Capitan General Rafael Carrera at Zacapa. These 
battalions were not numbered as were all others in the Guatemalan Army, but rather 
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were named after former Guatemalan nationalist and military heroes, signifying their 
elite status. In addition to these larger anti-guerrilla battalions, the United States helped 
develop several smaller specialist units for counter-insurgency watfare. These included 
the 1st Airborne Infantry Company, made up of elite paratroops modeled on the U.S. 
Army "Rangers"; the 1st Special Forces Company called "Kaibiles" (Ixal for Tigers) 
based on the U.S. Army "Green Berets"; a counter-insurgency unit menacingly referred 
to as "the CT Detac~nt" - "CT" teams in Vietnam during this period meant 
"Counter-Terror", and a "CI", Counter-Intelligence Detachment. Overall, these 
specialty units included about 800 airborne and airmobile troops in the Special Forces 
and Airborne infantry units, comprising the counter-insurgency shock troops of the 
Guatemalan Army. U.S . Vietnam veteran Green Beret advisors trained, groomed, and 
often hand-picked, each of these 800 "Tigers". 50 
On United States advice, the Guatemalan military emphasized the para-military 
side of the counter-insurgency equation as well. In 1963, Chief-of-State Peralta began 
a massive revamping and expansion of the comissionados militares or military 
commissioner system. These had formerly consisted of part time, unpaid, regional 
positions given typically to retired military or police personnel. Military commissioners 
could not bear arms, had to live in the district in which they served and were often 
appointed or even employed by local land-owners. They registered and called up 
military conscripts in their areas and reported on any local problems (i.e. political 
dissidence) to the Army. In 1963 they numbered 300. By 1966 there were 9,000 of 
them, armed and paid members of the military reserve, writing comprehensive monthly 
reports to the Army on subversion in their districts. They conducted surveillance of 
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suspected enemies of the state, drew up lists of "peasant cooperative leaders, Indian 
union leaders, guerrilla sympathizers and leftist malcontents". 51 The military 
commissioners became the eyes and ears of the Guatemalan Army deep in the 
countryside where the military seldom penetrated. Their force structure was actually 
even larger than the 9,000 men paid. Each commissioner normally had an informal 
group of supporters consisting of landowners and their sons, plantation foremen and 
overseers, businessmen, even local cantina toughs and hoodlums who could be counted 
• 
on to join him in any vigilante action. 52 Similar to the Civil Guard and Phoenix 
programs in Vietnam, the military commissioner system provided the Guatemalan 
military with a low cost, easy maintenance right wing hit squad in virtually every village 
in the country. Richard N. Adams in his 1970 Crucifixion by Power and numerous 
Latin American historians, particularly Alejandro de Coro in his suberb "Los 
commissionados militares en Guatemala, 1963-1966," emphasize the significance of this 
commissioner system in muzzling all political dissent in the countryside during the 
Peralta regime and afterwards. 
Peralta also fit his new security apparatus into the larger regional context. Here 
the United States applied pressure though Peralta, who had served as his nation's 
delegate on the Inter-American Defense Board (IDB) appeared genuinely enthusiastic. 
On December 14, 1963, representatives of five Central American nations - Guatemala, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama signed a treaty in Guatemala City 
creating the organization acronymed CONDECA (Consejo de Defensa 
Centroamericana) -- the Central American Defense Board . In a speech at the elaborate 
signing ceremony, Peralta said: 
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A plan for the Defense of the Continent has been drawn up, presenting 
as the single and exclusive enemy -- Russia. The Central American 
Isthmus in this Plan .. .is considered as a unit not as five or six separate 
units. As a consequence what is required is a military organ formed of 
representatives of all the Armies of the Isthmus ... 53 
Peralta's designation of Russia as the principal enemy of CONDECA was 
patently ludicrous and largely a political cover story. With the preponderance of 
American air, naval and amphibious power in the Caribbean, the idea of the Soviet 
Union, or for that mattey Cuba, attempting an invasion of Central America defied 
credulity. Clearly the United States and Central American militaries created 
CONDECA as a larger more efficient instrument for coordinating internal security. 
Guerrillas in this period frequently displayed the annoying habit of crossing borders for 
sanctuary. Despite its attempts to publicize itself as a sort of NATO or SEATO for 
Central America, the organization was simply a larger regional counter-insurgency 
mechanism as U.S. Department of Defense documents confirm. CONDECA called for 
"a greater coordination of military and police operations against Communism" and "an 
interchange of information and intelligence as a contribution to the fight against regional 
subversion. "54 In the first official meeting of CONDECA, held again in Guatemala City 
in 1964, Peralta, who had come to power in a military coup, praised its potential as "a 
rampart for the protection of the democratic system "55 While a supposedly 
"independent security arrangement" CONDECA proved about as independent as the 
Organization of American States. Though not an official member, the United States 
through military aid, training and administrative command and control, effectively 
dominated the organization. 
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Also in 1964, as part of this larger regional military integration , Guatemala 
joined the new U.S. constructed CAPT SN System, Central America and Panama 
Telecommunication Network which linked all the Central American military and police 
communications to the United States Southern Command in Quarry Heights , the Canal 
Zone .56 Public Safety Communications Advisor , Alfred Nauracki, an old 
communications hand from Vietnam, helped construct this system within months of his 
arrival in Guatemala in August , 1964. In a Public Safety Report dated October 13, 
1966, the system is described as: 
A totally secure radio-teletype network which interconnects on a private 
frequency the principal officials of the Guatemalan National Police, Treasury 
Police , Judicial Police, Detective Corps, Ministry of Defense , the President ial 
House and the Guatemalan Military Communications and Command Center 
with all analogous headquarters in the other four CONDECA nations as well as 
the United States Southern Command. 57 
Guatemala was now a full member of the Central American Counter-insurgency 
Internet. Along with the United States, it had in fact created the network. In his 1985 
work , The American Connection : State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala , 
Amnesty International activist, Michael McClintock , painstakingly reconstructs the 
United States military and security assistance to Guatemala in the mid-fifties to early 
1980s. It is McClintock's contention , which dovetails with Latin American military 
specialists, Edwin Lieuwen and Morris Janowitz's opinions that the exportation of the 
Kennedy counter-insurgency doctrine , equipment and training played a vital role in the 
creation of a number of brutal military governments which sprang to power in the 
region in the 1960s. In 1961 only one strictly military government held office in Latin 
America , that of Paraguay. By 1964 there were nine, Guatemala foremost among them. 
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In the crisis years of 1962 and 1963, the unstable yet elected government of 
Miguel Y digoras Fuentes staggered through innumerable political crises before it 
ultimately collapsed to a military coup. How legitimate the Y digoras government ever 
was is clearly open to question. The March 1958 election that brought Ydigoras to 
power has alternatively been described as "a massive hypocritical fraud" and "one of the 
fairer elections in Guatemalan history. "58 When analyzing a Guatemalan election in the 
1950s, it is important to remember that about half the electorate (illiterate Indians) 
' 
could not legally vote and the 20% of Indians who could were usually too frightened of 
authorities to go near the polls. Therefore, if Y digoras was a legitimate president, he 
was so only in the sense that say John Stennis of Mississippi was a legitimate senator in 
the 1950s. That having been said, Ydigoras' regime, however corrupt and repressive, 
was the constitutional government of Guatemala when military officers at the 
instigation, or at the very least, with the approval of the United States, overthrew it. 
The United States sponsored military build-up in Guatemala had been proceeding apace 
before the assumption of power by a military government, but it clearly took off on a 
substantially higher, more specialized trajectory afterwards. The United States put 
very little pressure on the Peralta regime in the years 1963-1965 to hold elections and, 
in fact, appeared much more at ease with his military caretaker government than with 
the volatile Y digoras. Peralta did bring a measure of stability to Guatemala from 1963 
to 1966, but at a considerable price. Internal repression soared and the military grew in 
power to a proportion far exceeding its traditional role in Guatemala society. The U.S . 
obsession with the rather small 300 man Guatemala guerrilla movement led to a 
monstrous example of military overkill and to the acceptance of a government that 
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violated all the ideals of the Alliance for Progress. This shift in Washington's policy was 
most fully embodied in the Johnson Administration's Mann Doctrine which will be 
analyzed in the next chapter. IBtimately, the United States sacrificed its hopes for 
economic and political reform in Guatemala like some ancient Mayan captive on the 
altar of counter-insurgency . Few State Department US AID, USIA, MAAG, or 
CINCSO documents questioned the absurdity of the United States spending an annual 
average of $5 83 per Guatemalan soldier in a country where per capita income was $181 
(see table below) . 
Table Xill 59 
U.S. Military Assistance to Central America 
Cumulative U.S. Military Aid, U.S. Military Aid per Member of 
1952-1962 Armed Forces 1962 
Country (Millions of dollars) (dollars) 
Nicaragua 3.813 930 
El Salvador 1.136 169 
Honduras 2.324 529 
Guatemala 5.311 583 
Panama .929 n.a. 
Costa Rica .832 n.a. 
But as Communist guerrilla leader Caesar Montes said, "As long as there was 
one rebel left bloody and ragged still fighting in the jungle, no landowner, no Yankee, 
no generalissimo could ever sleep in peace . 1160 All three of these distinct interests would 
unite for different reasons in the final phase of the Guatemalan counter-insurgency war 
of the 1960s. 
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CHAPTERV 
VIETNAM ON THE ISTHMUS: THE U.S. LED COUNTER-INSURGENCY 
WAR IN GUATEMALA 1966-1967 
At midnight on March 3, 1966, some one hundred and fifty members of the 
Guatemalan Judicial Police, led by U.S. trained military intelligence officers, raided 
three residences in Guatemala City. The central committee of the outlawed Guatemalan 
Communist Party (PGT) conducted its monthly meetings in the first house. In the other 
two residences, members of the legal Federacion Nacional de Campesinos (FNC), 
Guatemala's largest peasant union, gathered to discuss strategies for the upcoming 
Presidential election, only three days away. The Judicial Police arrested twenty-eight 
men from the three houses, among them Victor Manuel Gutierrez, secretary-general of 
the Communist Party, and Leonardo Castillo Flores, Guatemala's most famous union 
leader and the head of the FNC. 1 
The police immediately took about two-thirds of "the twenty-eight" to a secret 
military post in the countryside where they summarily executed them. The more 
important of the "twenty-eight" were interned in basement cells at Judicial Police 
Headquarters . There, over the course of the next three days, the police interrogated, 
tortured and eventually executed each and every one of them. Some of the bodies were 
apparently flown to remote jungle locations where they were hacked to pieces with 
machetes and their fragments strewn over a number of burial pits, the standard Judicial 
Police method for disposing of political prisoners. In the case of the more important 
personages, Gutierrez and Flores, reports later surfaced that the military flew their 
bodies out over the Pacific in American UH- I helicopters and dumped them into the 
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sea, a technique commonly used against captured Viet Cong (VC) and National 
Liberation Front (NLF) leaders in South Vietnam 2 In any case, none of the 
twenty-eight were ever heard from again. 
1bis strike, the first major offensive by the new elite U.S. trained CT 
(Counter-Terror) Detachment and CI (Counter-Intelligence) Unit ushered in the start of 
a savage new phase in the counter-insurgency war in Guatemala, prosecuted by both the 
United States and .Guatemalan militaries. 1bis escalation to all-out war in Guatemala 
eerily mirrored a similar process occurring eight thousand miles away in South Vietnam 
There, too, by the mid-1960s, the Johnson White House eschewed earlier more surgical 
methods of increased internal repression, military advice and training, air and combat 
support in favor of direct military intervention by U.S. ground forces. The numbers of 
U.S. troops deployed in Guatemala remained classified and controversial to this day, 
but the Johnson Administration clearly opted for a more direct approach to attain its 
politico-strategic goals just as it did in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic in 
1965. 
Johnson's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Thomas Mann, 
became the chief architect of the President's departures from the Kennedy Doctrine in 
Latin American policy. Although an early enthusiast for the Alliance for Progress in 
1961, Mann had a reputation as a veteran, hard boiled pragmatist when it came to the 
Cold War in Latin America. He announced in 1964 that the United States would adopt 
a more "realistic policy for dealing with Latin American military governments." There 
would be "no more good guys and bad guys." All military juntas would get carrots and 
Washington virtually threw away its rather seldom used stick. Preoccupied with the 
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civil rights movement at home and military escalation in Southeast Asia, Johnson lost 
interest in social reform south of the Rio Grande. Stepped up counter-insurgency war 
proved the natural result of the Mann Doctrine , not just in Guatemala, but in Venezuela 
in 1964, in Colombia 1964-1968, in Peru in 1965, and in Nicaragua , Honduras and 
Bolivia in 1967. The U.S. run Murder Incorporated Johnson expressed shock at 
discovering in the Caribbean soon spread to the entire Hemisphere. Johnson's 
increasingly militaristic a1wroach to Latin America, forgotten due in part to all the 
opprobrium heaped upon him for the Vietnam War, more closely resembled Ronald 
Reagan's than any recent president. Indeed, while Reagan fought four 
counter-insurgency wars in Latin America, Johnson conducted eight. His 
administration soft peddled economic development as the cure for Latin American 
instability and increasingly brought out the heavy artillery in support of authoritarian 
regnnes. 
Peralta's so-called "military caretaker" government gave only a limited stability 
to Guatemala in the years 1963-1966. Under Colonel Peralta , the military emerged as 
a dominant force though it still ruled with the acquiescence of a larger coalition of 
interests. Senior officers occupied the center of this coalition which also included 
foreign and domestic econoilllc interests and a newer breed of technicians and 
administrators that arose ironically as a consequence of Alliance for Progress economic 
investments and reforms. 3 
The Kennedy Administration's emphasis on technical training and education for 
Guatemalan civilians (as well as the military), combined with the increase in 
development and the expansion of the Guatemalan government , created a need for a 
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new indigenous class of managers and technicians. Most of these bureaucrats and 
specialists were ladinos and by the mid-1960s emerged as a crucial, new political 
group. What proved ironic is that this technocratic class, which the Kennedy 
Administration banked on to lead Guatemala to democracy, became among the 
strongest supporters of military rule. They were, after all, committed and dependent 
upon capitalist economic development and investment (many were lower and middle 
level managers of U.S. o,wned Guatemala based firms) and an expanded government 
bureaucracy ( others were civil servants for the government's new tepid social 
programs). These middle-class technocrats regarded the prospect of a socialist 
revolution in Guatemala, the guerrilla program, with as much trepidation as the U.S. 
trained military. 4 
The traditional landed oligarchy also supported the Peralta regime as a bulwark 
against Communism or even worse, serious reform. But beginning in the mid-1960s, 
the U.S. emboldened military increasingly shunted the oligarchy aside and usurped it as 
the real political ruler of Guatemala. As Mexican political scientist Edelberto 
Torres-Rives put it, "Once the Army needed the oligarchy but now the oligarchy, 
surrounded by guerrillas and caught up in a changing economy, needed the Army. "5 
Peralta appointed scores of officers to key cabinet and top level government 
administrative posts . While Peralta relied on the expertise of civilian technocrats, he 
always wanted military officers above them Indeed the civil administration courses 
taught to Guatemalan officers at the U.S. School of the Americas encouraged this 
trend. Peralta increased military salaries and encouraged officers to acquire plantations, 
cattle ranches and private businesses of their own. One of the striking aspects about 
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Guatemalan officers until the 1960s was -- with the exception of a few corrupt generals 
-- how poor they all were. Though proud of their traditions, insular, clannish and elitist, 
the majority of officers lived in substandard housing on military bases with their 
families. Many "moonlighted" on the side as maintenance workers and night foremen to 
supplement meager salaries. 6 
In 1965 under Peralta, the military acquired their own bank, named quite 
brazenly Banco de Ejercito (Army Bank) which invested heavily in U.S . manufacturing 
~ 
and food processing franchises . Peralta established a huge pension and military 
investment fund called the Institute for Military Social Security (1PM). The IPM 
provided start-up capital for the Guatemalan Bank of America. 7 Officers began 
drawing double salaries as body guards and security personnel for U.S. businessmen, 
landowners and corporations. They charged "security fees" for new foreign enterprises. 
With opposition newspaper increasingly shut down and censored the Army's 
newspaper, Ejercito , gained a larger prominence and circulation. In 1965 the military 
established its own political party, the Partido Democratico Institutional, Democratic 
Institutional Party (PID) which almost overnight became a major player on the 
Guatemalan political scene. In 1966 the PID fielded a presidential candidate and a full 
slate of congressional candidates . Its positions on domestic issues often proved 
sacrosanct. As one Christian Democratic leader, Danilio Barillas, complained "we can 
get out the votes, but they (the PID) can get out the tanks . 118 Richard N. Adams' 1970 
Crucifixion by Power and Jerry L. Weaver's 1969 "The Military Elite and Political 
Control in Guatemala 1963-1966" in Social Science Quarterly illustrate the corporatist 
nature and political ascendency of the Guatemalan military in this period . Their analysis 
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of the military's institutional expansion and unprecedented political opportunism could 
serve as a model for similar government take-overs by generals and colonels throughout 
Latin America in the 1960s. Jim Handy, in his underrated 1985 Gift of the Devil takes 
a post-revisionist approach to the creation of a garrison state in Guatemala, bringing in 
larger cultural, historical, racial, and even religious elements which helped the 
Guatemalan military to view itself as the only possible savior of the nation. 
By the early 1970s this trend of the military becoming an economic corporation 
~ 
indivisible from the state reached full flower. Military men ran 46 semi-autonomous 
state institutions. They owned a cement factory Cementos Gustatoya, a radio and 
television station, several factories and mining operations as well as the 800 unit Santa 
Rosita housing project and a multi-storied parking building in downtown Guatemala 
City.9 Like the Kennedy Administration, the Johnson White House supported the 
Guatemalan Army as the one institution best capable of managing Guatemala. "The 
military forces are the decisive power element and determinant of stability," a State 
Department memorandum to the White House read. In a racist twist it continued 
" ... popular opinion and interest in democracy as a whole tends to be apathetic in 
Guatemala. Only in the heat of a well publicized campaign or when the mass man 
himself comes under unusual stress does he arouse himself to make his opinions felt. 1110 
But even the new administration was taken aback by the acquisitive corporate greed 
that military rule eventually spawned. "The military are beginning to take on a 
vulture-like aspect," a later CIA report stated, "in acquiring properties from arrested 
and executed suspects. "11 
109 
Traditionally the Guatemalan Army had been an arbiter between various political 
and economic factions within Guatemalan society, the conservatives and the liberals, the 
landowners and the growing urban business elite. The Army was often a political 
stepping stone for ambitious officers like Jorge Ubico and Miguel Y digoras Fuentes to 
run for the presidency. At times the Guatemalan Army attached itself to a particular 
political party or figure in order to maintain the balance of forces within Guatemala 
such as when it supported the Revolutionary Party of Arevalo and Arbenz during the 
" 
Revolutionary "ten years of spring", 1944-19 54. At this juncture the Army felt its 
traditional benefactor, the landed oligarchy, had become too dominant. 12 
By the mid-1960s, however, due in no small part to the United States' military 
aid and indoctrination, the Guatemalan military had gone from the guardian of political 
order to the absolute masters of Guatemalan society. Proud landowners and even 
foreign corporations bowed as supplicants before Peralta and his junta, seeking support 
and favors from a military they had once controlled. Had the U.S. not built up the 
Guatemalan military into such a powerful, modern, highly skilled and uniquely equipped 
institution, the new technocratic and educated ladino civilian class might have 
eventually gained dominance over the landed oligarchy and instituted at least some 
meaningful reform. But by its elevation of the military to the supreme seat of power, 
the United States perhaps even unwittingly choked off this last possibility for peaceful 
reform in Guatemala. 
As the Guatemalan military became a major economic player, it increasingly 
regarded the rising ladino elite as a competitor and its rather moderate reform 
sensibilities as treason . Thus the United States warped economic development at the 
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same time as it encouraged it. The frustration of the educated ladino engineers, 
teachers, managers, and administrators intensified by the late 1960s as the military 
subordinated them to political impotence and turned violently against any who dared to 
speak out. A guerrilla leader, Camillo Sanchez, crystallized this conflict: 
If you keep giving one group of men more and more guns and you keep giving 
another group of men more and more books, who do you think is going to 
become the most powerful? And who do you think is going to become the most 
frustrated? You Americans have created your own revolution so I cannot feel 
sorry for you. 13 
The political and social crisis which led to open warfare in 1966 actually began 
the previous year. Peralta and the United States' steady yet measured build-up of the 
Guatemalan military and security forces brought increasing repression especially in the 
countryside and among Guatemalan students at the University of San Carlos. One 
political analyst noted that during the eight-year period between January 1962 and 
January 1970, the Guatemalan people lived under a government instituted state of siege 
for 58 out of 96 months. 14 Raids and security sweeps of the University became an 
almost daily event with respected professors dragged out of packed lecture halls at gun 
point and student leaders beaten to a bloody pulp in their dorms. In the countryside to 
the already increased repression of the vastly expanded military commissioners system, 
the Peralta regime added the Policia Militar Ambulante (PMA) or Mobile Military 
Police . Formed in 1964, this new counter-insurgency police force of 1,000 men was 
established by Decree Law 332 "to lend police service in the rural areas of the 
Republic." Articles 5 and 6 of the Decree stated: 
The PMA shall lend assistance in cases of emergency , to the owners and 
administrators of estates, haciendas, agricultural lands, forests and all rural 
properties ... [and] observes all activity that tends to inflame passions among the 
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peasant masses or in the rural communities and when necessary repress through 
licit means any disorder that shall occur. 15 
In response to the government's ever tightening grip in the countryside, Yon 
Sosa's and Turcios Limas' guerrilla groups stepped up their attacks focusing on 
assassinating well-known brutal landlords and kidnapping others for ransom The FAR 
raised some $500,000 from kidnapping and robberies between 1964 and 1966. 16 These 
funds helped purchase more weaponry and also funded "the April 12 Front," a student 
resistance movement in the capital. Not all of Washington's concern over Castroite 
links with the guerrillas proved unfounded. Castro gave moral and political support, 
some money , and tactical and strategic advice to the guerrillas . Turcios Lima traveled 
to Havana in 1965 to meet with Castro. David A Crain's insightful 1975 article 
"Guatemalan Revolutionaries and Havana's Ideological Offensive of 1965-1968" 
supplies the best account of Cuban-Guatemalan guerrilla links . He beautifully illustrates 
the irony of the supreme anti-imperialist Castro attempting to dominate all the guerrilla 
movements of Latin America. While the Guatemalan guerrilla movement was still 
relatively small at this stage, CIA and State Department officials no doubt remembered 
that Castro and Che Guevara had started out with only a handful of men in the Sierra 
Maestra in Cuba in 1955 yet eventually overthrew Batista's regime and its 50,000 man, 
American equipped army. The guerrilla movement's increasing Communist 
indoctrination alarmed Washington and ended the trivializing of the movement by 
dissenting analysts as "basically a bunch of bandits. "17 
In 1965 the two main guerrilla movements split due to political bickering and 
Yon Sosa's disgust with the lethargic Guatemalan Communist Party . Yon Sosa's 
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MR-13 broke away from FAR and espoused a Trotskyite , pro-Chinese line while 
Turc ios Lima's "Edgar Ibarra Front" (named for a murdered student) remained in the 
FAR and continued to align itself with the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) , 
Moscow and Havana. 18 Neither the Guatemalan nor United States governments has yet 
to document a substantial weapons link between the guerrillas · and Castro. The 
Guatemalan guerrillas stole or bought about 80% of their weaponry from the 
Guatemalan Army • ( the remaining 20% came from private arms purchases in Mexico 
~ 
and Costa Rica). 19 In another similarity with Vietnam, American military advisors 
frequently expressed outrage at how many U.S . weapons ended up in the hands of 
guerrillas due to corrupt or politically sympathetic Guatemalan officers . The Viet Cong 
also fought and killed numerous U.S. advisers with M-16s and American made hand 
grenades and mortars in this period purchased from the Army of the Republic of Viet 
Nam (ARYN) . Castro did send some medical supplies and small amounts of 
ammunition to the guerrillas . A few Cuban volunteers fought with the FAR but even 
CIA Intelligence estimates discounted any substantial Cuban role. 20 Whether Cuban 
support might have increased in the future remained a legitimate concern for American 
advisers. Castro had a documented record of adventurism in Latin America , in 
Venezuela in 1963 and Bolivia in 1967, and loved to stir up trouble for the United 
States wherever possible but from his vantage point , having survived one invasion , 
numerous sabotage attacks and several assassination attempts by the CIA, Castro 
probabl y regarded his own limited inteiventions as morally justified. 
On February 5, 1965, MR-13 urban gunmen assassinated the chief of the United 
States military mission, Colonel Harold Hauser , in his car while he was driving home 
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from the U.S . Embassy. In a public statement MR-13 , cognizant of the links between 
U.S . policy in Guatemala and Vietnam, claimed the act "constituted the response of the 
Guatemalan people to the criminal acts of Yankee imperialism in North and South 
Vietnam "21 Peralta declared a state of siege (the last one had just ended two months 
previously) and suspended even the 1964 military constitution. A day later rebels burnt 
down the United States Agency for International Development's (AID) motor pool 
garage . They threw a hand grenade at Peralta (it bounced off his jeep and landed in a 
~ 
crowd of civilians, killing several) and blew up Army trucks in the capital. In April and 
May they machine-gunned the Guatemalan Army headquarters and the U.S. Consulate. 
On May 21, they assassinated the Deputy Minister of Defense, Colonel Erresto Molina 
Arreaga, near his home. In June, MR-13 launched bomb attacks against seven Latin 
American Embassies in the capital, all belonging to nations that supported the U.S . 
invasion of the Dominican Republic. 22 The Guatemalan guerrillas regarded the 
Dominican Invasion as a crucially significant event which might presage a U.S . invasion 
of Guatemala or even Cuba. Occurring as it did at the very moment the Johnson 
Administration decided to introduce U.S. ground combat troops to South Vietnam, it 
seemed part of a larger all-out American offensive against Third World nationalism 
under the familiar guise of anti-communism The Johnson White House was also 
cognizant of the significance of this step. The invasion amounted to the first clear-cut 
violation of the thirty-two year old Good Neighbor Policy of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt. Unlike the 1954 Guatemalan coup and 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, which 
largely employed surrogates, the Dominican Invasion deployed U.S . combat troops --
22,000 of them. It also violated the Organization of American States' Charter on 
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non-intervention. Troubled by the escalation in Vietna~ yet criticized by domestic 
conservatives for not standing up enough against communists, Johnson apparently 
hesitated to make this commitment. Mann and Rusk, on the other hand, urged him to 
send in the Marines and paratroopers. This invasion actually constituted the logical 
outcome of Washington's obsession since 1959 of deterring a "second Cuba," the 
essence of the whole Kennedy Doctrine in Latin America. 
Confronted • with the Guatemalan military government's apparent impotence 
" 
before the guerrilla offensive, the White House's initial enthusiasm for Peralta began to 
wane. A June 22, 1965, CIA National Intelligence Estimate sent to President Johnson 
stated: 
The Peralta regime, despite its effectiveness in reducing corruption has been 
unable to take any affirmative decisions in the economic and social fields which 
would have contributed to progress and to reduction of counter-insurgency 
problems. The Government has been unable or unwilling to eliminate guerrilla 
groups although sporadically aggressive patrol activity by the military has 
succeeded in keeping them somewhat off balance ... 
The U.S . should undertake in various low key ways, including direct personal 
contact to make known to Peralta the U.S. view that an early return to 
constitutional government is essential and emphasizing the U.S. concern that 
failure to move in this direction enhances the possibility of subversion or civil 
war. .. Further the U.S. should encourage Peralta to permit all "middle of the 
road" political parties to present candidates for the presidency.23 
By the fall of 1965, the Peralta government agreed, with some reluctance, to 
hold presidential elections in March of 1966. Several underlying reasons can be listed 
as to why Peralta decided to relinquish at least some of the reins of absolute power and 
why the United States wanted a "more legitimate" government as well. First, Peralta 
was confident that the military would retain most of the instruments of power even 
under a civilian president just as the military had in the last year of Y digoras' reign. 
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Second, Peralta and his advisors felt their governmental party, the PID, had a 
reasonable chance of winning the election. Indeed in the final tally, the Institutional 
Democratic Party (PID) polled second to the Revolutionary Party (PR) winner, Julio 
Cesar Mendez Montenegro . And since the military government ran the election, there 
always existed the possibility it could rig the results right up until election day. Third, 
Peralta remained unwilling to assume a permanent position as Chief of State. Though a 
ruthless anti-Communist, and a fierce champion of the Guatemalan military, Peralta had 
.. 
a reputation for personal integrity. Unlike his two predecessors, he did not enrich 
himself in office, lived modestly, and weeded out considerable corruption as even his 
opponents grudgingly admitted. "Peralta was a bastard," guerrilla Pablo Momsanto 
said, "but he was an honest bastard . "24 Fourth, the influence of the United States helped 
force the military's hand. A stiff necked nationalist, Peralta often rejected and 
obstructed U.S. policy in Guatemala, yet with a military and an economy as dependent 
as his on Washington, he had to take the American viewpoint into account. 25 
Its reputation still stinging from the angry Latin American denunciation of its 
Dominican Republic invasion, the Johnson Administration sought some political cover 
in a Guatemalan free election, the first in eight years. It hoped a civilian government 
would diffuse guerrilla resistance and perhaps even implement some economic reforms 
to further negate the social causes of insurgency. More cynically, the Johnson 
Administration realized conducting a savage counter-insurgency war under the guise of 
a civilian government could prove more politically palatable than under a military one. 
Frustrated with Peralta's obduracy, the White House felt it could achieve its military 
aims more easily under a pliable civilian government, vulnerable to a military coup and 
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dependent on U.S. political support for survival. "A civilian government might prove 
much more amenable to our security needs," the new U.S. Ambassador, John Gordon 
Mein, wrote to Dean Rusk. 26 Even before the actual election, the U.S. showed a 
propensity for influencing and manipulating the leading candidate, Mendez Montenegro, 
a former law professor at the University of San Carlos. A State Department telegram 
to the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City, dated February 14, 1966 stated: 
We wonder whether the confidence gap between MM (Mendez Montenegro) 
and the military- conservatives cannot be bridged . We wonder for example 
whether MM could not reassure the business community on how far he 
proposes to go in economic and social reforms and the military establishment on 
the future status of their programs and control of communist activities. We 
recognize that the mechanism for accomplishing this may be difficult to 
assemble ... 27 
Through its savage, sudden annihilation of "the 28", the Guatemalan military 
delivered an unmistakable message to all political parties that it would continue to 
manage the domestic security affairs of Guatemala . The United States issued no protest 
against this clear violation of human and constitutional rights and on the contrary 
congratulated the government "on its recent success in disrupting communist subversive 
activities. "28 The government held elections on March 6, 1966, in an atmosphere of 
fear, terrorism and intimidation . 
TABLE XIV 29 
March 6, 1966 Guatemalan Presidential Elections 
Candidate 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro 
Colonel Juan de Dios Aguilar 
Colonel Miguel Argel Ponciano 
PR 
PID 
MLN 
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Votes 
199,545 
145,863 
109,386 
Percentage 
43.9% 
32.1% 
24.0% 
Since none of the three candidates gained an absolute majority, the National 
Congress would have to decide the election in a special May 5 session. While the new 
Constitution allowed illiterate Indians to vote for the first time since 1954, government 
repression in the countryside discouraged even a moderate Indian turn-out. The table 
below shows the problem of judging the legitimacy of Guatemalan elections in this 
period . 
TABLE:XV 30 
,. Guatemalan Election Results 1958-1970 
Winner Abstention 
1958 Miguel Y digoras Fuentes 33.2% 
1963 Elections canceled 
1966 Julo Cesar Mendez Montenegro 43.7% 
1970 General Carlos Arana Osario 46.2% 
Adult Population Voting for the 
Winner 
12.7% 
10.0% 
10.5% 
Guatemala certainly qualified as an extremely "limited democracy", although it 
should be noted that some of these figures are not far off from recent U.S. presidential 
elections. 
With no clear winner and the moderate-leftist Revolutionary Party in the lead, 
rumors spread of a military coup to overturn the results and seat the Army's PIO 
candidate and Peralta favorite, Colonel Aguilar. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in a 
March 10 telegram, instructed Ambassador Mein that a message be "conveyed to 
Peralta that the White House would like to see the results fully respected and power 
transferred peacefully. "31 
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The United States, through Ambassador Mein, helped broker an arrangement 
between Mendez Montenegro and the military. A memorandum written by Bill Moyers 
for President Johnson described the main points of the deal: 
Peralta and other military leaders have worked out an agreement with Mendez 
Montenegro under which Mendez will be allowed to assume office in exchange 
for the following guarantees - 1) naming of the Defense Minister and other 
heads of security departments by the military; 2) a continued and uninterfered 
crackdown on Communists and subversives; 3) no prosecution of military 
personnel for past misdeeds. 32 
It was later learned that this pact also included the military's right to appoint all 
• 
base and zone commanders, to have complete control over the military budget and not 
to permit any radical elements, i.e., the supporters of Arevalo, Arbenz, Villagram 
Kramer, and Lucas Caballeros (all four leftist-moderate political leaders) to participate 
in the government. 33 This agreement clearly violated the Guatemalan Constitution and 
created in effect two governments within Guatemala -- a civilian government 
responsible for social policy severely restricted by the agreement; and a military 
government which had the authority to wage its own private war, free from civilian 
oversight. 
Mendez Montenegro was no doubt aware of the Faustian nature of this deal. 
Former admirers and allies on the left criticized him harshly for selling out his 
administration before he even got started. Given his political weakness -- the military 
and the U.S. held all the cards -- what real choices did the president-elect have? 
Right-wing gunmen assassinated his brother Mario, the original PR's presidential 
candidate, in October 1965 . Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro demonstrated 
considerable physical courage, picking up the mantle of his slain brother and running in 
the election against a brutal regime supported by numerous right-wing fanatics. 
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Mendez Montenegro apparently hoped to isolate the more rightist elements within the 
country and the military by broadening his moderate base of support through reform 
legislation. With his liberal background, he also mistakenly expected to enjoy a special 
relationship with the United States. But having helped install him, Washington quickly 
left the president dangling in the wind, nudging him if anywhere to the right, particularly 
on security issues. Under its Mann Doctrine, the Johnson Administration preferred 
strict anti-communists to liberal political leaders, which the Kennedy Administration had 
,. 
at least lent some moral support. 
At his inauguration on July 1, 1966, surrounded on the dais by military officers 
and a throng of machine-gun toting commandos, Mendez Montenegro offered full 
amnesty to any guerrillas who would give up the struggle and join the legitimate 
democratic process. Confidants of the president say he wore a bullet-proof vest that 
day and carried a loaded .45 caliber pistol under his suit. He never went anywhere in 
the next four years without being similarly equipped, not because he feared the 
guerrillas, but because he feared his own Army bodyguards. 34 Following a drum roll 
and orchestral flourish, U.S. Ambassador Mein congratulated the sweating president on 
"the return of democracy to Guatemala. "35 
The guerrillas rejected Mendez Montenegro's amnesty offer and shortly 
afterwards the Guatemala military attacked them with a savagery seldom witnessed 
under Peralta's military regime. Paradoxically, as political scientist Cesar D. Sereseres 
has pointed out, Mendez Montenegro had everything to gain and nothing to lose in 
agreeing to the all-out U.S. supported final solution to the guerrilla dilemma. Fighting 
a war in the countryside kept the military occupied and left them neither the time nor 
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the inclination to launch a coup d'etat against his government. Mendez Montenegro 
shored up his position with suspicious rightists in the MLN and PIO by proving more 
bellicose than Peralta in ferreting out and destroying Communist rebels. By instituting 
an aggressive counter- insurgency campaign, Mendez Montenegro held his hand on a 
lever that would enable him to demand more economic aid from the United States 
government than ever before. Here, after all was a popularly elected law professor -- of 
all occupations -- fightin,g a lone heroic battle against Communist guerrillas in the 
Western Hemisphere. What conservative Congressional Committee could deny him all 
the economic aid he requested? Any additional military aid garnered only boosted his 
prestige with the Army. 36 The war, however, rapidly escalated into a horrendous 
tragedy in which the security forces butchered hundreds of Mendez Montenegro's 
sincere supporters . The president had concluded a truly Faustian deal whose 
dimensions he probably failed to imagine the day he signed the pact at the National 
Palace. 
The Guatemalan Army, which between 1963 and 1966 had increased 50% from 
8,000 to 12,000 men, struck hard on October 1, 1966, in the eastern departments of 
Izabal and Zacapa. The counter-insurgency campaign was directed first at controlling 
the vital and often attacked Atlantic Highway, then rapidly spread out to the adjoining 
rural areas that had come under control of the FAR- Rebel Armed Forces . The 
operation which had required months of logistical and training preparation proceeded 
on an unprecedented scope and scale. The U.S. 1965 creation of a central maintenance 
facility, a central supply depot, and a central Recruit Training Base proved an essential 
logistical prelude to this operation. 37 UH-1 Army helicopters airlifted elite Guatemalan 
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paratroop and Special Forces strike units directly on top of guerrilla controlled villages. 
Others flew into rapidly constructed airstrips on C-47 transport planes. Thousands 
more drove in on trucks and newly supplied M-113 armored personnel carriers along 
recently built civic action roads. A few specialty units even launched amphibious 
assaults in U.S. donated 40 foot CGUB patrol boats and 85 foot CPB amphibious 
landing craft. 38 "Suddenly from out of nowhere," one of the few rebel survivors, 
Alvarado Lopez, recalleq, "there were thousands of soldiers everywhere. They 
parachuted from the sky, they landed in helicopters, they poured in on armored 
cars ... And always they were led by the American Green Berets. "39 
How many U.S. Green Berets took part in this operation remains a matter of 
considerable dispute. Chicago Daily News correspondent Georgia Anne Geyer 
reported up to a thousand Green Berets from the Eighth Special Forces Group in 
Panama flew in for the operation (the unit had a strength of 1,400 men).40 They not 
only led Guatemalan Army units but served as direct combat troops . Because of the 
intensive rotation policy of the Green Berets, nearly two-thirds of the Eighth Special 
Forces had Vietnam experience. Tuey represented an indispensable, highly skilled 
veteran anti-guerrilla force. The Defense Department denied the figure of 1,000 but 
admitted to having nine Special Forces Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) in Guatemala in 
the summer and fall of 1966. With a normal strength of between twelve and thirty-six 
men, these nine MTTs could comprise over three hundred Green Berets. But according 
to guerrillas, several U.S. correspondents and even members of the Guatemalan 
military, the figure was much higher. The Pentagon admitted twenty-eight Green 
Berets died in combat in Guatemala 1966-1967, supposedly while "advising 
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Guatemalan units." Again, these figures are disputed. Green Beret Vietnam and 
Guatemalan veteran Donald Duncan puts the figure at least three times higher. 41 The 
Pentagon could have used several methods to lower the Guatemalan Green Beret body 
count. One is by adding combat dead to those Eighth Special Forces soldiers who died 
in training exercises in Panama in 1966-1967. Another even more novel concept, 
according to Donald Duncan, was that the U.S. Army flew Green Berets rotating out of 
Vietnam directly to the C,illlal Zone and Guatemala. If they were killed or wounded in 
the Guatemalan operation their names went onto the Fifth and Seventh Special Forces 
Vietnam casualty lists.42 According to this theory perhaps as many as a score of the 
Green Berets listed on the Vietnam Memorial in Washington died in Guatemala, not 
Vietnam 
The U.S.-led regular and elite troops swept through the villages of Zacapa and 
Izabal and worked in close cooperation with paramilitary irregulars, Military Mobile 
Police (PMA) as well as the crucial military commissioners. These paramilitary forces 
walked along the lines of prisoners and pointed out guerrilla sympathizers or suspects in 
the same manner as Vietnamese Civil Guard, Phoenix operatives and Kit Carsons 
pointed our VC suspects to ARYN and U.S. military during village sweeps in the Delta 
and Central Highlands. The PMA summarily executed most suspects. Others were 
taken away for interrogation and internment in "Tiger Cages" (La Tigrera) at Judicial 
Police Headquarters similar to those in the notorious Con San prison in Vietnam or in 
cells known as "the Stables" (Las Cuardas) at National Police Headquarters. The police 
used electronic and water torture methods commonly practiced in Vietnam 43 
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The Army also relocated hundreds of Guatemalan villagers to resettlement 
camps where they forced them to bear arms and vow their allegiance to the 
government. Political scientist Susanne Jonas referred to these camps as "the strategic 
hamlets of Guatemala." The commander of the Zacapa operation, Colonel Carlos 
Arana Osario, later known as the "Butcher of Zacapa," conducted a particularly brutal 
scorched earth campaign in his department, burning villages, destroying crops, killing 
livestock and turning guei,;rilla support areas into wastelands. He referred to his efforts 
in Vietnam double speak as a "pacification campaign. "44 New Left historian, Susanne 
Jonas, remains probably the foremost authority of human rights abuses in Guatemala in 
this period and has compiled an impressive amount of research, beginning with the 1974 
Guatemala, continuing with 19841s Guatemala: Tyranny on Trial and her most recent 
1991 The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power. Jonas relies 
heavily on Guatemalan sources, particularly oral histories of the victims of atrocities. 
At times her work degenerates into flat-out anti-American diatribes with a strong 
Marxist undertone, nonetheless, her studies provide invaluable data on the inhumanity 
and barbarity of counter-insurgency in Guatemala which more conventional historians 
often treat in far too clinical terms. 
Many other military tactics used in Guatemala also fit into classic Vietnamese 
counter-insurgency doctrine. The Guatemalan Army and Air Force supplied close air 
support with UH-1 helicopters gunships and fixed wing aircraft. Tuey strafed, bombed, 
defoliated and napalmed villages using the infamous Dow Chemical jellied gasoline for 
the first time in the Western Hemisphere. Unconfirmed reports claimed United States 
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Air Force bombers flying from the Canal Zone joined in on these operations.43 This 
might not have even been necessary as MAP funding had furnished the Guatemalan 
Army and Air Force with sufficient combat aircraft of its own. As Ambassador Mein 
said in a ceremony upon the delivery of five new HU-lB jet powered helicopters: 
These articles, especially the helicopters, are not easy to obtain at this time since 
they are being utilized by our forces in the defense of liberty in Southeast Asia. 
But liberty must be defended wherever it is threatened and that liberty is now 
being threatened ifl. Guatemala. 45 
The Guatemalan Air Force designated areas fraught with guerrilla activity zonas 
libres ("free fire zones") where extensive indiscriminate bombing and artillery barrages 
were permitted. U.S. advisors from the Air Mission directed Guatemalan Air Force 
operations and even participated in some of them The death in a crash by U.S. Air 
Force Major Bernard Westfall of the Air Mission in September 1967 while on a 
bombing mission in a converted T-33 jet trainer (the most common U.S. donated 
Guatemalan aircraft) confirmed this. Officially Westfall "died while testing the aircraft" 
but according to Maryknoll missionaries and Guatemalan activists, Thomas and 
Marjorie Melville, in Guatemala -- Another Vietnam?, "it was common knowledge and 
a public topic of conversation that the Major [Westfall] often tested Guatemala aircraft 
in strafing and bombing runs against guerrilla encampments in the northeastern 
territory . "46 
The United States set up a rotation system referred to jokingly as the 
"Saigon-Guatemala Shuttle." According to the U.S. State Department records and the 
Foreign Service Lists and Biographic Register, some twenty-eight diplomatic, AID, and 
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Office of Public Safety personnel, previously stationed in Vietnam, were transferred to 
the U .S. Embassy in Guatemala during the 1964-1972 period. Below is a list by year of 
that personnel: 
TABLEXVI 47 
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS REASSIGNED FROM SOUTH VIETNAM 
TO GUATEMALA 1964-1972 
1964 1969 
Newton B. Knox - ROCAP* 
1965 
Alfred N aurucki - public safety advisor 
1966 
Robert E . Zimmerman - USIA 
David Jickling - public safety advisor 
1967 
Lucille E . Martin - admin . asst . 
F. R Worten - engineer 
Dudley Burris - public safety advisor 
1968 
Russell L. Hale - deputy controller 
Stan W. Jorgensen - consular officer 
James L. Roush - public safety advisor 
Drayton Phillips - program evaluation 
officer 
1970 
Leo E. Crampsey- administration 
specialist 
Gerald D. Brown - public safety advisor 
Nathan Rakahar - budget/acct. officer 
Robert E . Culberton - director AID 
Jack Force y - public safety advisor 
1971 
Richard A Barth - auditor Rudy V. Fimbres - multisector officer 
Richard E . Kaegi- asst/dir . devl. operations Norbert F. Holz - multisector officer 
Sara Shonk - disbursement officer Karl L. Mahler - deputy exec . officer 
Richard D . Van Winkle - pub/safety advisor Carl M. Fisher - hwy. engr . advisor 
David Wright - political officer Robert R Parker - multisector officer 
1972 Raymond F. Burghardt, Jr. - political officer 
*Regional Office for Central America and Panama 
Six of the sixteen public safety administrators stationed in Guatemala during the 
counter-insurgency war period 1966-1970 had been previously assigned to the Public 
Safety Administration in South Vietnam The CIA has not released records as to how 
many of its Guatemalan operatives previously served in Vietnam but if the strong 
pattern evidenced by the State Department is any indication, one can assume they were 
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significant. Uruguayan journalist Eduardo Galeano, a close confidant of the guerrillas, 
came up with his own short list in his book, Guatemala: Pais Occupado: 
TABLEXVII 48 
CIA Agents Transferred from Vietnam to Guatemala. 
Serving in Jutiapa Military Base 
Headquarters 
Richard Park Guthrie 
John Chapleo Beckimon 
Elton Nurmi . . 
John Mess 
Serving in lzabal Military 
Robert Bemestein 
Arnold Blechenger 
Oscar Hunt Adams 
Edward Thorton Floyd 
Arthur Kerr 
James McNamara 
Edward Suarez 
Three individuals on the State Department list, Gerald D. Brown, Alfred 
Naurocki and Jack Forcey, served on the staff of the CIA's infamous pacification 
agency in Vietnam, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS), 
which helped set up the Civil Guard, strategic hamlet and Phoenix assassination 
programs. Human rights activists identified two public safety advisors and one political 
programs officer within the U.S. Embassy: Dudley Burris, Richard D. Van Winkle and 
David Wright as CIA agents. Several key U.S. military officers attached to 
Guatemala's MAAG had also served in Vietnam. They included the 1966-1967 head of 
the U.S. military mission, Colonel Joseph Koontz, the 1967-1968 chief advisor, Colonel 
John Webber, and the head of the U.S. Civic Action advisory staff during the 
counter-insurgency campaign of 1966-1968, Major Frederick F. Woerner, "a combat 
veteran of over fifty search and destroy missions in Vietnam. "49 
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By the spring of 1967 the State Department judged the rural counter-insurgency 
war in Guatemala "a huge success."50 U.S. and Guatemalan forces completely 
annihilated whole units of Guatemalan rebels. Many of the rebels failed to maintain 
proper security and lived openly in vulnerable villages. According to the rebels own 
highly critical postmortem, new student recruits neglected to maintain watches or 
apprise their units of government military movements. The guerrillas also failed to 
establish a strong Indian_ and peasant support base within Zacapa and Izabal. Tuey 
didn't receive enough intelligence from the local population which in several cases 
turned against them and cooperated with the Army. 51 
Mostly, however , the massive fire power and mobility of the U.S. led 
Guatemalan forces simply overwhelmed the guerrillas. In a combined arms effort, the 
U.S. brought thousands of seasoned, well equipped troops against the guerrillas' rather 
amateurish and lightly armed 500 man force. Tue guerrillas also suffered a key loss of 
leadership. Turcios Lima died under somewhat mysterious circumstances in a 
automobile accident in early October 1966, just as the government offensive opened. 
His death decapitated the rebel movement at the very start of the campaign. Tue 
government killed or captured some four hundred out of five hundred active guerrillas 
in the first few months of the war, dealing a severe defeat to the rural insurgency that it 
would really not recover from until the mid-1970s. 52 
In the wake of this counter-insurgency success government allied paramilitary 
forces launched a reign of terror in both the cities and the countryside. They took 
advantage of the wartime crisis atmosphere to settle old scores with political enemies 
and even neutrals. Besides the PMA, the military commissioners and the Judicial 
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police, a number of "private groups" came to fore in this effort. They included 
Movimento Anti-Communista Nacionclista Organizado or MANO BLANCO, Nueva 
Organizacion Anti-Communista or NOA, Consejo Anticommunista de Guatemala or 
CADEG, as well as numerous others, RA YO, CRAG and ASA 53 These groups, 
comprised of retired servicemen and policemen, reservists, landowners, businessmen 
and paid thugs systematically eliminated all individuals suspected of "communist 
leanings." They slaught~red hundreds of largely non-communist civilians -- labor 
organizers, peasant cooperative leaders, agrarian improvement workers , rural teachers, 
labor lawyers, leftist journalists, college students and professors , and just about 
everyone who subscribed to any political beliefs to the left of the MLN. This terror 
campaign effectively wiped out the few successful grass roots Alliance for Progress 
programs in Guatemala and reasserted the oligarchy's unchallenged rule in the 
countryside. Hard line paramilitary groups maintained strong links to the Guatemalan 
military and its U.S. advisors. In early 1967 they even began assassinating 
Revolutionary Party mayors, councilmen and officials -- members of the President 
Mendez Montenegro's own party. In the all-out counter-insurgency war of 1966-1968 
and the counter-terror that followed it, 8,000 to 11,000 Guatemalan civilians lost their 
lives. 54 
But the Johnson Administration's troubles had just begun for the Guatemalan 
left rocked back on its heels, counter attacked with a ferocity that matched the right 
wing paramilitary outrages . While the war continued smoldering in the countryside, its 
main focus shifted to the capital where Guatemala City, like Saigon, soon faced its own 
Tet Offensive. 
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CHAPTER VI 
TET COMES TO GUATEMALA: THE URBAN GUERRILLA CRISIS 
1967 - 1969 
The April 1967 Office of Public Safety Incident Report sent from Guatemala 
City to Washington had a distinctively upbeat ring about it. It stat~d that April had 
been "a fairly good month and a considerable improvement over March." In April the 
report went on to say there had been "2 riots , 5 attacks on the police, 4 attacks against 
~ 
police buildings, 9 attacks by guerrillas or organized bands other than on the police, 8 
bombings , 7 assassinations , 5 political kidnappings and 7 reported incidents of 
sabotage . "1 All in all, for the Guatemalan government in 1967, a fairly calm month . 
The first optimistic reports of success against the rural guerrillas in late 1966 
turned markedly sour by spring. Due in no small part to the wave of assassinations in 
the countryside by MLN allied paramilitary groups, new recruits joined the guerrillas as 
fast as the security forces could kill them Left-wing retaliations increasingly spread to 
the cities where a fairly effective "safe house" network afforded guerrillas some refuge 
from the storm A number of tactical advantages derived from taking the war to the 
city, chief among them the reluctance of the military to bomb its own capital . Urban 
warfare negated the government's overwhelming air advantage in the countryside .2 
The U.S . led rural counter-insurgency campaign, besides wiping out several 
hundred guerrillas , also killed thousands of innocent civilians caught in the crossfire of 
napalm, mortar and artillery barrages , helicopter gunship raids, and heavy conventional 
bombing. The death toll was estimated at 4,000, but it would more than double after 
this strictly military phase of the campaign ended . The Guatemalan Army and its U.S . 
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advisors committed the classic counter-insurgency error warned against in its own 
doctrine: 
Military operations by large bodies of troops, as a non-selective method of 
applying force are likely to inflict disproportionate hardship on the civil 
population; it will be compounded if the troops regard themselves as in enemy 
tenitory and behave accordingly. The result is likely to be popular bitterness 
which turns fii.endly or neutral elements against the government. Large scale 
operations directed against guenillas thereby tend by their very nature to 
strengthen and widen the very insurgency they seek to defeat. 3 
With scores of villages and farms destroyed by the "pacification campaign", as in 
Vietnam thousands of peasants fled to the cities depopulating their traditional 
farmlands. These rural refugees proved fertile recruiting ground for the bomb 
throwers , kidnappers and assassins of the left. They also supplied additional murder 
victims for the hit squads of the right. 
While the rebels may have suffered severe setbacks in the countryside, like the 
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the winter of 1967-1968, they hoped to rebound 
politically by taking the war to the cities and striking at the very bowels of the security 
apparatus built to destroy them Although the Guatemalan left's tactics at times proved 
as inflammatory, vicious and inhumane as the government's it is important to note that 
the government launched the opening blows in this new "dirty war" phase of the 
counter-insurgency and inflicted atrocities at a rate that can best be estimated at about 
five to one in comparison to the left.4 The left's sporadic attacks tended towards 
emotional response. The right's terror campaign proved much more systematic. 
As early as June 1966 a full month before Mendez Montenegro's government 
took office, the first ominous, unsigned leaflets appeared in Guatemala City proclaiming 
the creation of anti-Communist "defense squads." Some seventeen paramilitary groups 
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eventually sprang to life in the 1966-1967 period, many of them clearly fictitious 
nomenclatures for Guatemalan military and police units. While several of these 
paramilitary groups may have been independently formed, they all maintained close ties 
to the Guatemalan military and police as well as the National Liberation Movement 
(MLN) , Guatemala's leading right-wing party and President Mendez Montenegro's 
chief political opponents . 5 
The MLN 's leade.r Mario Sandoval Alarcon pulled no punches in spelling out 
his party's philosophy. "I am a Fascist and I have always tried to model my party after 
the Spanish Falange. "6 Besides the larger, more infamous, terror groups such as 
MANO BLANCO, NOA, CADEG , RA YO, ASA, a number of smaller groups surfaced, 
sporting more flamboyant names: Ojo per Ojo (Eye for an Eye), Rosa Purpura (Purple 
Rose) and El Buitre Justiciero (The Hawk of Justice). In the 1970s many of these 
groups took on religious connotations -- the Assassins of the Virgin Mary, the Army of 
St. John the Baptist, etc., but in the 1960s most remained strictly political.7 The MLN 
and much of the oligarchy supported these groups quite openly. Wealthy businessman 
Raul Garc~a Granados told the Guatemalan daily La Hora : 
Of course, the death squads are organized under the patronage and approval of 
the government and the Army. They have lists of people that are suspected of 
being communists and they kill them It's war, you see, a war between 
communists and anti-Communists . They have the sympathy of most of the 
Guatemalan people . 8 
U.S . investors seconded Granados' opinion. Bank of America manager Keith 
Parker said: 
When you've got a situation like you have here you need the strongest 
government you can get. If you use human rights in a country with guerrillas 
you're not going to get anywhere ... What they do here is declare martial law. 
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Then when you catch somebody, they go to a military court . Three colonels are 
sitting there; you're guilty, you're shot . It works very well. 9 
This philosophy contradicted the official , prosaic anti-guerrilla rules laid out by 
the Defense Department and Embassy MAAG that included such homilies as: 
1. Pay the market price in cash for anything obtained locally . 
2. Return anything you borrow. 
3. Pay for everything you break. 
4. Never walk on or needlessly damage growing crops. 
5. Leave people's women along. 
6. Be courteous and polite to people and help them when you can. 
7. Use a minimum of\riolence and only as a last resort in selective situations . 10 
I 
The president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Guatemala , Fred 
Sherwood , took a more pragmatic view: 
Why should we do anything about the death squads? They're bumping off the 
commies , our enemies. rd give them more power . Hell, rd give them more 
cartridges if I could , and every one else would , too. They're bumping off our 
enemies, which are also the enemies of the United States . Why should we 
criticize them? 11 
Sherwood had a point. U .S. counter-insurgency doctrine included "the selective 
use of counter-terror through paramilitary forces. 1112 This philosophy comprised the 
psychological part of the counter-insurgency equation. Friendly governments 
supposedly had the legitimate right to retaliate in kind against communist terror directed 
against them As Naval Intelligence officer , Albert L. Fisher , wrote in "To Beat the 
Guerrillas at Their Own Game , 11 in Military Review: 
This is the tactic of intimidating, kidnapping or assassinating carefully selected 
members of the opposition in a manner that will reap the maximum 
psychological benefit for :friendly forces. 13 
This type of doctrine had been taught for years to Guatemalan officer candidates 
at the U.S . Army School of the Americas and dozens of other U.S. facilities around the 
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world. Therefore when the United States expressed alarm at escalating paramilitary 
violence in Guatemala, its criticisms should be judged more as protest against the 
amount and not the~ of violence employed. 
The MLN took out full page advertisements as early as August 26, 1966, in 
Guatemala's most popular newspaper El Imparcial which warned of the impending 
"vigilante action ... the MLN cannot prevent the people from acting in self-defense. The 
government should not ~ be surprised that the citizenry organize themselves for 
self-defense or take justice into their own hands." 14 On May 7, 1967, just as the 
counter-terror gathered momentum, another advertisement, this time in La Hora read: 
The government, the people and the Army have amalgamated into a single 
fighting force with the object of destroying the guerrillas definitively in a 
political and armed struggle without quarter which will be a true national 
crusade!15 
The MLN mounted a concerted effort both in the cities and the countryside to 
whip up a popular frenzy for its new vengeance campaign. It bussed urban supporters 
to rural demonstrations where they waved placards reading: "Death to the Guerrillas!" 
"Long Live the Army!" "We Don't Want to Be Another Cuba!" "Guerrillas, Stop 
Killing Innocent People!" The U.S. Embassy drove American journalists to these 
staged events where they reported "mass peasant support for the counter-insurgency 
campaign in Zacapa and Izabal. "16 
Paramilitary groups next distributed death list pamphlets throughout the cities 
with names and pictures of "Traitors to the Guatemalan Nation." In rural areas 
Guatemalan Air Force planes dropped these leaflets. "Your Hour Has Come, 
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Communists at the Service of Fidel Castro, Russia and Communist China." They read: 
"You have until the last day of March to leave the country. "17 
MANO BLANCO enthusiasts stencil painted hundreds of white hands on the 
doorways of union leaders, leftist journalists, activist priests , labor lawyers, even largely 
moderate politicians who had once suggested negotiations with the guerrillas. 
The paramilitary squads placed the mutilated bodies of their first victims in 
prominent areas: in city market squares, on the steps of churches or in victims' 
.. 
doorways. They pinned notes to the bodies which explicitly described: "how the victim 
had been slowly cut to pieces, castrated, strangled, burned , drowned or smothered. "18 
Often pieces of bodies were simply strewn about city streets, leaving it to relatives to 
piece them together and try and discover who was who. Hundreds of victims simply 
disappeared never to be heard of again, ten years before the desseperados of Argentina 
became a cause celebre.19 The U.S. Army's 1962 field manual Operations Against 
Irregular Forces, the virtual bible at the U.S. School of the Americas in the early 1960s, 
included the following list of overt irregular activities that could be used to confront 
communist insurgents and their supporters: 
terrorism by assassination, bombing arson, torture , mutilation and kidnapping, 
provocation of incidents, reprisals, and holding of hostages, the use of chemical 
or biological agents, the use of booby traps and explosive devices. 
Covert irregular activities included: 
espionage, sabotage, dissemination of propaganda and rumors, issuing of false 
or misleading reports , assassination, extortion, blackmail, identifying individuals 
for terroristic attack, psychological destruction of individuals.20 
Lyndon Johnson may have been referring to more than just the CIA 
assassination attempts on Castro when he exclaimed in 1964: "We have been operating 
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a damned Murder Incorporated in the Caribbean!"21 In his 1984 work, Ganison 
Guatemala, George Black investigated U.S. complicity with violent paramilitary 
organizations. Black demonstrates how the Guatemalan military and elites, long 
accustomed to hostility against the Indians and upstart ladino reformers, felt more at 
ease with the United States anti-communist crusade than with their own country's 
nationalist aspirations. This attitude embodied a classic colonial elite mentality, 
emphasized in much of Franz Fanon's ground breaking work, and is clearly rooted in the 
... 
300 year old Spanish colonial experience. Like many revisionist studies published in the 
early 1980s at the height of the Reagan backed contra war in Nicaragua and the bloody 
civil war in El Salvador, Garrison Guatemala contains a fair amount of presentism and 
sometimes reaches, in trying to present parallels between the 1960s and the 1980s. 
Black does an effective job, however, in portraying counter-revolution as a way of life 
for successive Guatemalan governments ever since the 1954 U.S. backed coup. 
By the fall of 1967 the activities of right-wing assassination squads reached 
pandemic proportions. Every week scores of twisted bodies, many those of outstanding 
and educated ladinos were discovered in rivers, lakes, municipal dumps and alleyways. 
At the funeral of academic and labor lawyer, Julio Carey Herriera, the rector of the 
University of San Carlos expressed the frustration of those trying to reform the political 
system: 
The black banner that preaches the death of intelligence has been raised many 
times .. .It seems that the blood of the university is being demanded as the 
solution to the problems of Guatemala. It seems that giving bands of killers a 
license to operate is seen as the solution to our problems.22 
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Earlier in the year, Walt Rostow, Chairman of the State Department Planning 
Council and a longtime counter-insurgency enthusiast, praised "the aggressiveness of 
the security forces in Guatemala" which resulted in "the death or capture of several key 
members of the guerrilla and urban terrorist apparatus ... The security forces should be 
congratulated for conducting an outstanding counter-terrorism campaign against the 
Communists. 1123 Rostow failed in any way to either mention or criticize the incredible 
amount of atrocities and bloodletting associated with this effort. He also totally ignored 
.. 
the concerns of the duly elected Revolutionary Party (PR) whose Congressional 
representative Edmundo Lopez Duran spoke out in the Congress in February 1967: 
"The situation of the state of siege has been taken advantage of by the terrorist 
organization MANO BLANCO and by the military commissioners to persecute and kill 
well known members of the Partido Revolucionario."24 The next day MANO BLANCO 
put Lopez on its death list. (They murdered him in January 1968.) 
By October 1967, however, the State Department Director of Intelligence and 
Research, Thomas Hughes sent an urgent memorandum to Dean Rusk: 
President Mendez Montenegro evidently gave the security forces a carte blanche 
in the field of internal security in exchange for military support to his 
administration. The United States supported this arrangement. He and we may 
now wish to reconsider, however, as the military use of extra-legal tactics is 
creating considerable unease in Guatemala and threatens to undermine the 
President's popular support. The Embassy warns that continued use of such 
rough and ready counter-insurgency tactics could lead to popular agitation for 
the re-establishment of law and order, and eventually might create conditions 
propitious for a coup ... At the center of the Army's clandestine counter-terrorist 
apparatus is the Special Commando Unit formed in January 1967 by CIA 
advisors and currently under the command of Colonel Maximo Zepeda. 
Composed of both military and civilian personnel, the Special Unit has carried 
out abductions, bombings, street assassinations and execution of real or alleged 
communist and occasionally has also acted against other vaguely, defined 
"enemies of the government." The Special Unit supposedly does not act 
without specific orders from Colonel Zepeda who in tum receives his 
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instructions from the Defense Minister, Colonel Arriaga Bosque .. For a time the 
Special Unit also worked with the leaders of the notorious MANO 
BLANCO ... rough estimates indicate that approximately 500-600 persons have 
been killed by the unit since January; with the addition of missing persons this 
figure might double to 1,000-1,200. 
This remarkable document ( one of the few declassified and completely 
unsanitized reports of the period) went on to describe the full breadth of the 
Guatemalan terror network as well as the depth of U.S. complicity: 
Civilian counter-insurgency groups armed and organized by the military are also 
active in rural Guatemala -- particularly under the jurisdiction of Colonel Carlos 
Arana, commander of the Zacapa Military Brigade ... The Army says it has 
approximately 1800 armed civilians under its control but other armed groups are 
known to be operating semi-independently. These groups have long been a 
source of concern to rural members of President Mendez's Revolutionary Party 
(PR) who have complained of persecution and who fear that reported 
rightist/military plans to expand these groups are motivated by partisan political 
considerations ... The entire situation brings into serious question the ability of 
President Mendez, the government or even the Minister of Defense to control 
the activities of the counter-insurgents ... We find persuasive the Embassy 
speculation that "in some instances the government can still exercise a degree of 
control over the activities of the clandestine killer units, both civilian and 
military" but that it would "be foolhardy to count on it." Mendez may shortly 
discover, ifhe has not already done so, that survival can have too high a price.25 
The crowning irony of this conclusion was that the United States helped push 
Mendez Montenegro into making his agreement with the military in the first place. But 
now that right-wing terror, which Washington helped sponsor, began to spin out of 
control, the State Department blamed Mendez Montenegro for failing to bridle his 
military. 
What the Guatemalan military at the behest of the United States government 
actually conducted in Guatemala was a Central American version of the highly 
controversial Vietnam Phoenix Program. Begun also in 1967 by CIA assistant director, 
William Colby, the Phoenix program embodied an abandonment of the original 
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integrated rural program of Robert Komer's in Vietnam, the so-called "strategic hamlet 
concept", in favor of a complete liquidation of the Viet Cong infrastructure. As ex-CIA 
agent, Frank Snepp, put it: "Instead of winning their hearts and minds the idea behind 
Phoenix was to just kill the bastards. 1126 By 1971, the Phoenix program had eliminated 
20,687 supposed members of the VC resistance network. (The South Vietnamese 
government cited a figure of 40,994.)27 This program, like its smaller version in 
Guatemala, encompassed the use of specialized "CT" counter-terrorism units comprised 
of CIA, U.S. Special Forces and indigenous South Vietnamese paramilitary personne~ 
the so called Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) to identify and assassinate anyone 
remotely connected to the Viet Cong. Besides VC operatives the victims included 
Buddhists, students, opposition politicians and civilian critics of the Saigon regime --
even personal enemies and creditors of the assassins. 28 The program called for the use 
of murder, ambushes, kidnappings, torture and intimidation against VC leadership, the 
same "fight fire with fire" rationale employed by right-wing terrorist groups in 
Guatemala. 
Political violence in Guatemala reached a crescendo in early January, 1968, 
when members of MANO BLANCO dumped the raped, mutilated and tortured body of 
popular 26-year old Rogelia Cruz Martinez, the former "Miss Guatemala of 1959" onto 
a main thoroughfare in the capital. Martinez came from an upper middle class family, 
professed leftist sympathies and was reportedly the girlfriend of rebel guerrilla Leonard 
Castillo Johnson.29 On January 16, 1968, before the outcry over this atrocity died 
down, masked FAR machine gunners, firing from a passing green sedan, sprayed a 
Ford van full of U.S. military advisors about ten blocks from the U.S. Embassy. They 
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succeeded in killing the chief of the U.S. military mission, Colonel John D. Webber, and 
the Naval Attache, Lieutenant Commander Ernest A Munro, as well as wounding two 
other U.S. servicemen. 30 The FAR issued a statement claiming the attack represented 
an act of vengeance against "the master minds of the genocidal forces that had 
murdered 4,000 Guatemalans in the past year. "31 
A January 26, 1968 Time Magazine article reported that "Webber and Munro 
were victims of their own success in Guatemala ." The article went on to praise the 
~ 
energetic Webber for reinvigorating the Guatemalan counter-insurgency effort by 
procuring "U.S. jeeps, trucks, armored cars and helicopters to give the army more 
firepower." When the reporter questioned Webber's policy of arming "civilian 
collaborators to kill peasants who they considered guerrillas or potential guerrillas," 
Webber replied: "That's the way this country is. The Communists are using everything 
they have including terror. It must be met . "32 
In his statement Webber conformed to the widely held misconception 
proclaimed in virtually every official document of the period that terror lay at the base 
of the Guatemalan guerrillas' civilian support. This constantly repeated "mantra" 
appeared as an almost desperate attempt to explain away the apparent cooperation of 
large segments of the population with the Revolutionary guerrillas. Washington's 
counter-insurgency dogma remained adamant in its belief that peasants were coerced 
into compliance with the Communists. Why else would they join them? The Vietnam 
experience is replete with similar delusions . Since the counter-insurgency experts 
mistakenly held terror as the key communist technique, it naturally followed that 
counter-terror framed the appropriate military response . Yet with the exception of a 
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limited number of executions of government informants and notoriously brutal 
landlords, the Guatemalan guerrillas practiced very little terrorism against civilians in 
the countryside. In fact, they went out of their way, unlike the U.S . trained Guatemalan 
counter-insurgency units, to befriend the population. "Without the people we are 
nothing," FAR leader Cesar Montes said. "We have men who work with us by night 
and work the soil by day. We build the people's organization for revolutionary war. 
Land to him who works it is our slogan. "33 Eduardo Galeano, a Marxist Uraguyan 
journalist, spent several months in 1966-67 in the mountains of Zacapa, interviewing the 
guerrillas. His 1968 Guatemala: Pais Occupado is an important representation of the 
radical Latin American view of U.S.-Guatemalan relations. Published at the height of 
the Vietnam War, his work captures much of the romanticism, the tragedy , and the 
violent anti-Americanism of the period. Imperialism is Galeano's favorite word and he 
manages to work it into practically every other sentence. His view of Guatemala and 
most of Latin America as a colony of the United States is an important one, however, 
so prevalent among the Latin American Left in the 1960s and 1970s. Galeano is a kind 
of forerunner of the later "dependency school" of economists and other social scientists, 
such as Andre Gunder Frank, who maintain that the only thing the United States ever 
developed in Latin America was underdevelopment. This school strongly influenced 
later revisionist historians such as Walter LaFeber and Richard Immermann. 
Tue decapitation of the U.S. military mission in Guatemala in January 1968 
sparked increased waves of atrocities. Right wing gunmen cut down liberal 
Congressmen at home over their breakfast tables. Police captains were assassinated 
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leaving church. One labor leader ran into a police station to escape a carload of MANO 
BLANCO gunmen. The police shot him in the lobby. Bleeding profusely he begged for 
his life. Laughing, the police carried him up to the fourth story roof and threw him 
off.34 He thus joined the list of "leftist suicides" which one U.S. embassy official 
surmised "may be a result of the growing disillusionment with communist ideology. "35 
By the spring of 1968 the collapse of Mendez Montenegro's government 
appeared imminent: It could not control Guatemalan Army directed terrorism or the 
" 
retaliations and bombings of the left. In an example of both Mendez Montenegro's 
growing impotence and personal decency, the National Palace was full of his friends 
and former students sleeping on cots and sofas. Once he learned acquaintances were on 
the "death lists" the president invited them to live with him in the palace, the only place 
in Guatemala where political activists were safe. 36 Moderate elements even those that 
originally supported MLN paramilitary attacks on communist civilians and blatant 
leftists felt the campaign had gone too far. Washington's confidence in Mendez 
Montenegro reached a new low after the assassination of its military mission and 
increasing rumors of military plots against him. Hard right officers, aligned with the 
MLN, resented the president's efforts to restrain their paramilitary campaign and plotted 
against him. 
On March 16, 1968 the Guatemalan right, delirious with recent success, 
overplayed its hand. Three key security force officers, Colonel Francisco Arana, leader 
of the Zacapa counter-insurgency war and of the paramilitary terror in the countryside; 
Colonel Manuel Francisco Sosa Avila, the Director of the National Police and 
coordinator of the right-wing urban death squads; and Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque, 
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the Minister of Defense and "godfather" of the Guatemalan terror network conspired to 
overthrow Mendez Montenegro. They hatched a plan for kidnapping Guatemala's 
Roman Catholic Archbishop Mario Caseriego and blaming it on the Rebel Armed 
Forces (FAR). The Archbishop was a well known conservative and vociferous critic of 
the guerrillas. He blessed U.S. donated police cars and armored personnel carriers with 
holy water at ceremonies in the capital. In an interview he unabashedly admitted, "I 
love military life. I. love it when it is based upon discipline such as I believe is the case 
·~ 
in our army and the American army. "37 The military conspirators felt that the abduction 
of such a man would naturally be blamed on the guerrillas. They hoped it would 
provoke massive anti-government demonstrations. They could then seize power to 
restore order. Of the three, Colonel Arana had the strongest presidential ambitions. 
After taking control of the government the three colonels planned to arrange for the 
release of the Archbishop following a period of sham negotiations with his "leftist 
captors" from which they would emerge as even greater heroes for delivering the 
archbishop to safety. 38 
Their plan backfired mainly because of poor execution and the unwillingness of 
the archbishop to go along with this bizarre scheme, this auto-secuestro or 
self-kidnapping. The abductors picked up the archbishop within 100 yards of the 
heavily guarded National Palace in the presence of scores of heavily armed troops and 
police. Guatemalan journalists working for El Imparcial and La Hora immediately 
suspected military collusion . 39 
Rumors of security force involvement led to anti-military, not anti-government, 
demonstrations as the plotters had hoped. By March 20, the second day of the crisis, a 
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U.S. Embassy telegram to the State Department decided "the kidnapping of the 
archbishop is part of a military/rightist plot to overthrow the government. Kidnapping 
of the archbishop seems to have been carried out by members of the armed forces to 
promote public demonstrations. "40 
In a comedy of errors a Guatemalan civilian, a postal clerk, spotted the 
archbishop in the company of the paramilitary kidnappers. The civilian followed them 
in his car to a safe house in Villa Candes where the bishop was held. The postal clerk 
-~ 
called the National Police to report the kidnappe rs whereabouts. Within minutes of his 
call the bishop and his entourage suddenly left the townhouse confirming to the clerk 
that the police were in on the deal. He phoned the newspapers minutes before he 
himself was arrested by the police "for spreading malicious rumors detrimental to the 
security of the state.41 Tue CIA meanwhile got wind of this story and through their own 
confidential police and military contacts , quickly confirmed the military's involvement. 
Their scheme unco vered , the conspirators searched desperately for scapegoats. 
On the same day that the archbishop was released unharmed , the National Police 
arrested two MANO BLANCO operatives involved in the kidnapping , Raul Estuardo 
Lorenzana and Ines Mufio Padilla . While in transit to a courthouse , the patrol car 
holding the two men stopped and the arresting officers abandoned it. A few seconds 
later another car pulled up alongside the patrol car and fired approximately 200 machine 
gun bullets into it, shredding the two hand-cuffed prisoners .42 
If the plotters hoped this act would exonerate them, they were mistaken . The 
whole sordid incident generated widespread public outrage against the security forces , a 
rare occurrence in Guatemala in the 1960s. Seizing upon this propitious turn of events, 
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President Mendez Montenegro reasserted himself and demanded the resignation of all 
three conspirators. 43 
The military surprisingly acquiesced. Several semor officers, including the 
retired yet influential Colonel Peralta, felt that military discipline and control had 
collapsed badly amid the "wild west" tactics of the past year. While Colonel Arana 
remained extremely popular among his own crack counter-insurgency troops, 
significant sectors . of the officer corps -- the more moderate technocratic and 
~ 
administrative branch -- regarded him as a dangerous opportunist. The government in 
the end brought no charges against the three men such was the institutional power of 
the military in protecting its own. Instead the conspirators were quietly given foreign 
assignments. The government sent Defense Minister Bosque to Miami, Florida, to 
become Counsel General, National Police Chief Avila to Spain as Military Attache, and 
"The Butcher of Zacapa" (his own men called him the "Tiger of Zacapa"}, Colonel 
Arana, to Nicaragua as ambassador, where Dictator Anastasio Somoza feted him as a 
hero.44 
Briefly the right-wing terror abated. In late August, however, on a tip from an 
informant, the government captured FAR leader Camilo Sanchez. The rebels demanded 
his release and began a series of savage reprisals against government officials which 
culminated in the August 28, 1968, assassination of U.S. Ambassador John Gordon 
Mein, the first American ambassador ever to be killed in service in history. The rebels 
apparently meant to kidnap and exchange Mein for Sanchez, but the ambassador ran 
from the gunmen after they forced his car off the road . They shot and killed him.45 
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-The government declared a state of siege. What little control President Mendez 
Montenegro had managed to reimpose over his military and right wing terrorists due to 
the archbishop fiasco, ended. The resurgent security forces unleashed a new series of 
attacks occasionally matched by FAR atrocities. A Tet-like atmosphere descended over 
Guatemala City particularly around the U.S. embassy compound. Machine gunned, 
bombed, its ambassador slain, its military mission slaughtered, the facility took on 
wartime siege mentality strongly reminiscent of Saigon during the horrific attacks of 
January and February 1968, when Viet Cong sappers penetrated the compound and 
nearly killed Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Cables from the State Department warned 
all embassy personnel to take the strictest security precautions when traveling to and 
from the embassy. Washington ordered a doubling of the Marine guard contingent. 
Guatemalan armored cars ringed all access roads.46 
In Washington 1968 proved a turning point in the Cold War. Johnson virtually 
admitted defeat in Vietnam with his decision not to run again. The policy of 
containment that had shaped U.S. foreign policy from Truman, Kennan, Acheson, 
Dulles and Kennedy seemed at least temporarily bankrupt. The United States' global 
economic dominance, the engine of its military and political power, also appeared to be 
slipping. But while a reappraisal of Washington's relationship with the Soviets and the 
world might be taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the hard line in Latin 
America only intensified. It was one thing to admit failure eight thousand miles away in 
Asia; it was quite another to countenance defeat in one's own backyard. U.S . fairly 
direct intervention in Guatemala on two occasions in 1954 and 1966 predated by two 
years similar Soviet interventions within its own sphere of influence in Hungary in 1956 
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and Czechoslovakia in 1968. While Washington might write off Vietnam as an exotic 
military adventure gone awry, it regarded communist subversion in Guatemala as an 
almost internal domestic revolt the same way Khrushchev and Brezhnev viewed their 
respective Warsaw Pact rebellions . In siege warfare, dissension inside the fort in often 
more threatening than the larger battle on the ramparts . 
The New York Twies called Mein's murder a "foul cowardly act."47 Missing in 
its coverage was any mention of Mein's complicity in the relatively enormous U.S . 
military build-up of Guatemalan security forces during his tenure or of Mein's 
enthusiastic support for the "paramilitary solution" in Guatemala. One of the reasons 
Washington assigned the 52 year old Mein to Guatemala in 1966 was because of his 
counter-insurgency experience in Greece during the late 1940s when he was the 
political officer at the U.S. embassy in Athens.48 (John Peurifoy, the U.S. ambassador 
during the 1954 coup, had held a similar position in Greece.) 
In 1978, ten years after the assassination, a MANO BLANCO operative, Jorge 
Zimeri Saffie alleged to the New York Times that right-wing Guatemalan military 
officers participated in the murder of Mein. Their influence badly diminished by the 
archbishop kidnapping farce, they hoped to regain the upperhand by committing this 
outrage which would automatically be blamed on the left. Counter-insurgency doctrine 
listed staged atrocities as "an often very effective technique for discrediting opposition 
forces ." Guatemalan paramilitary units were famous for bombing government buildings 
as a prelude to vicious political crackdowns. Michele Firk, a French socialist who 
reportedly rented the car used to assassinate Mein, "committed suicide" before the 
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police could bring her to court. She shot hersel.£ which even the CIA report on the 
incident noted "was an uncharacteristic method of suicide for a woman. "49 
No conclusive proof has ever surfaced of military or right-wing involvement in 
the assassination of Mein. Zimeri, arrested in Miami for illegal arms sales, when the 
New York Times interviewed him, may have simply concocted the story to escape 
prosecution or extradition to Guatemala. Yet the continued Machavellian tactics of the 
Guatemalan right throughput this period leave the charge open to question. 
Spurred on by the assassination, the ever growing cycle of political violence 
continued throughout 1968 and into 1969. President Mendez Montenegro barely hung 
on as a sort of figurehead leader. The CIA chronicled the main deleterious effects of 
this new Tet offensive and counter-offensive in Guatemala: "The fact that real power in 
Guatemala resides with strictly violent conservative elements means that any 
government -- and especially the suspect incumbent one -- flirts with political disaster in 
pushing for even the most elemental progress and reform. 1150 Just as the "winning the 
hearts and minds" campaigns in Vietnam, the seven year attempt at "nation building" in 
Southeast Asia -- collapsed irrevocably in the January-February 1968 bloodbath, so 
similar hopes of the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala died in a hail of machine gun 
fire along rural trails and city back alleys in the late 1960s. The savage "scorched earth" 
counter-insurgency campaign in Zacapa and Izabal destroyed overnight the decade long 
efforts of Peace Corp Volunteers, Maryknoll missionaries and AID local project 
workers to build peasant cooperatives and credit unions, dig wells, improve irrigation, 
open schools and clinics. The chilling effect of the right-wing terror spread far beyond 
the actual areas of the counter-insurgency. "Everyone was terrified," one Peace Corp 
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volunteer , James McNeill, testified. "Peasants and Indians ran from anyone connected 
with the government. Two years of work went down the drain in my district. We had 
the materials but the campesinos were afraid to build their own school...[for fear of the] 
landowners retaliation. "51 
In Guatemala City the AFL-CIO recruitment drive effectively ended when 
rightists bombed their headquarters in 1967. "You would have to have a death wish to 
want to become a labor ,.organizer in Guatemala in the late 1960s," AFL-CIO local 
coordinator, Emiliano Zebadua, recalled years later. 52 In 1968 AID canceled its 
sponsorship of a large scholarship program at the University of San Carlos. It seemed a 
wasted effort since most of the graduates were either murdered or became guerrillas. 53 
John Breen, AID director in Guatemala, concurred with this generally 
pessimistic outlook in an October 2, 1968 memorandum: 
My personal view is that this country is not going to achieve political and 
economic stability and democratic government is not going to survive, if 
government is essentially an absent figure throughout most of the country 
leaving the work of protecting lives and punishing offenders to private armies, 
armed crackpots, or burgeoning military caesars making a reputation in the 
countryside prior to their triumphant entry into Guatemala City. 54 
What Breen chose to ignore was his own agency's Office of Public Safety 
division's contribution to this process. As part of U.S. policy it effectively armed and 
trained the private armies and crackpots. 
From the late 1960s onward, AID increased its emphasis on the larger scale 
development projects which benefited the wealthy and the Guatemalan military that had 
grown into an economic powerhouse of its own. Hopes for rural development , small 
business entrepreneurship and land reform ended with the Mendez Montenegro 
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Administration. For the next 19 years, from 1970 to 1989 Guatemala's presidents 
would all be generals. As three successive Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
Generals Matthew Ridgeway, John Gavin and Maxwell Taylor all came from the U.S . 
Army paratroop elite, so the successive presidents of Guatemala all emerged from the 
counter-insurgency units of the Guatemalan Army-- the "Kaibiles" or Tigers. 
Ironically, Sir Robert Thompson, the counter-insurgency guru of both the 
Kennedy and Nixon Administrations, warned against the development of extra legal 
.. 
overkill which helped destroy the Alliance for Progress in Guatemala: 
There is a strong temptation in dealing both with terrorists and with guerrilla 
action for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the 
processes of law are too cumbersome, that normal safeguards in the law for the 
individual are not designed for an insurgency, and that a terrorist deserves to be 
treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong , but , over a 
period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. 
A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits its right to 
be called a government and cannot expect its people to obey the law. 55 
Thompson's argument fell on deaf ears in Guatemala. The policy of endless 
militarization and polarization grinded on. In 1968 Blase Bonpane , an outlawed 
Maryknoll priest, wrote: "Guatemala smells like South Vietnam in the early 1960s. 
There are the same United States military advisors by the hundreds , the same corrupt 
power structure , the same fear of communism to the point of paranoia, the same heaps 
of dismembered peasants by the sides of the roads ... "56 
In early 1970 the newly promoted General Francisco Arana Osario, kidnapper 
of Archbishop Casariego, the "Butcher of Zacapa", returned to Guatemala in triumph to 
run for the presidency. He was elected a few months later in an election noted for 
"major voter discrepancies" and "massive intimidation at the polls". In an interview 
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before his inaugural address he promised "to kill every last communist in Guatemala 
even if I have to turn the whole country into a graveyard. "57 Arana, long a favorite of 
the U.S . Military Mission, would prove as good as his word. 
In the 1966-1969 paramilitary terror campaign, the United States' 
counter-insurgency doctrine in Guatemala reached its apogee. The entire debacle was 
the logical outgrowth of the nearly decade long policy which began in the United States 
School of the Americas,~ the Inter American Police Academy, and Special Warfare 
School at Fort Bragg in the early Kennedy years. In fact, the roots of this tragedy could 
be traced back as far as the immediate post 1954 coup's counter-revolution, when at 
CIA and FBI direction Castillo Armas' newly established Liberacion government 
ruthlessly purged the Guatemalan left and center, murdering and imprisoning thousands 
of Arbenz supporters. MANO BLANCO operatives frequently drew upon the 1955 
70,000 name "black list" compiled by the CIA, FBI , and Guatemalan security agencies 
for their 1966-1969 victims. Many of these Guatemalan leftists and centrists, after 
fleeing their country in 1954, had returned during the relatively "moderate" reign of 
Ydigoras (1958-1963) or the early days of the Mendez Montenegro government, only 
to be caught up in the sudden counter-insurgency slaughter of 1966-1969. This brutal 
policy of political massacre forever dashed whatever slight hope of political 
reconciliation and consensus might have still existed in Guatmalan society in the early 
1960s. 
The horrific legacy of this Guatemalan Tet continued into the 1970s and 1980s. 
To this day Guatemala remains one of the most politically polarized nations on the face 
of the earth, where bullets not ballots are the principle means of discourse, where 
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torture , castration and the gasoline torching of political opponnts is more the norm than 
the exception. Sometimes a military laboratory can become almost too diabolicai a 
kind of eternal Stalingrad where Nazis and Communists fight everyday to the last man, 
such is the political climate of Guatemala, fostered by deep sociai raciai culturai and 
economic divisions yet fought with hardware, doctrine, and ideology largely exported 
by the United States. 
Washington's attempts to try and pull back from this policy in 1968, when faced 
~ 
with the full magnitude and logical consequences of its own actions, proved too little 
and far too late. If anything, the bitter stalemate in Vietnam steeled the Johnson 
Administration's resolve to gain a clear victory over communist insurgents, not only in 
Guatemala, but in various other Latin American countries during the 1960s -- no matter 
what the long term costs. While the Nixon Administration would re-examine 
containment in both Europe and Asia with its policy of detente with the Soviets and its 
opening to China, the policy of ruthless anti-communism continued unabated in Central 
America until the 1990s. 
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"Pamper the army and despise the rest" 
Septimus Severus' deathbed advice to his son and successor Caracalla. 
CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION 
One of the difficulties in gauging the effects of United States military assistance, 
doctrine and training on the Guatemalan military and society is the lack of a control 
group . If one national military or country in Latin America developed without receiving 
" 
U.S . military assistance, it could be studied and compared with Guatemala . 
Unfortunately no such army or country existed. In the 1960s the United States funded 
and trained all the militaries, police forces and nations of Central America, Latin 
America and the Can'bbean. (Costa Rica had no Army but the United States trained and 
funded its police force.) 
Cultural biases can present a problem as well in judging U.S .-Guatemalan 
military relations. Most Americans tend to view the concept of professionalizing and 
modernizing a military as depoliticizing it. In fact the American tradition of civilian 
control over a largely apolitical military is an historical anomaly. It also can be a racist 
generalization to suppose that there is something intrinsic in the Latin American 
character that lends itself to military rule. Probably the most professional and modem 
army of the nineteenth century was the Prussian Army which was deeply involved in the 
politics of Germany. By comparison Guatemala's twentieth century military played a 
less prominent role in its government's affairs prior to the United States massive 
injection of aid, equipment, training and doctrine in the Kennedy years. 
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Another seductive trap in analyzing U.S.-Guatemalan relations is to ascribe 
everything that occurred in Guatemala solely to outside forces. Many early revisionist 
historians succumbed to this temptation. According to this scenario, the United States 
commanded and Guatemala obeyed. Yet it would be an even greater miscalculation to 
discount the enormous economic, political and military power the United States wielded 
in the Caribbean in the early 1960s and the huge influence of its Cold War 
anti-communist ideology on militaries and economic elites in the region. Walter 
~ 
LaFeber in his 1984 Inevitable Revolutions correctly emphasizes the clear historical 
links from Teddy Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson to FDR, Eisenhower, Kennedy and 
Johnson in their overall view of the Caribbean as the United States mare nostrum and 
their consistent opposition to revolution in the region. 
Anecdotal examples of the influence of American military indoctrination can be 
powerful but are they scientific? A Guatemalan-American, Carlos Caranza, who served 
in his country's military in the 1960s and trained in the United States remembered: 
I don't think people here can appreciate what it's like to come from a poor 
village in Guatemala and at the age of nineteen go to a place like Fort Bragg. It 
was the greatest thing in my life .. .I don't think Americans understand how 
powerful their military is, what a reputation it has as the greatest and strongest 
Army in the world. Every day at Fort Bragg was like a dream to me to think 
that I was training and learning from the richest, most powerful people in the 
world ... The equipment, the money, the food! I don't think my whole country 
had as much food as was at Fort Bragg ... Some of the people didn't like us. 
They thought they were better than us but I don't think I really even noticed 
it. .. At the graduation an important official from the American government came 
to address us. And all the officers up on the platform in their shiny uniforms and 
medals with the tanks and armored cars lined up, the band playing and 
paratroopers jumping into the sky. It was like a miracle. And I thought what an 
honor it is to be a part of this big fight against the people who were trying to 
destroy my country, my church and my people. I was sure we would defeat 
them. How could we not defeat them with the United States on our side?' 
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Young Turcios Lima expressed similar sentiments before he turned to 
Communism a few years later. American military indoctrination had no long term 
effects on him For the average, barely literate Guatemalan conscript, however, U.S. 
training must have been a heady and extremely influential experience. Those who 
questioned U.S. doctrine and anti-communist ideology probably comprised a small 
minority of the thousands of officers and enlisted men who went through this process. 
More importantly their senior commanders -- Peralta and Arana -- and the governments 
.. 
they served, enthusiastically subscribed to said doctrine and ideology. 
Guatemala was a racist authoritarian society for nearly four centuries before the 
United States intervened in its affairs significantly in the late nineteenth century. 
Post-revisionist historians, such as Stephen G. Rabe, Jim Handy and James Dunkerley, 
have explored the cultural and historical roots of Guatemala's social inequities. Jim 
Handy convincingly argues that three centuries of Spanish rule in Guatemala proved 
much more crucial in shaping Guatemalan society than the last hundred years or so of 
U.S. domination. Yet Guatemalans make a credible argument that they had begun to 
ascend from their own dark and troubled past during the "ten years of spring," 
1944-1954 before anti-communist paranoia in the form of the Dulles State Department 
and the CIA crushed their small experiment in democracy. While the United States in 
the 1960s invested, loaned, and donated enormous sums of money to Guatemala, it did 
so in ways which best served United States economic interests and favored traditionally 
U.S. allied elites. Castro undoubtedly posed a real threat to Washington policy-makers 
in the early 1960s -- not so much Castro, the military leader, as Castro the example. A 
good deal of America's economic affluence remained tied to America's favorable 
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balance of trade with Latin America -- cheap and vital imports combined with expensive 
manufactured exports . In 1960, 20% of all U.S. trade was with Latin America and 25% 
of all U.S. investments overseas were concentrated there. But the Kennedy 
Administration's obsession with counter-insurgency warfare as a solution to the 
problems of poverty and underdevelopment m Guatemala proved contradictory, self 
defeating, and ultimately tragic. 
Both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations displayed a palpable sense 
contempt for Guatemala in their decision, based upon the pretext of a relatively small 
internal rebellion, to turn the whole country into a counter-insurgency laboratory. In 
1963 General Maxwell Taylor stated in a Congressional Hearing on U.S. involvement in 
South Vietnam: 
Here we have an ongoing laboratory where we see subversive insurgency, the 
Ho Chi Minh doctrine being applied in all its forms. This has been a challenge 
not only for the armed forces but for several of the agencies of government, as 
many of them are involved in one way or another in Vietnam On the military 
side, however, we have recognized the importance of the area as a laboratory . 
We have teams out there looking at the equipment requirements of this kind of 
guerrilla warfare. We have rotated senior officers through there, spending 
several weeks just to talk to people and get the feeling of the operation so even 
though not regularly assigned to Vietnam, they are carrying their experience 
back to their own organizations in other countries. 2 
One of those "other countries" was Guatemala where a disproportionately 
amount of freshly assigned embassy and military personnel had Vietnam experience. In 
a September 25, 1968 speech to the Eighth Conference of American Armies in Rio de 
Janeiro, former Vietnam Commander General William Westmoreland stated: 
I am pleased to accept this invitation because as military men, I believe that we, 
perhaps more than any other profession in the public service, recognize the 
immediate threat to the countries and people we serve that is posed by the sort 
of thing which is taking place today in Southeast Asia. We know that South 
Vietnam is a communist laboratory. We know that if aggression under the guise 
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-of "national liberation" succeeds there , it is ready to be marketed in our own 
Hemisphere . 3 
But Guatemala was clearly more of an American than a Communist laboratory. 
One way to establish proprietorship of a laboratory is to determine who owns the 
property and the equipment. In 1960 U.S. and other Western investors owned nearly 
40% of the arable land of Guatemala. (The U.S . allied Guatemalan oligarchy owned 
another 40%.) By the mid-1960s the United States had donated over $20 million worth 
of sophisticated military equipment to Guatemala -- jet bombers , helicopters , armored 
personnel carriers , artillery, communication equipment , night vision scopes , machine 
guns, mortars, sensory devices , and thousands of brand new M-16s . The Guatemalan 
rebels on the other hand possessed about 300 M-1 and M-14 rifles. If Guatemala was 
Castro's laboratory , it was severely underfunded , under-equipped and understaffed . 
The proportional ratio of permanent U.S . military advisors to the Guatemalan Army in 
the 1960s was the highest in the Western Hemisphere (see table) . 
TABLEXVill 4 
U.S. Military Advisors to National Armed Forces 
1964-1968 
Argentina 1/2034 
Brazil 1/1760 
Chile 1/1250 
Colombia 1/1470 
Ecuador 1/2010 
Guatemala 1/300 
But this only encompassed permanently stationed advisors within the Embassy's 
MAAG staff Hundreds of additional American advisors (MTTs) were flown in during 
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-crisis periods such as the 1966-7 counter-insurgency war, bringing the ratio up to an 
almost incredible 1 to 9. 
The United States initially regarded its Guatemalan laboratory an enormous 
success, a clear cut victory compared to the murky, unsettling results in its Vietnamese 
lab. U.S . led Guatemala security forces crushed most of the rural insurgency while 
allied paramilitary forces decimated the urban left. But this "triumph" proved 
transitory . Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa, the communist guerrilla leaders who had 
ironically been trained by the U.S., never really established a broad Indian or ladino 
peasant base in Izabal and Zacapa. By the mid-1970s their successors (Yon Sosa was 
killed in 1970 by Mexican Police while crossing the border) put together a truly popular 
based insurgency among the Indians of El Quiche which the Guatemalan military, 
despite tens of thousands of atrocities and twenty years of fighting, have thoroughly 
failed to eradicate. Turcios Lima and Yon Sosa fielded about 500 guerrillas in the 
mid-1960s ; the EGP currently maintains 6,000. Indeed the violent counter-terror of 
1966-1969 planted the seeds for this new more virulent form of guerrilla revolution. 
The application of U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine radicalized the Indians, 
traditionally the most isolated and apathetic group in Guatemalan society. 
The United States so lavished the Guatemalan military with equipment, training, 
advisors, education, money . and technology it virtually assured their becoming the 
dominant and most cohesive group in Guatemalan society. The corporate nature of the 
Guatemalan military; its insularism, emphasis on personalism, nepotism and graduate 
class loyalties contributed to this process , but without U.S. military assistance and 
political backing, it is difficult to imagine the military running Guatemalan society as it 
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has from 1962 to the present as a virtual garrison state. In no other Central American 
nation has the military held such prolonged endemic and undisputed sway. On two 
separate occasions in April 1962 and May 1966 the United States exerted its 
considerable diplomatic pressure to assure Guatemalan military's dominance of the 
civilian government. In March 1963 the United States conspired with senior Guatemala 
officers to overthrow an elected government and install an illegal military one, which it 
recognized eighteen days 1'iter. 
Did the United States have any credible policy options to simply militarizing 
Guatemala? All the steps fundamental to meaningful change for Guatemalan society --
redistribution of land from the criollos to the Indians, nationalization of Guatemala's 
natural resources, guaranteeing of full democratic participation for all political parties 
(including socialists), subsistence farming as opposed to vast two crop agricultural 
exports, developing a Guatemalan industrial-manufacturing base instead of relying 
solely on imports from the West, the United States diametrically opposed, some on the 
grounds of economic self-interest, others due to even deeper ideological beliefs on the 
sanctity of property , investments and free market superiority over any collectivist 
solution. In order to bring real freedom and more equitable living standards to 
Guatemala, the United States purported Alliance for Progress goals, Washington would 
have had to let Guatemala go and become a sort of Caribbean Switzerland. But the 
Kennedy Administration believed in holding onto every square inch of the "Free World" 
in its zero sum game approach to the Cold War and was more than prepared to fight for 
Guatemala. I. F. Stone explained the political delusions of the Kennedy 
Administration's main doctrine better than most: 
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In reading the military literature on guerrilla warfare now so fashionable in the 
Pentagon, one feels that these writers are like men watching a dance from 
outside through heavy plate glass windows. They see the motions but they can't 
hear the music. They put the mechanical gestures down on paper with pedantic 
fidelity. But what rarely comes through to them are the injured racial feelings, 
the misery, the rankling slights, the hatred, the devotion, the inspiration and the 
desperation. So they do not really understand what leads men to abandon wife, 
children, home, career, friends and to take to the bush and live gun in hand like a 
hunted animal; to challenge overwhelming military odds rather than acquiesce 
any longer in humiliation, injustice, or poverty ... 5 
Between 100,000 to 140,000 Guatemalan civilians would die from political 
violence from 1960 to 1~94, due in no small part to this myopic tunnel vision of 
counter-insurgency. 6 
The United States' intervention in Guatemala in the 1960s closely mirrored its 
policy in Vietnam of the same time period and fit in neatly with the larger context of 
U.S . actions during this stage of the Cold War. As in Vietnam, the United States found 
itself on the wrong side of nationalism in Guatemala, resented by large segments of the 
Guatemalan people as a colonial overlord, not the liberal modernizer or concerned 
political mentor of American rhetoric. In order to prop up an unpopular government , 
Washington sent enormous amounts of economic and technical aid, military advisors 
and state of the art weaponry. Civic action, Peace Corps, and charitable programs built 
"model projects" and strategic hamlets. U.S . advisers at training facilities molded the 
local army and security forces. American officials launched a concerted effort at 
"nation building" and "winning hearts and minds." But by 1965, with the advent of the 
new Johnson and Mann Doctrines , much of the energy and idealism had dissipated from 
the Alliance for Progress, from the spirit of Punta del Este . Obsessed with events in 
Southeast Asia, fiscally constrained by the growing cost of the war there and the Great 
Society at home, Johnson lost interest in Latin America as a vast social experiment . 
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Whereas Kennedy, at least, started out with a dual program of reform and 
counter-insurgency, Johnson by the mid-sixties in both Vietnam and Guatemala 
concentrated solely on the latter, indeed on outright conventional war. Kennedy felt the 
U.S. should kill virulent communists, retain the ability to tear gas and club unruly 
leftists, yet also strive to prevent Third World peoples, like the Vietnamese and the 
Guatemalans, from becoming communists in the first place through social improvements 
and western style econom,ic prosperity. Saddled with the abject failure of the Kennedy 
Doctrine to achieve any substantial results in these areas, Johnson simply unleashed the 
vast killing machine of the modern American military to cut down all real and potential 
enemies in both nations.. Claymores, helicopter gunships, and airborne units, replaced 
Green Beret advisers and esoteric theories of the stages of economic growth . To 
paraphrase General Sheridan for the Johnson Administration, the only good Third 
World Communist was a dead Third World Communist. Yet in all fairness to Johnson, 
his policies were only the logical result of his predecessor's miscalculations and willful 
blindness to the realities of the Third World. 
The Kennedy and Johnson White Houses made some undeniable efforts to 
institute improvements and local development projects in Guatemala, but the bulk of 
their foreign policy emphasis always rested with the elites and the security forces. The 
United States never really trusted a democratically elected liberal politician -- be it 
Jacobo Arbenz in the 1950s or Mendez Montenegro in the 1960s to govern Guatemala. 
A 1962 State Department telegram entitled: "Guatemala: Guidelines for Policy and 
Operations" clearly stated the U.S. political objectives. 
1. The prevention of the ascension to power of Communists in Guatemala. 
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2. The continuance if possible within the :framework of objective no. 1 of a legally 
established constitutional government. 7 
By the very nature of its command structure and its intrinsic legitimization of 
violence , the military profession was not a good training ground for the techniques and 
processes of negotiation, consensus building and bargaining so necessary for effective 
democratic political leadership. Nonetheless obsessed with objective number one, the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations bet on an Army and not an Alliance for Progress 
in Guatemala. 
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